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Institutional anomie theory, developed by Messner and Rosenfeld (1994),
explains variations in crime rates across geographic areas and time as resulting
from the interrelationship between social institutions and culture. Their theory
predicts that when the institution of the economy dominates all other social

institutions, and when norms and values focus heavily on monetary success, crime
rates will be higher than when there is less dominance of the economy.

Institutional anomie theory has been tested using a number of different methods
and data from county-level to international-level aggregates. This study addresses
the research question of whether variations in crime victimization can be

explained across European nations using institutional anomie theory, and whether
relationships specified by the theory have changed across time as the European

Union has adopted neoliberal labor and welfare policies. The study uses
hierarchical generalized linear modeling to test for variations in crime

victimization across European countries at four points in time. Using survey data
from the European Social Survey, I develop measures of social institutions, and
macro-level measures of social institutions that provide a unique test of Messner
and Rosenfeld's theory.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

Messner and Rosenfeld developed institutional anomie theory based heavily on
Merton's anomie theory to explain cross-national differences in crime rates, particularly

the higher rates of crime in the United States compared with other advanced capitalist
nations, and changes within countries over time. In Messner and Rosenfeld's latest
edition of Crime and the American Dream (2007), homicide rates are compared across 45
advanced democratic nations. From 1996-2000, all but two of these nations had homicide

rates under 2.0 per 100,000, Finland (2.6) and the United States (5.9) were the only two
above that mark. As one can see, the U.S. rate was more than double that of Finland's

(2007:20-21). Messner and Rosenfeld theorize that higher homicide rates are the result of
a social structure that is more subservient to the institution of the economy, and cultural
values that heavily stress monetary success. About half of the research testing

institutional anomie theory has been done using cross-national data, while the other
portion has used only the United States or smaller aggregates from within the United
States as the unit of analysis. The most notable examples include Chamlin and Cochran's
(1995) test of institutional anomie theory across all 50 states within the United States, and
Messner and Rosenfeld's (1997b) test of their own theory in which they used
international data to test their hypothesis that homicide rates have a negative relationship
with the decommodification of labor within 45 nations. Both of these studies, along with

the vast majority other studies testing institutional anomie theory, provide at least partial
empirical support for the theory.

The main focus of the current study is to provide a more rigorous test of
institutional anomie theory, as well as to cover gaps in the literature. To test the theory, I
will use cross-national data to attempt to explain variations in homicide rates across
European nations at four points in time. My research question is: Do nations that have a

more dominant economy, as an institution, have higher rates of crime victimization?
Similar to all other tests of institutional anomie theory, this study uses measures of major

institutions as independent variables, while the dependent variable is crime victimization.
This study will use a quantitative approach to test institutional anomie.

The major departure from previous literature is the use of advanced multivariate
techniques in testing institutional anomie. Quantitative techniques such as ordinary least

square (OLS) regression have been used in previous studies such as in Chamlin and
Cochran (1995), Messner and Rosenfeld (1997b), and Maume and Lee (2003). OLS

regression provides a basic method to provide some support for cause and effect

relationships between variables, while being able to control for problems that might be
present in the data. However, more advanced techniques have been made available in the
past few years that allow researchers to better test for cause and effect relationships
between variables over time and at multiple levels of analysis. Batton and Jensen (2002)

and Freichs, Munch, and Monika (2008) provide the only studies that use an advanced
quantitative approach, time-series analysis. I make a contribution to the literature by
providing a study that uses multilevel modeling. This will be accomplished by testing for

changes in crime victimization at four different points in time. Overall, I expect to find
that the nations with a more dominant economy over other social institutions will have
higher crime victimization. This can be tested at different points in time across nations.

A second contribution is the use of survey data as a way to measure social

institutions. Only a few studies use survey data to test institutional anomie theory. In
addition to the survey data from European Social Survey (ESS), I also use macro-level
measures of social institutions that have been used in previous research in a second

model. More traditional ways of measuring institutions include percentages or activities

within particular institutions. An example of this would be by creating a measure of
decommodification to measure the relative strength of the economy over the polity.

The purpose of this study is to expand on the literature testing institutional anomie

theory. The next chapter provides a detailed explanation of the original theory stated by
Messner and Rosenfeld, as well as its evolution by Messner and Rosenfeld and other

authors who theoretically assessed institutional anomie. Chapter 3 gives a brief summary

and critique of all the studies that have been published on institutional anomie theory.

Chapter 4 details the methods andplan for the analysis. Chapter 5 covers the findings of
the models. Finally, Chapter 6 discusses implications of the study for institutional anomie
theory, limitations of the current study, and suggestions for future research.

CHAPTER II

THE DEVELOPMENT OF INSTITUIONAL ANOMIE THEORY

Merton's Anomie Theory

Messner and Rosenfeld's explanation of variations in crime rates across social

units has its roots in Robert Merton's work on anomie theory. Merton (1938) suggested
that the cultural structure and the social structure are interrelated with one another and

help create conditions that lead to higher crime rates. The emphasis on material success
in the United States is due to cultural values that stress monetary success. At the same
time

.. .the pressure of prestige-bearing success tends to eliminate the effective social
constraint over means employed to this end. 'The-end-justifies-the-means'
doctrine becomes a guiding tenet for action when the cultural structure unduly
exalts the end and the social organization unduly limits possible recourse to
approved means (Merton 1938:681).
High crime rates are due to the erosion of adherence to institutionalized norms for

achieving monetary success. This is referred to as a strain toward anomie and use of

innovative practices. Even with high levels of social inequality, every member of society

is expected to reach the same goals. People unable to reach these culturally-defined goals,
even with access to legitimate means, nonetheless will still feel the pressure to achieve
these goals, and will sometimes turn to illegitimate means to accomplish these goals, a
process Merton refers to as innovation.

Merton (1957) expanded on and critiqued his own theory throughout his career.

The main addition to his original 1938 work is the concept of the American Dream and
how it is perceived in terms of monetary success. Merton also adds that equivalent

legitimate means must exist for all to reach cultural goals. If these goals are not
attainable, then crime will increase.

Thus, according to Merton, all in U.S. society are socialized to the same cultural
goals of material success. The cultural structure places too much emphasis on these goals

while deemphasizing the importance of following normative means (e.g., educational

attainment and hard work) for achieving these culturally prescribed goals, while the
social structure blocks access to the legitimate means for achieving success for those at
the bottom of the socioeconomic hierarchy. The result is both higher crime rates in the
United States than in other nations that have more of a cultural balance between goals

and means for achieving them coupled with a more open opportunity structure of access
to legitimate means for success, and changes in crime rates within the United States over
time. Messner and Rosenfeld build on these ideas in developing their institutional
anomie theory.

Messner and Rosenfeld's Institutional Anomie Theory

Two criminologists who followed up and expanded on Merton's work on anomie
theory are Steven F. Messner and Richard Rosenfeld. However, Messner and Rosenfeld
(2007) conclude that

The anomie perspective as developed by Merton and his followers does
not... provide a fully comprehensive sociological explanation of crime in
America. The most conspicuous limitation of Merton's analysis is that it
focuses exclusively on one aspect of social structure: inequality in access
to the legitimate means for success. As a consequence, it does not explain
how specific features of the broader institutional structure of society,
beyond the stratification system, interrelate to produce the anomie
pressures that are responsible for crime (14).

The last sentence in this passage from Crime and the American Dream (2007) is the key
extension of Merton's work added in Messner and Rosenfeld's institutional anomie

theory. Messner and Rosenfeld believe that one must examine the institutional makeup of
society and how these institutions interact with one another, particularly noting if other
major institutions such as the polity, family, and education share a balance of power with
the economy, or if they instead are subordinated to it. Messner and Rosenfeld agree with
Merton that the concept of the American Dream is something unique to the United States
and does not exist in other nations.

As noted earlier, the American Dream represents "a commitment to the goal of
material success, to be pursued by everyone in society, under conditions of open,
individual competition" (Messner and Rosenfeld 2007:68). However, the playing field is
not equal. Messner and Rosenfeld see the American Dream as representing four cultural
values—achievement, individualism, universalism, and the fetishism of money.

Achievement simply refers to a person achieving a goal they set for themselves.
Individualism is something that is revered in the United States, as much of the framework
of the United States is based on individual rights and autonomy. This is also tied into
achievement as people are supposed to achieve the goals they set on their own. This
makes every citizen competitive and impedes an individual's pursuit of the American

Dream, and these aspects of culture together can create a strain toward anomie.
Universalism relates to societal goals being largely determined by American culture.
Whether or not an individual achieves these goals, mostly monetary goals, dictates how
likely they are to be perceived as a success or failure. One can see how this last statement
alone could create a strain toward anomie in a social environment. The final cultural

value that is probably the most unique in the United States is the fetishism of money. The
fetishism of money occurs when money takes on a life of its own. Besides what can be

purchased with money, the possession of it takes on value of its own, and possession of
money alone becomes a symbol of success. Because of this, money is the ultimate
symbol of success in the United States. The more money an individual has or appears to
have, the more successful they are perceived to be. This can become problematic in the

United States as there is no upper limit, one can never have enough money. This can

cause norms to lose their power in preventing use of criminal means in accumulating
more money. All of these four cultural features combined help make up the American
Dream. Culture must be looked at in its relationship with, and impact on and from social

structure for one to truly grasp high crime rates in the United States and significantly
lower ones elsewhere (Messner and Rosenfeld 2007:68-70).

Societies are composed of and held together by social institutions. These social

institutions develop slowly over time and with their stability help establish norms, values,
roles, and beliefs in a given society. Messner and Rosenfeld (2007) discuss three
important functions that social institutions perform-'adaptation to the environment,
mobilize and deploy resources for the achievement of collective goals, and socialize
members to accept the society's fundamental normative patterns" (72). For a given

society to function, institutions must be coordinated together in an efficient manner with
one institution playing one role, while another institution plays another. Messner and
Rosenfeld focus on four of the largest and most easily identifiable social institutions,
namely, education, polity, family, and the economy.
Messner and Rosenfeld describe how conflict can arise when institutions become

subservient to others. In the United States, the economy has become by far the most
dominant institution, as every other major institution serves the interests of the economy.
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The economy involves the production and distribution of necessary goods and services.
Messner and Rosenfeld explain why an institutional imbalance has occurred, noting that

it results because of the inflated importance placed on monetary success goals and
acceptance of criminal innovation in meeting these goals.
Three unique interrelated characteristics have caused the economy in the United
States to be dominant over all other social institutions—reduced power of noneconomic

institutional functions and roles, subservience to economic necessities by other
noneconomic institutions, and diffusion of economic norms into other noneconomic

institutions realms. An example of the devaluation of noneconomic institutional functions

and roles is the role education plays in our society. Education is primarily used as a
means to obtain monetary rewards through a job. Education loses its value if it does not

provide a means to a monetary reward. As a result, people in the United States use
education less and less as a means to better themselves through acquiring knowledge.
An example of accommodation that noneconomic institutions make to meet the

needs of economic necessity is the lack of consideration given to parents after giving
birth. The United States does not require paid leave for new parents and only when
companies have 50 or more employees are they required by law to provide unpaid

parental leave. Compare this with most other industrialized nations, which provide
generous paid parental leave. With this type of policy in the United States, family roles
are subordinated to the economic roles of parents, as is not the case with most similar
industrialized nations.

An example of penetration of economic norms into other institutions can be seen

in the polity, as politics focus heavily on reducing costs whenever possible. Politicians

often act like business leaders addressing their board of directors, in that they strive to

create the most positive climate for profitability as possible. Typically because of this,
social welfare programs are not well funded or, if they are, they are imbued with a

negative stigma, such as being viewed as a burden for those who work hard (Messner and

Rosenfeld 2007:76). The United States in general does not provide a social safety net to

vulnerable members of society that equals the one provided by most other industrialized
nations.

It is both the cultural and social structures that are interrelated and work together,

and as a result, create the environment for particular forms of social behavior. In Messner

and Rosenfeld's case, the relationship betweenthe cultural and social structures in the
United States explains high crime rates, particularly homicide rates.
At the cultural level, the dominant ethos of the American Dream
stimulates criminal motivations and at the same time promotes a weak

normative environment (anomie). At the institutional level, the dominance
of the economy in the institutional balance of power undermines the
vitality of non-economic institutions, reducing their capacity to control
disapproved behavior and support approved behavior (2007:84).

Messner and Rosenfeld (2007) argue that these macrosocial institutions working together
in favor of the economy have created higher levels of crime in the United States than in

other comparable advanced industrialized nations. Through social safety nets such as
social programs for the vulnerable classes, as well as less cultural emphasis on monetary
rewards, other nations have been betterprepared to stop economic forces from weakening
their normative environment and prevent the economy from creating an institutional
imbalance in society.

Throughout all four editions of Crime and The American Dream (1994, 1997a,

2001, 2007), Messner and Rosenfeld maintain the same thesis that variations in crime
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across geographic areas can be explained through structural and cultural orientations that
over emphasize monetary success. However, Messner and Rosenfeld expanded on their

key concepts as well as provided more detail through use of additional examples. In the
2nd edition they expand on the original thesis by providing statistics for cross-national
differences in homicide rates and robbery rates for 16 post-industrial capitalist nations.

These figures provide supportthat the United States, which is Messnerand Rosenfeld's
case exemplarfor institutional anomie, has much higher homicide rates and robbery rates
than other nations (1997:20-21).

Also in the 2nd edition, race and gender are considered as important factors that
must be taken into consideration when discussing high crime rates in the United States.
Messner and Rosenfeld discuss how women are insulated from some of the anomie

pressures of the economy within the United States due to the large role they play within
the family. This insulation is used to explain why women are much less likely to commit
instrumental crimes than men. African Americans, especially males, have little insulation

from noneconomic institutions, particularly the family. They are exposed to the full
effects of the American Dream, as they are expected to achieve success in the economy,
while social controls are weak due to little involvement in family and education

institutions (1997:80-81). This partof the theory is later expanded to include juveniles,
drugs, and guns as important correlates to take into consideration within the United
States.

Finally, throughout the evolution of Crime and the American Dream, more

attention is paid to the social response to crime and howthis has affected crime itself.
Messner and Rosenfeld explain that through mass incarceration, crime has continued to
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stay at much higher levels than other nations, despite locking up offenders at higher rates
than other nations. Messner and Rosenfeld also discuss how street offenders are punished
much harshly than white-collar offenders. They explain that these levels of punishment
reflect stratification in our society, as white-collar criminals are usually not punished to
the same extent as street offenders, due the economic roles white-collar criminals play in
our society and the resources they possess (2007:94).

The scope of institutional anomie theory is, for the most part, limited to

democratic capitalist nations that are advanced enough to provide some form of social
welfare to their citizens. Literature on the topic has shown that many different forms of

crime and deviance are applicable as dependent variables. Studies have shown that rates
of homicide, robbery, white collar crime, and also other forms of deviance such as
cheating, can be explained by institutional anomie theory. As far as independent variables

go, all the literature to this point has focused on measures of the major institutions, with
measures of the economy always being included as they are necessary in any test of
institutional anomie theory. Support has also been provided for institutional anomie in
both qualitative and quantitative research.

One of the major criticisms of institutional anomie theory when it was originally
developed was the lack of clarity of key concepts. Since then the theory has been better
developed throughout the four editions of Crime and theAmerican Dream. Some of
ambiguities in the key concepts have been clarified by Messner and Rosenfeld (1997b,
2006, 2008) in journal articles. Several other authors have attempted to critique and
clarify and develop some of the unaddressed issues in institutional anomie theory. I
discuss these more recent contributions to institutional anomie theory next.
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Recent Contributions to Institutional Anomie Theory
Bernburg (2002) examines institutional anomie theory by comparing the theory
with other classic anomie theories. The author examines Durkheim, Merton, and

Polanyi's works along with that of Messner and Rosenfeld. By examining these previous
theorists' work, Bernburg attempts to fill in some of the gaps that are present in

institutional anomie theory. Many of the gaps that are present are filled in by comparing
Merton's theory of anomie with Messner and Rosenfeld's institutional version of the
theory. Bernburg does not see institutional anomie theory as just complementary to

anomie theory, but rather he argues that the theories could be integrated with each other
to create a more complete theory.

Bernburg explains how institutional anomie theory stays faithful to Merton's
theory of anomie by focusing on any means necessary to achieve goals. Like Merton,
institutional anomie does not see crime as resulting from deregulated ends, but rather

from deregulated means of social-action. Messner and Rosenfeld (1994) go beyond
Merton in that they note that deregulated means of social action result from an
unbalanced institutional structure. This unbalanced institutional structure, with a focus on

a dominant economy, creates the anomie cultural ethos present in capitalist market

societies (2002:732). Messner and Rosenfeld also believe that the anomie cultural ethos
can be present in all capitalist market societies without strong social safety nets, not just
the United States.

The notion of a dominant economy, unchecked by other major institutions, is
what Polanyi refers to as a disembedded economy. However, Polanyi does not focus on
how disembedded the economy is. Durkheim also recognizes a disembedded economy as
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a major source of deregulation. Durkheim also acknowledges that a capitalist market
economy's anomie ethos is limitless and is universal to all members of society. Bernburg
(2002:736) notes that "institutional anomie theory makes use of Merton's elaboration of

anomie, but brings us back to the type of social criticism that Durkheim and Polanyi
emphasize."

Bernburg further argues that combining macro-level aspects of Messner and
Rosenfeld's theory with individual-level aspects of Merton's theory can create a much

stronger theory. For example, Merton does not discuss the structures that cultural anomie
result from, while Messner and Rosenfeld fail to discuss the unequal distribution of

conditions that people face when they react to the anomie environment by committing

crimes. Thus, one improvement Bernburg suggests for Messner and Rosenfeld's theory is
acknowledging the interrelation between the conditions that create specific goals and
normsthat are in play that can create potential criminogenic activity (2002:739).
Messner and Rosenfeld (2006) discuss the basic tenets of institutional anomie

theory, as well as previous research on the topic, and note several insights and

implications from recent research. Messner and Rosenfeld address Bernberg's (2002)

critique that states thatthe theory of institutional anomie has abandoned the Mertonian
idea of motivations and opportunities that are conditioned through social stratification.

Messner and Rosenfeld agree that motivations and opportunities are important factors in
determining whether an individual decides to engage in criminal activities. However,

they argue that traditional anomie fails to take into consideration the importance of social
institutions and the effects they have on crime (Messner and Rosenfeld 2006:139).
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Messner and Rosenfeld also address American cultural exceptionalism, which has

received very little attention in research on institutional anomie theory. Cao (2004) and
Jensen (2002) found that Americans do not actually differ from other nations in values,

goals, and beliefs based on World Values Survey data. However, Messner and Rosenfeld
state that some of the questions used from the survey lack validity as they do not capture

the meaning of key concepts. For instance, Jensen (2002) used a question that asked

respondents if "less emphasis on money and material possessions is a good thing?"
Jensen concluded that the United States actually views money and material possessions

as less important than othercountries based on the United States ranking nearthe top on

this question. However, individuals from nations with little emphasis on materialism

would be less likely to say even less emphasis needs to be given to materialism. Nations
such as the United States, with a strong emphasis on materialism, would be more likely to

have individuals from the country say less emphasis is a goodthing (Messner and
Rosenfeld 2006:141).

Messner and Rosenfeld also discuss Cao's (2004) conclusions that the United
States is no less anomie that most other nations. However, Messner and Rosenfeld see a

validity problem once again in how the questions are asked and what they actually
measure. Forexample, Cao uses responses from questions about justifications thatwere

developed by respondents for certain crimes. Cao uses this as a measure of anomie and
claims this is evidence that the United States is not an exceptional case in its level of

anomie. However, Messner and Rosenfeld note that in a truly anomie society, moral

considerations forjustifying a crime for obtaining culturally prescribed goals is not

necessary. Using the same dataset, Messner and Rosenfeld use the questions on private
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ownership and competition as a good thing to demonstrate that the United States does
have a greater cultural emphasis on materialism. They agree with Cao that the
measurement of anomie can only be narrowly defined (Messner and Rosenfeld
2006:142).

Messner and Rosenfeld conclude that when using survey data, the context of the

question is the most important aspectwhen research is tryingto use it as a measure of a
theoretical construct. They note that future researchneeds to be done on the cultural

dynamics that underlie institutional anomie theory and that these dynamics can be usedto
explain cross-national variations in crime. In addition, future research needs to address
the connection between institutional anomie theory, criminal motivations, and
opportunities (2006:144).

Chamlin and Cochran's (2007) theoretical critique of institutional anomie theory

takes into consideration several assumptions that need to be addressed in future research.

The authors of thispiece argue thatcertain parts of the theory need to be revised in future

work by Messner and Rosenfeld (2007:57) First, Chamlin and Cochran examine the
variables used in testing institutional anomie theory in pastresearch. In all editions of
Crime and the American Dream, Messner and Rosenfeld do not clearly state how

theoretical constructs within institutional anomie theory are to be operationalized. Due to

this ambiguity, falsifying this theory becomes difficult or impossible (2007:41-42).
A second critique of institutional anomie theory is that the nations that are
included in most of the studies, including in Crime and theAmerican Dream, are not

justified. In Crime and the American Dream (1997, 2001, 2007), 16 advanced capitalist
nations are used in the sample to examine variations in robbery and homicide rates with
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American exceptionalism as the main focus. Chamlin and Cochran (2007) do not see why

less advanced capitalist nations cannot be included, as no theoretical justification is given
in any of Messner and Rosenfeld's work as to what countries can and cannot be included.
Chamlin and Cochran compared the United States with a much larger sample of nations

that included many less advanced capitalist countries. The United States ranked 45 out

of 70 nations in their examination of homicide rates and 63rd out of 73 nations in their

examination of robbery rates (2007:49) This shows that the U.S. crime problem is
nowhere near the worst across the globe.

The idea that the United States has a disproportionate emphasis on monetary

success is also challenged by these authors. Similar to Jensen (2002), Chamlin and
Cochran use the third-wave of the World Values Survey to determine if American

respondents value incomeas the most important feature of work. The United States

ranked 19th out of 45 nations with regards to this question, showing thatU.S. citizens do
not value income more than citizens in some other nations. They also assess whether U.S.

citizens have a lower rank with regard to viewing less emphasis on money and material

possessions as a good thing. The United States ranked 44th out of47 in regards to the this
question, showing that only three nations ranked higheron this question (2002:53-55)

Although this does not by any means completely capture economic dominance within
cultural attitudes, it does point to the possibility that U.S. citizens are not as driven by
monetary success as Messner and Rosenfeld make it seem.

Baumer (2007) states that Merton's macrolevel explanation of variations in crime
and his microlevel strain theory are not two distinct theories, but rather one multilevel
theory.
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Merton suggested that the cultural prescriptions and proscriptions of a
society are transmitted to individuals through a process of socialization,
and individuals who have assimilated those cultural values act in ways that
might be expected on the basis of the values to which they have
committed, their economic position in the social structure and their risk
assessment of various courses of action (2007:66).

Baumer suggests that by using a multilevel theory, one could create a two-level model
with the individual level being at the first level and the institutional level being at the

second level. Thus, explanations for the variations within a given group can be explained,
as well as across macrosocial units.

Messner and Rosenfeld (2008) elaborate on the cultural component institutional

anomie theory drawing on the work of two classicaltheorists, Parsons and Durkheim.

They elaborate the core cultural principles of institutional anomie theory by adopting a

Parsonian perspective, particularly how Parsons conceptualizes institutions. Messner and
Rosenfeld also incorporate the Durkheimian idea of a society's evolutionfrom

mechanical to organic solidarity. In a Durkheimian sense, a society that has gone from a
collective, mechanical society to an organic society is more likely to experience the break
down in norms and cultural values in favor of individualism. This will result in higher

rates of deviance and crime. This rise in individualism may have led to a weakening of
the nation-state, where nation-states now conform to the notion of individual success.

This is particularly evidenced by more socioeconomic inequality and the lowering of
taxes.

Testing institutional anomie theory is not well defined in any of the versions of
Crime and theAmerican Dream (1994, 1997a, 2001, 2007). Messner and Rosenfeld

(2008:169) conclude in this piece that patterns of crime and deviant activity besides
robbery and homicide can be explained by institutional anomie theory, as a weakening of
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norms and controls should have the same effect on all types of deviant and criminal
activity.

Vagueness in the units of analysis covered by institutional anomietheory is also
considered by Messner and Rosenfeld (2008). They argue that the theory is applicable at

many levels, including at the individual level. At the individual level,

[w]ith respect to the relative valuation of institutional roles, the prediction from
IAT is that actors who perceive economic roles to be more attractive and more
highly valued thannon-economic roles are expected to be at comparatively high
risk of criminal behavior, including violent crime (2008:173).

Using individual-level data also allows researchers to adequately create a multilevel
model by having individual-level dataat the first level and macrolevel data at the second
level. However, when using survey data, measures should include the amount or total
involvement within a particular institution. Messner and Rosenfeld leave the dooropen
for future modifications to the theory that may strengthen its explanatory power.

The theory itselfhas mostly changed with regards to howit canbe properly
tested. Messner and Rosenfeld (2008) statethat the theory does not have to be tested
across nations. Tests of institutional anomie theory can include forms of deviance that are

not necessarily illegal. The current study tests institutional anomie taking into account the
theoretical considerations purposed in the aforementioned studies; for instance, using
both individual and macro-level data. Thus, institutional anomie theory is tested using

multilevel modeling. The next chapter addresses the quantitative research thathasbeen
done on the theory. This research helps guide the current study on how to measure

variables, as well as modeling techniques that should be given more consideration.
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CHAPTER III

REVIEW OF EMPIRICAL LITERATURE

Chamlin and Cochran (1995) conducted the first empirical assessment of

institutional anomie theory by testing the hypothesis that "an improvement in economic
conditions [should] result in a reduction of instrumental crime only when there is a

simultaneous strengthening of noneconomic institutions" (414). In their study, Chamlin
and Cochran defined improvement in economic conditions as having fewer families in

poverty as a result of stronger social safety nets provided through more social welfare

programs and stronger noneconomic institutions that help insulate individuals from
anomie pressures. Chamlin and Cochran tested their hypothesis by including measures of
three major noneconomic institutions—family, polity, and religion. They also used
absolute economic deprivation as a measure for economic dominance within the
institutional balance of power

All 50 U.S. states were used as the sample for this test of institutional anomie

theory. All measures came from 1980, or the closest year with data available. The
percentage of families below the poverty level was used to measure economic
dominance. Property crime rates per 1,000 for the year 1980 were used as the dependent
variable. Family was measured by a ratio of yearly divorces to yearly marriages per 1,000
in 1980. Religion was measured using Stark's (1997) data for adjusted rate of church

membership per 1,000 in1980. Polity was measured by the percentage of voting age
individuals who voted in 1980 congressional contests. Racial heterogeneity was

measured as the percentage of the state's population that was black in 1980, and the age
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structure was operationalized as the percentage of the population aged 18 to 24 in 1980.
These latter two variables were included as control variables to account for differences in
the age and race composition across states.

Weighted least squares regression was used due to the problem of

heteroskedasticity, with each case being weighted by the square root ofthe 1980

population size ofthe state. Product terms were created for the respective measures ofthe
family, polity, and religion with the economy. Product terms are brought into the model

separately, as bringing all ofthem in at once caused multicollinearity. Results show that
(1995:9) "[hjigher levels ofchurch membership, lower levels ofthe divorce-marriage
ratio, and higher levels ofvoting participation reduce the criminogenic effects ofpoverty
on economic crime." Separate alternative models were estimated using the Gini index

and the unemployment rate as measures ofeconomic dominance. Adifferent measure of
the polity, percentage voting in the presidential election in 1980 also was used. Other
than with family disruption, all ofthe results in these alternative models were similar to
the first model, leading the authors to conclude that their study provides overall support
for institutional anomie theory.

One major limitation in Chamlin and Cochran's study is that itis cross-sectional
rather than longitudinal. Research can best test institutional anomie theory over time

within an aggregate unit ofanalysis rather than at a single point in time. To conduct this
type oftest, multilevel regression analysis should be used in place ofOLS regression.
Also, institutional anomie theory was originally formulated to betested onlarger

aggregates such as nations where there are greater social structural and cultural
differences. A third limitation is the exclusionof the noneconomic institution of
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education in the model, thus the research underrepresents the institutional balance of

power. Fourth, the measure of economic dominance does not capture the strength of the
economy in relation to other noneconomic institutions, but rather just economic

conditions within states. Finally, many of the analytical procedures were missing in this

study or not reported. Tests for normality are not discussed anywhere and results of the
follow up models with different measures are not directly available.
In the first cross-national assessment of institutional anomie theory, the

originators of institutional anomie theory, Messner and Rosenfeld (1997b), testedthe

hypothesis thatdecommodification would vary inversely with homicide rates, with higher
decommodification producing lower homicide rates. Following Esping-Andersen (1990),

Messner and Rosenfeld (1997:1394) saw decommodification as "the empowerment of the

citizenry against the forces of the market... [It] frees people from the market" through

provision of goods, services, and income bythe state. Moreover, "...decommodification
signals thatthe balance of institutional power in market society has shifted from the
economy toward the polity..." (Messner and Rosenfeld 1997:1397). When
decommodification is low, the economy dominates the polity; a condition that
institutional anomie theory suggests will increase serious crime rates.

Messner and Rosenfeld (1997) collected data for 45 countries at varying levels of

capitalist development. They used the natural log of World Health Organization
homicide rates per 100,000 people averaged over available years 1980-1990 as the
dependent variable in their study. To test their hypothesis, they developed a
decommodification index that was the sum of the z-scores of welfare expenditures as a

percentage of gross domestic product (GDP), the percentage of welfare spending for
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employment injuries, and welfare expenditures per capita. To control for other factors

that may explain cross-national differences in homicide rates they included three control
variables—the natural log of the sex ratio, an ordinal economic discrimination index

developed by Gurrand Scarritt (1989), and a development index that included the natural

log of the gross national product (GNP) per capita, the infant mortality rate, the
percentage of the population over64, the percentage of the population living in urban
areas, andthe life expectancy at birth. To handle missing data, Messner and Rosenfeld
used mean substitution, but they also estimated models using listwise deletion of missing
data to test the sensitivity of their findings.

In support of institutional anomie theory, Messner and Rosenfeld (1997) found a
statistically significant, moderate, negative zero-order correlation between the
decommodification index and homicide rates for their sample of 45 nations (r = -.48).

Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression models including all control variables using all
45 nations and mean substitution of missing data, deleting a possible outlier(Syria) and

mean substitution of missing data, and listwise deletion of missing data(N=39) showed a

significant, weak, negative relationship between decommodification and homicide rates
(P=-.209, p= -.161, and p=-.161, respectively). A series of four additional models
eliminating one control variable per model yielded standardized regression coefficients
for the effect of decommodification on homicide rates in the same direction and of

similar magnitude.

The use of a cross-national sample is the most effective way to capture variations
in crime and deviance across nations. The measures do adequately capture the

institutional relationship betweenpolitical and economic institutions. Nonetheless,
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Messner and Rosenfeld's research suffers from several limitations. First, as Messner and

Rosenfeld (1997:1408) acknowledge, their study is limited to the restraint the political
institution exerts on the economy. Thus, it fails to assess the full "balance of power" (p.

1396) among the social institutions that institutional anomie theory purports to affect
cross-national differences in crime as well as changes in crime rates over time within
nations. A more complete test of institutional anomie theory needs to include measures
of the relative dominance of the economy vis-a-vis other social institutions such as the

family, religion, and education that all play a role in socialization and informal social
control of crime. Second, Messner and Rosenfeld's study is cross-sectional rather than

longitudinal. A more complete test of institutional anomie theory not only should
examine differences in crime rates across countries, but it should also examine changes
over time in crime rates within nations. Such a test would necessitate multilevel

regression analysis rather than OLS regression. Finally, Messner and Rosenfeld logged
the average homicide rate in order to reduce the considerable positive skewness they
found in the distribution of the variable. They reported that this "reduced" the skewness,

but did not report whether the residuals of their models were normally distributed and
homoskedastic, two necessary assumptions for OLS regression to yield consistent,
efficient estimates of standard errors, and thus accurate hypothesis tests. A better

approach would be to use poisson or negative binomial regression analyses that are

appropriate techniques when the dependent variable is a count of rare events, as it is with
the homicide rate.

Savolainen (2000) also tested institutional anomie theory using cross-sectional,
cross-national data. Savolainen (2000:1021) hypothesized that "the positive effect of
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economic inequality on level of lethal violence is limited to nations characterized by

relatively weak collective institutions of social protection." This study builds on previous
tests of institutional anomie by Messner and Rosenfeld (1997b). Savolainen used a

dataset directly from Messner and Rosenfeld's (1997b) study to try to provide further

support for institutional anomie theory. Savolainen also drew from Chamlin and
Cochran's (1995) study by including measures that show how strong noneconomic
institutions can insulate citizens from the criminogenic effects of a strong economy. This

study also sought to clear up the ambiguity ofMessner and Rosenfelds's (1997a)

analytical model by specifying in more detail the relationships between key theoretical
variables that would create a more definitive theory (2000:1025-1026).

The first sample (N= 45) came from Messner and Rosenfeld's (1997b) study on
cross-national homicide rate variation. World HealthOrganization data on homicide

deaths averaged from 1980-1990 were used to calculate homicide rates. These rates were

logged to reduce skewness from outlier nations. Messner and Rosenfeld's (1997b)
measure of decommodification collected from the International Labor Organization was

used to measure economic dominance. The other independent variables in this study

included a measure of income inequality (based on Gini coefficients from circa 1969),
economic discrimination, development index, and sex ratio. A single index of

socioeconomic development, a control variable from Messner and Rosenfeld's (1997b)

study, was used to reduce problems ofmulticollinearity. The single index is made up of
the items GNP per capita, infant mortality, size ofthe elderly population, population

growth, and levels ofurban development. The logged sex ratio was included as a separate
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control variable. All variables were computed using multiyear averages for the
yearsl980-1990 (Savolainen 2000:1028).

The second set of data differed slightly from Messner and Rosenfeld's first
dataset. First, a different sample (N=32) of nations was used. The second supplementary

sample included seven developing market economies from Europe. Due to the limited
amount of data available for this area of the world, single year statistics were used for all

of the variables, as opposed to the multiyear averages used with the first sample. National
homicide rates disaggregated by sex provided two dependent variables for this study, i.e.,
male and female victimization rates. Disaggregated victimization rates were used to

separate the difference in situations under which each sex is likely to be victimized.
Research shows that females are more likely to be the victim of a homicide in domestic

disputes, while males are more likely to be the victim in crimes related to instrumental

gain. A third difference was that the supplementary dataset used the Gini index as the
measure for economic inequality, as it was seen by the authors as a better single measure

of such inequality. The fourth difference was "the institutional balance of power is
measured by the amount of government spending on social security and other welfare

programs as a percentage of total public expenditures" (Savolainen 2000:1029). In the
supplementary sample, GDP per capita and population age structure (those aged15 to 24
as percentage of the total population) were used as control variables. Sex ratio was also
used, but not logged in this model.

Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression was used in this test of institutional
anomie theory. Savolaninen also used a p-value of .10 to determine statistical

significance due to the small sample size. Interaction terms were created between each of
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the noneconomic institutions and the measure of the economy. All interaction terms were

centered to reduce potential multicollinearity. The variables that were centered in the first
dataset were income inequality, economic discrimination, and decommodification, while
in the second set they included income inequality and social security spending
(2000:1031).

Along with the follow up to the first dataset, a second sample of nations was used
that employed different measures including disaggregated homicide rates by sex and the
Gini index as a measure of economic inequality. Only the development index in the first

dataset was reported as having serious problems of multicollinearity. The second set had
minimal multicollinearity, with no variance inflations factors above 4.0. Mean

substitution was used for missing cases for the variables income inequality and economic
discrimination.

With the first dataset, Model 1 had all of the explanatory and control variables in

the regression. Models 2-3 introduced separate interaction terms into the regression.
Models 4-6 were identical to 1-3, except the outlier case (Syria) was removed. Overall, in

the first set of models, logged sex ratio was significant in models 1-3 at the .10 level. The
decommodification index was significant in models 1, 2, 4, and 5 at the .10 level. The
interaction terms for economic discrimination and decommodification were significant at

the .10 level in models 3 and 5. The explained variance in these models ranged from .319
in Model 2 to .509 in Model 6 (2000:1032).

The second set of models used the second dataset that was disaggregated by sex.

Homicide rates were still used as the dependent variable. Model 1 included all variables
and controls, while Model 2 included the interaction terms for a regression done only on
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male homicide rates. Models 3 and 4 are the same as 1 and 2, except the regressions were

run on female homicide rates. GNP per capita was significant at the .10 level in Model 2.
The logged sex ratio was a significant predicator of homicide rates at the .10 level in all

four models. Income inequality was significant at the .10 level in models 1, 2, and 4.
Welfare spending was a significant predictor of homicide rates in Models 2 and 4.
Interactions terms for income inequality and welfare spending were significant in both

Models 2 and 4. The explained variance ranged from .379 in Model 1 to .756 in Model 4
(2000:1030-1033).

Overall, Savolainen (2000) found support for institutional anomie theory using
both datasets. The interaction terms for economic discrimination and decommodification

in the first model set, and the interaction terms for income inequality and welfare
spending were both statistically significant predictors of homicide. The use of two cross-

national samples is a major strength in this study. The strength of the economy was also
measured appropriately using a decommodification index. However, this study is only a
partial test of institutional anomie theory due to a lack of measures for the noneconomic

institutions. Finally, all of the assumptions were met with regard to OLS regression.
Batton and Jensen (2002) examined the impact of decommodification on

homicide rates using time-series analysis within the United States. They hypothesized

that decommodification should result in a dampening effect on violent crimes through
social welfare programs and policies that will insulate citizens from the pitiless effects of
a free-market economy (2002:13). Jensen and Batton looked at several points in time
from 1900 to 1997. Studying the period before the beginning of the New Deal should be
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able to determine whether homicide rates are historically constant or vary over time.

Batton and Jensen (2002:20) hypothesized that under institutional anomie theory
decommodification should result in lower homicide rates because it (a)

buffers the impact of market events and fluctuations and (b) shifts the
institutional balance of power, which diminishes anomie pressures and
strengthens social control mechanisms.
As noted earlier, Batton and Jensen (2002) used time-series from 1900 to 1997 to

study homicide trends within the United States. The dependent variable is measured by
NCHS annual homicide mortality rates from 1933 to 1997. Homicide rates within the
United States were not reported until 1933 by the NCHS, therefore Batton and Jenson

(2002) used econometric-forecasting techniques developed by Eckberg (1995) to estimate
the homicide rates within the United States from 1900 to 1932.

In calculating estimates, Eckberg accounted for the composition of the early death
registration area, which largely excluded southern and western states where
homicide rates were highest. He also adjusted for differences in the proportions of
urban and rural areas in the registration area and nonregistration area states
(2002:15).

The independent variable used in this study was a time-series replication of Messner and
Rosenfeld's (1997a) decommodificaiton index basedon summed z-scores. Batton and
Jensen's decommodification index spans the years 1929to 1995. Inflation was controlled

by dividing per capitaexpenditures by the 1982 to 1984 Consumer Price Index and
converting to constant 1982 to 1984 dollars by multiplying by 100.
Several control variables were used for different time periods for explaining other

factors that may have caused variations in homicide rates. Cirrhosis deaths per 100,000
were used as a measure of alcohol consumption. For the years 1900 to 1970, data were

obtained from Historical Statistics ofthe United States (HSUS), 1971 to 1994 data came
from Vital Statistics and issues of the Statistical Abstractofthe UnitedStates (SAUS),
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and 1995 to 1997 data comes from NCHS web site tables (2002:16). The control variable

prohibition legislation was measured with a count variable developed by Cashman in
1981 that reflects states with legislation that enacted prohibition for any given year. A

dummy variable for mob-related murders was used for years that murders may have been
related to the popular illegal trade of liquor. The control variable immigration was

measured as the percentage of the U.S. resident population made up of newly admitted
immigrants. Data for this variable came from HSUS (1900-1970) and SAUS (1971-

present). HSUS, SAUS, and the Bureau of Labor Statistics web site provided the data for
the control variable unemployment rates, which shows the conditions and fluctuations in

the market that citizens experienced (2002:17). Divorce rates per 1,000 were used as a
control for social integration. The U.S. Bureau of the Census (1931) provided data for
1900 to 1929, while Vital Statistics provided data for the years 1930 to 1982, and SAUS

provided the data for 1983 to 1997. Data from HSUS for the years of 1900-1970 and
SAUS for the years of 1971-1997 were used to measure the percentage of people in the
armed forces. Homicide rates tended to be lower in periods with a high percentage in the

armed forces, as military positions are usually filled by those most likely to commit
violent crimes, young males. A dummy-coded control variable was used for times that

immediately followed wars, which tended to have higher homicide rates. Data were taken
from HSUS for the years 1900-1959 and the Centers for Disease Control for 1960-1997.

The percentage of the population aged 15 to 24 and 65 and older was used to control for
age structure (2002:18).

Ordinary least squares time-series regression was conducted using 2001 EViews
software. The assumption of stationarity was tested using Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests.
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The results indicate several of the series contain unit roots in levels and are

difference stationary processes. In consideration of problems posed by
nonstationarity, we difference our data. However, we also attempt to model the
effects of trends and eliminate autocorrelated error terms through the inclusion of
theoretically and historically relevant variables (2002:19).
Durbin-Watson statistics for basic-models, Durbin's h for higher ordered processes,

Breusch-Godfrey LM test, and Box-Ljung Q test were used to test for autocorrelation and
partial auto-correlation. A lagged endogenous term was added to deal with
autocorrelation. After testing different break points in time and running recursive models,
the model differentiates between two time periods 1900 to 1945 and 1946 to 1997.

Controls for prohibition and mob violence were used only for the time periods from 1900
to 1945, while divorce rates were used from 1946 to 1997.

The results of the model showed no significant autocorrelation using the

autocorrelation tests. Consistent with the research hypothesis, results revealed that

unemployment had a positive effect on homicide in the early period for the level model
(b= .117, a= .001) and differenced model (b= .075, a = .01) and good model fit with

respective adjusted R2's of .896 and .337. In the period from 1946 to 1997 unemployment
rates had an unexpected negative effect on homicide rates for the level model (b = -.091,
a = .05) and the effect became nonsignificant for the differences model (b = .009, a
=.86). Rising levels ofjuvenile violence and more males dropping out of the workforce

completely started in the 1980s and gender composition may be responsible for the
unexpected negative relationship between unemployment and homicide rates (2002:26).
Carlson and Michalowski (1997) proposed using four different contextual periods
from 1933 to 1997. Batton and Jensen (2002:22) follow up on this by replicating using
bivariate regression. They found that there
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was a positive and weak (b = .167, a = .000) during exploration (1933-1947),
nonsignificant (b =-.115, a = .211) during consolidation (1948-1966), positive
and weak-moderate (b = .329, a = .020) during decay (1967-1979), and

nonsignificant (b =-.034, a = .854) but inthe expected direction during recent
exploration (1980-1992)

between unemployment and homicide rates. However, they acknowledge the limitations

ofnot being able to use controls in bivariate regression. Chow breakpoint tests were also
run for the total time span (1900 to 1997) and the two time periods used in the model.

The test supported the periodization proposed in the models. However, the Chow test
should be used with caution as every time period inthis research, as well as with a similar
model by Carlson and Michalowski (1997) was found to be significant.
The authors ofthis study concluded that the post World War II period is better

conceptualized as one period, as opposed to three distinct eras for explaining variations in
homicide rates. Conclusions remain the same with regards to unemployment and

homicide rates, no matter ifone conceptualizes the first period at one point (1900 to

1945) or two points (1900 to 1932 and 1933 to 1945). Although support was found for
institutional anomie theory, change in decommodification was not a significant predicator
ofhomicide rates over time (2002:29). Future research should follow up on Batton and
Jensen's work on homicide over time.

This study was the first to use a longitudinal approach necessary to capture in the
effect ofchanges in the social structure on crime rates over time. However, itfails to
capture this across different units ofanalysis that have different institutional structures
and cultural values. The use of a decommodification index does capture the strength of

the economy. However, the absence ofnoneconomic institutions in the model, which
could capture economic dominance is a serious limitation.
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Jensen (2002) went in a much different direction than previous cross-national
research on institutional anomie theory. Jensen focused on the limitations of institutional
anomie theory, theoretically and empirically. One of the major methodological

shortcomings that Jensen noted is how there is a lack of valid and reliable measures for
important concepts in institutional anomie theory. A second major limitation Jensen
identified is that there is no empirical support or evidence that society embraces the

cultural goals that Messner and Rosenfeld discuss as central tenets of their theory. A third
major issue is the lack variables from other competing theories used as controls in past
studies. Using such control variables can help to establish how much variation in crime
rates across nations is explained by key concepts such as decommodification.
Jensen also conducted his own test of institutional anomie theory. He

hypothesized "that the United States should rank relatively high among nations in the
importance accorded economic roles relative to other activities" (Jensen 2002:58). A

second hypothesis was that "the United States should rank relatively high among nations
in exhibition of calculating, self-interested and utilitarian standards concerning law
breaking" (Jensen 2002:58). Jensen used World Values Survey data with a maximum

sample size of 38 nations to find evidence of some of the limitations in institutional
anomie theory. Logged homicide rates per 100,000from World Health Organizationdata
were used as the dependent variable. Using other data sources such as MicroCase
Corporation, Lester (1996), and Fox and Levine (2001) to fill in missing data, a

maximum sample of 84 nations was available. Jensen used self-report data from the
World Values Survey for his measures of the institutions. The measure of
decommodification came from the International Labor Organization. All other measures
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came from MicroCase Corporation. Jensen measuredthe strengthof each institution
based on respondents' answers to how much they value work, leisure, family, and
religion as being very important.

Basedon the percentages of respondents who answered yes, the United States tied

for second for stating that family is very important, as well as fifth andninth respectively,
for stating religion and leisure are very important, while it was fifteenth for the

percentage ofrespondents who said that work was very important. The United States also
had the fifth highest response indicating that less emphasis on material possessions would
be a good thing.

Next, Jensen ran a bivariate correlations between decommodification and the

family using measures of marriage and divorce rates, with birth rates being used as a
control variable. He found no statistical evidence that higher decommodification will

result ina stronger family. After this, he ran two regression models using logged
homicide rates. In the first model divorce rates, birth rates, and marriage rates were used

as predictors. In the second model, the four items from the WVS were used as predictors
of homicide rates. Jensen did not use both sets of predictors in the same model due to the

lower number of nations in the WVS sample (N=34, as opposed to 54 withthe first

model). With regards to the first two models, Jensen found that only the measure for
religion (b= .046) and the control variable ofbirth rates. (b= -.067) were significant

predictors oflogged homicide rates. Ina third model (N=34), Jensen used the variables
importance ofreligion, decommodification, birth rate, diversity, Latin nation, and per
capita wealth aspredictors of logged homicide rates. Latin nation, diversity, and per

capita wealth were significant atthe .05 level, while the variables for decommodification
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and religion were not. In the final set of models, Jensen showed how running a regression
with decommodification and each significant predictor from the third set of models

(N=43) revealed that the relationship between decommodification and homicide rates
was not statistically significant (2002:67). Jensen also showed that decommodification
and burglary rates were very strongly correlated (r= .864), and including Latin nation,

diversity, and wealth per capita as predictors only increased this correlation (2002:68-69).
Jensen concluded that "institutional anomie has serious limitations for explaining

both lethal violence and property crime" (2002:69). This remains one of the only studies
that openly criticizes institutional anomie theory and had findings that were not

supportive. This study did try to introduce different measures to be used when testing
institutional anomie theory. However, this study has numerous flaws that should be
addressed.

First, this study was cross-sectional and does not examine variations over time
that time-series or growth modeling could include. Second, the measures used for
noneconomic institutions only covered respondents' opinions on the importance of the
institutions, and were not actual indicators of the strength of the institutions that would be

tapped better by measures of respondents' involvement with these institutions. The
institution of education, which is clearly defined by Messner and Rosenfeld (2007a) as an
important institution, was not included in this study.

Maume and Lee (2003) tested institutional anomie theory on a smaller geographic
unit within the United States, counties. The authors argued that counties still fit under the
criteria of marco-level social unit, as Messner and Rosenfeld never clearly state that

nation-states can be the only unit of analysis. They also tested the theoretical emphasis
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on instrumental crimes rather than expressive crimes. They expected that noneconomic
institutions would mediate the effect of the economy with regards to creating

criminogenic pressures, as opposed to moderating the effect of the economy on crime
rates. "The analytical focus is on the effects of the prevalence of and commitment to both
economic and noneconomic institutions on serious crime, homicide in particular"
(2003:1153).

Cross-sectional county-level data from around 1990, with a total of 454 U.S.

counties with populations of 100,000 or more, were used in this study. The total number
of homicides for each country was obtained from the Supplementary Homicide Reports

offender file for the years 1990-1992. Ages below 10 and above 64 were removed, due to
the low number of homicides committed by people within these age groups. Using the

Supplementary Homicide Report allowed the researchers to separate homicides that were
seen as instrumental (usually in the commission of another felony) and expressive (e.g.,

crimes of passion). The Supplementary Homicide Reports are a good source of data on
homicides because most law enforcements agencies participate, the proportional

frequency of reporting homicide is much higher than any other crime, the clearance rate

is higher with homicide than other crimes, and no better alternatives exist for measuring
instrumental versus expressive homicidal deaths (2003:1154).

The measure of strength and dominance of the economy was based on the 1990
Gini coefficient for family income inequality, which was derived from the Census of

Populationand Housing Summary. The polity was measured using the average of the
voting rates for the 1988 and 1992 presidential elections. The lack of commitmentto the
family was measured as the rate of divorce for people 15 years of age and over.

36

Education was measured as the average of educational expenditures per person of school
age in the county for the years of 1987 and 1992. Religion was measured by the

adherence rate to civically-engaged religious denominations for 1990. The social welfare
system was also included as a noneconomic institution and was measured as welfare
generosity. The measure was made up of average monthly welfare payments per poor

person adjusted for cost of living and also the proportion of families receiving welfare.
These measures were standardized and averaged into an index. Indicator variables were

created at each quartile to account for correlation problems encountered from the 3r and

4th quartiles. The variable was dummy coded by making counties in the first three
quartiles, counties with low to moderate monthly social welfare payments, as 1, while the
last quartile, counties with high monthly social welfare payments, as 0 (2003:1157). The
first variable that was included to control for the differences in population composition

across counties in the model was population structure, which consisted of the z-scores for

the logged population size andpopulation density. Second, the percentage of people aged
15-29 was included as this tends to be the most crime prone age group. Percentage of
black residents and an indicator for counties in the southern region were used as other
control variables.

Negative binomial regression estimation was used in place of OLS, as negative
binomial regression is more appropriate when rare events such as homicide are analyzed.
A negative binomial estimation strategy was used to predict the rates of the three

dependent variables—total homicides, instrumental homicides, and expressive homicides.
Multicollinearity did not appearto be problematic according to the variance inflation
factors which were all under 2.5. The first series of models used total homicide rates as
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the dependent variable, while instrumental and expressive homicide rates were used in
the second and third series of models, respectively. The percentage reduction in the
effect of the Gini coefficient on homicide was calculated across models.

In the first series of models, only the Gini coefficient and control variables were
used in the model with total homicide rates as the dependent variable. Model 2
introduced the noneconomic institutions as a mediation model. Models 3-7 introduced

interaction terms for the Gini coefficient and each separate noneconomic institution to

test for moderation effects. The Gini coefficient and percent black had a positive effects

on the dependent variable and were significant at the .01 level across all 7 models.

Populationstructure had a positive effect on the dependent variable and was significant at
the .01 level in Model 1 and at the .05 level in Models 2-3 and 5-7. Voter turnout

(negative relationship) and divorce rate (positive relationship) were significant at the .01
level across models 2-6. Welfare expenditures had a positive effect on the dependent
variable and was significant at the .01 level across models 2-6 and at the .05 level in

Model 7. Only the the interaction term for welfare expenditures and the Gini coefficient
used in Model 7 was significant at the .01 level. The percentage reduction in the Gini
coefficient from Model 1 to Model 2 was 34.38 percent. This shows evidence of strong

mediation of the effect of the economy on homicide rates by noneconomic institutions.

The pseudo R2 for Model 1ranged from .07 to.09 for Models 2-7.
In the second series of models, only the Gini coefficient and control variables
were used in the model with instrumental homicide rates as the dependent variable.
Model 2 introduced the noneconomic institutions in a mediation model. Models 3-7

introduced interaction terms for the Gini coefficient and each separate noneconomic
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institution to test for moderation effects. The Gini coefficient, population structure, and

percent black all had a positive effects on the dependent variable and were significant at
the .01 level across all 7 models. Voter turnout (negative effect) and divorce rate (positive

effect) were significant at the .01 level across models 2-6. Welfare expenditures had a

negative relationship with the dependent variable and was significant at the .01 level
across models 2-6. Only the interaction term for welfare expenditures (negative effect)
and the Gini coefficient used in Model 7 was significant at the .05 level. The percent
reduction in the Gini coefficient from Model 1 to Model 2 was 43.2 percent, indicating a

substantial mediation effect. The pseudo R2 was .08 in Model 1and .10 Models 2-7.
In the third series of models, only the Gini coefficient and control variables were

used in the model with expressive homicide rates as the dependent variable. Model 2
introduced the noneconomic institutions and was used in a mediation model. Models 3-7

introduce interaction terms for the Gini coefficient and each separate noneconomic

institution. The Gini coefficient and percent black had a positive effect on the dependent

variable and were significant at the .01 level across all 7 models. Voter turnout (negative
effect) and divorce rates (positive effect) were significant at the .01 level across models
2-6. Welfare expenditures had a negative relationship withthe dependent variable and

was significant at the .01 level across models 2-6 and at the .05 level in Model 7. Only
the interaction term for welfare expenditures and the Gini coefficient used in Model 7,
which had a negative relationship with the dependent variable, was significant at the .05

level. The percentreduction in the Gini coefficient from Model 1 to Model 2 was 30.92

percent, again indicating strong mediation of the effectof the economy on crime by

noneconomic institutions. The pseudo R2 was .05 in Model 1and .07 in Models 2-7.
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In conclusion, the researchers found a strong mediating effect of the noneconomic
institutions on the relationship between income inequality and instrumental crime.

However, little to no support was found for a moderating effect of the noneconomic

institutions on the relationship between income inequality and instrumental crime. This

study does capture a full range of noneconomic institutions and includes several good
control variables. However, there are limitations within this study. First, it is hard to

study true changes within the same nations as national sub-units like counties tend to
have a generally similar institutional structure and cultural values. Nation-states can
better serve as the units of analysis as they can show social structural and cultural
variations between countries. Second, the Gini coefficient for income inequality is not

necessarily a valid measure of economic dominance within a given unit. More valid
measures such as a decommodification index could be used instead. Third, a cross-

sectional model does not allow one to see the change that occurs to a particular unit over

time, as the social structure may change as whenthe economy becomes more or less
dominant.

Cullen, Parboteeah, and Hoegl (2004) tested to see if the conditions of
institutional anomie increase unethical behavior in their study of institutional anomie

theory. Previous research onunethical behavior had mostly focused onnational culture.
In this study, the authors used the theoretical components of social structure and cultural
dynamics to explain cross-national variations in unethical behavior. This study tested
eight hypotheses—four tested cultural dynamics and four tested the institutional balance
within nations. Cullen Parboteeah, and Hoegl (2004:413-15) hypothesized

(1) The stronger the achievement values in a nation, the greaterthe
willingness of its managers to justify ethically suspect behaviors. (2) The
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stronger the individualism values in a nation, the greater the willingness of
its managers to justify ethically suspect behaviors. (3) The stronger the
universalism values in a nation, the greater the willingness of its managers
to justify ethically suspect behaviors. (4) The stronger the pecuniary
materialism values in a nation, the greater the willingness of its managers
to justify ethically suspect behaviors.... (5) The more industrialized a
nation, the greater the willingness of its managers to justify ethically
suspect behaviors... (6) The more welfare socialist a nation's political
system, the less willing its managers to justify ethically suspect
behaviors... (7) The lower the family strength in a nation, the greater the
willingness of its managers to justify ethically suspect behaviors. (8) The
greater a nation's educational attainment level, the less the willingness of
managers to justify ethically suspect behaviors.

Individual-level data from a sample of 3,450 managers across 28 nations were used to

test the hypotheses. The sample used in this study was a subset of the World Values
Survey from 2000. Nations were selected based on the reliability of individual-level data.

The dependent variable was created by taking seven items that represent unethical
behavior on a 1-10 scale and combining them based on a factor analysis. The cultural
value of achievement was measured by combining three items from Trompenaars and

Hampden-Turner (1998) and the WVS reflecting a sense of achievement. The cultural
value of individualism was measured using three items from Hefstede (2001) stressing

the importance of the individual in the work place. Universalism was measured through
combining two items created by Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner (1998) that capture

collectivethought processes. Materialism was measured by combining items from the
WVS and Inglehart (1997) relating to the importance of money and stability (2004:415).
The social institution variable industrialization was measured by the

degree of urbanization, measured by the percentage of urban population
(Duch and Taylor: 1993); energy use, measured in coal-equivalent units
(Parboteeah and Cullen, 2003); and demographic distribution of the
workforce into nonagricultural sectors, was measured by the percentage of
workers in the nonagricultural sector (2004:416).
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Welfare socialism strength was measured by three items: taxes collected as a percentage

of the gross domestic product, government expenditure as a percentage of gross domestic
product, and government revenues as a percentage of gross domestic product. Family
strength was measured as the ratio of marriages to divorces per 1,000 people. Education
was measured as the educational attainment score from the United Nations Development

Program. Control variables included age, gender (recoded with 0 equal to male and 1

equal to female), marital status (0 equal to single and 1 equal to married, divorced, or
widowed), and attendance at religious services more than once a week (2004:416).
Hierarchical linear modeling was used for this study. Control variables and the

dependent variables were included at the individual level, while cultural values and social
institutions were included at the national level. According to the authors, a multiple

regression was first run to test for multicollinearity, which revealed no evidence of
excessive multicollinearity according to the variance inflation factors, which were all

under 10 (2004:417). This can be seen as problematic, as the standard for VIF now is
considered to be under 2.5 for each variable (see Allison 1999:141). Overall, level-2

variables explained 35 percent of the variation between nations. Running tests with the

regression analysis and analysis of covariance gave them estimatesof the total explained
variance between individuals of 16-24 percent. Support was found for hypotheses 3 (b=
.23, s.e.=.03), 4 (b= .11, s.e.= 03), 5 (b= .44, s.e.=.03), and 7 (b = .12, s.e.=.03)
(2004:417-418).

This study provided moderate support for institutional anomie theory. They used
cross-national data to test their hypotheses derived from institutional anomie theory. The

use of HLM is appropriate when modeling cross-national variations. However, this study
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is cross-sectional and does not examine changes over time. A second weakness of this

study is that the full range of institutions was not considered at the second level,

particularly the institution of religion. Third, most of the assumptions underlying the use
of multilevel modeling, such as multivariate normality and homoskedasticity were not

assessed in this study. Multicollinearity was assessed, but the standard used to assess
variance inflation factors of less than 10 is far in excess of the 2.5 recommended by

Allison (1999:141). Hence, standard errors may be inflated due to the presence of

problematic multicollinearity resulting in a lack of statistical significance of some of the
model effects. Finally, the degree of industrializationdoes not accurately show the
dominance of the economy over other institutions.

Kim and Pridmore (2005b) tested institutional anomie theory using 78 regional

units throughout Russia. They hypothesized that "the association between (socio

economic) change and (property) crime is conditioned by the strength of non-economic
social institutions" (2005b:81). Previousresearch has shown a similar relationship to
what the researchers were expecting betweenhomicide and socio-economic change. The

researchers explained that structural situations are indeedsimilar to those in the United
States, as Russia's new capitalistsystem has providedmany of its people withoutthe
means to achieve economic goals. A unique problem Russia faces is the goals
themselves, as Russian citizens are often disconnected from cultural goals due to the

rapid change in the economic structure from communism to capitalism.

Two separate dependent variables were used in this study: armed robbery and

robbery rates per 100,000 residents. These data were obtained from the Russian Ministry
of Interior for the year 2001. Socioeconomic change was used as the measure of the
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institution of the economy. This measure was created by using residual change scores for
a composite index made up of measures of the population, poverty, unemployment,

privatization, and foreign capital investment. This information was obtained from the
Goskomstat. These change scores were from the year 2000 or closest year available to

1992 or closest year available. Family strength was measured as the proportion of singleparent families with at least one child under 18 in 1994. Educational strengthwas
measured as the logged rate of people enrolled in college per 1,000 according to

Goskomstat in 2001. Polity strengthwas measured as the logged proportion of registered

voters who participated in the 2000 presidential elections (Kimand Pridemore 2005b:8586).

Many control variables were used in this study. Economic inequality was
measured as the loggedratio of the top 20 percent and bottom 20 percent of the
distributionof individual incomes. Heavy alcohol consumption was measured as the rate

of deaths due to alcohol poisoning. A control was included that measured the proportion

of the population living in cities with a population over 100,000. A control was included
for the logged population of males aged 25-44. The Northern Caucasus andthe regions
east of the Ural Mountains were dummy coded to control for the differences in overall
crime rates in these areas, as crimes tend to be lower in the Caucasus region and higher in

the regions east of the Ural Mountains (Kim and Pridemore 2005b:87). Interaction terms
between socioeconomic change and the three measures of noneconomic institutions of
the family, education, and polity were also included.

Ordinary least squares regression was usedto test for the effects of socioeconomic
change, institutional strength, and the interaction terms in the two models with different
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sets of robbery rates. Missing data were handled by replacing "missing values by using
the other regressors in the model as instrumental variables" (2005b:87). Normality
assumption violations were addressed by logging education, polity, development,

inequality, and males aged 25-44. Four models were run, with models 2-4 including
interaction terms one by one. Mean centering the interaction terms took care of problems
with multicollinearity.

For tests on the dependent variables, armed robbery and robbery rates, the
interaction effects between socioeconomic change and family (b= .147, /?=.136),

socioeconomic change and education (b= .147, b= .136), and socioeconomic change and
polity (6=212, Z>=358) all were nonsignificant. The actual hypothesis testing institutional
anomie theory showed that there was no significant relationship between robbery and the
interaction terms. The results of this study show that the measures used for social

institutions do not appear to condition the effect of socioeconomic change on property
crime in transitional Russia. The authors acknowledge that their results are different
from studies such as Chamlin and Cochran (1995) and Piquero and Piquero (1998) that
showed that noneconomic institutions conditioned the effect of a measure of the economy

on property crime (Kim and Pridemore 2005b:92-93). This was more than likely due to a
difference in the cultures studied. The United States has had a stronger cultural ethos

toward monetary success for decades, while Russia has only been a capitalist nation for a
little over a decade (in 2005) and is still a developing nation.

This study did address every major assumption necessary for successfully using

OLS regression. However, many limitations methodologically and theoretically still exist.
Kim and Pridemore (2005b) acknowledge that reporting errors and bias are likely to
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occur in a country such as Russia due to poor record keeping and intentional

underreporting of crime. They also notethat they did not directly test institutional anomie
as it was intended theoretically by Messner and Rosenfeld. They explained that

Institutional anomie theory was not developed to explain the relationship
between socio-economic change and crime. Instead, it focuses on cultural

pressures for monetary success, the dominance of the economy in the
institutional balance of power and the interaction of these cultural and
institutional structures. Nevertheless, Bernburg (2002) argues that
Messner and Rosenfeld's theory provides an important link between

anomie, contemporary social change and crime, due to its consideration of
an unchecked market economy (2005b:93-94).

A third limitation is that this test of institutional anomie theory does not look at the

proper unit of analysis originally intended theoretically for institutional anomie theory.
Messner and Rosenfeld (1997a) looked at nations-states and applied their theory to crosscultural differences. A final limitation is the use of a cross-sectional approach instead of

a longitudinal study that could capture variations ofthe impact of institutional anomie
over time.

In a second study, Kim and Pridemore (2005a) tested institutional anomie theory

by looking at the effect of socioeconomic change onhomicide rates. They employed "an
index ofnegative socioeconomic change and measures of family, education, and polity to
test the hypothesis that institutional strength conditions the effects of poverty and
socioeconomic change on homicide rates" (2005a: 1377). The study aggregated Russia

into 78 different regions thatwere available for analysis. All data were collected for the
year 2000, unless specifically noted.

The dependent variable was measured through the regional homicide

victimization rate per 100,000. Socio-economic change was used as the measure of the
institution of the economy. This measure was created by using residual change scores for
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a composite index made up of measures of the population, poverty, unemployment,

privatization, and foreign capital investment. This information was obtained from the
Goskomstat. These change scores were from the year 2000 or closest year available to

1992 or closest year available. Family strength was measured as the proportion of singleparent families with at least one child under 18 in 1994. Educational strength was
measured as the logged rate of people enrolled in college per 1,000 according to

Goskomstat in 2001. Polity strength was measured as the logged proportion of registered
voters who participated in the 2000 presidential elections (2005a: 1383-1385).

Many control variables were used in this study. Economic inequality was
measured as the logged ratio of the top 20 percent and bottom 20 percent of the
distribution of individual incomes. Heavy alcohol consumption was measured as the rate

of deaths due to alcohol poisoning. A control was included that measured the proportion

of the population living in cities with a population over 100,000. A control was included
for the logged population of males aged 25-44. The Northern Caucasus and the regions
east of the Ural Mountains were dummy coded to control for the differences in overall
crime rates in these areas, as crimes tend to be lower in the Caucasus region and higher in

the regions east of the Ural Mountains (Kim and Pridemore 2005b: 1385-1386).
Interaction terms between socioeconomic change and the three measures of noneconomic
institutions of the family, education, and polity were also included.

Ordinary least squares regression was used to conduct cross-sectional tests of
institutional anomie theory. Negative binomial regression was used to estimate models
of the rare event data of homicide rates. Missing data were handled by regressing the

variables with missing observations on the other independent variables that had no
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missing, and predicted values from these regressions were used to fill in the missing data
(2005b: 1386). First, four models were run including poverty, social institutions, and then

interaction terms. In model 1, logged poverty, family, polity, alcohol, and the dummy
coded east variable were all significant at the .05 level. All of these variables remained

significant across all four models. In models 2-4, interaction terms were added and mean
centered to remove any possible multicollinearity. However, none of the interaction terms
conditioned the effect of poverty on homicide (2005a:1389). The second set of models

regressedthe homicide rate on the socioeconomic change index, social institutions, and
interaction terms. Socioeconomic change, polity, alcohol, and east were all significant at
the .05 level. However, like the first set of models, none of the interaction terms in
models 2-4 conditioned the effect of socioeconomic change on homicide rates
(2005a: 1390).

Kim and Pridemore (2005a) concluded that support was found for the first and

second hypotheses that poverty has a positive relationship with regional homicide rates
and that socioeconomic change has a negative relationship with homicide rates. Partial

support was found for the third hypothesis that institutional strength is negatively
associated with homicide rates, particularly the family and polity, which both had a

negative relationship with homicide. Finally, no support was found for the hypothesis that
the effects of poverty and negative socioeconomic change on homicide rate were
conditioned by the strength of noneconomic institutions (2005a: 1390).

This study did not measure the institution of economy in a manner that showed its

strength in relation to other institutions. Kim and Pridemore (2005a:1393) stated that
institutional anomie theory was not developed to explain the role of rapid
socioeconomic change on crime. It focuses instead on the specific cultural
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pressure for monetary success that gives rise to anomie because of the (1)
imbalance between the economic institution and other noneconomic institutions

and (2) interplay between cultural pressure for material desire and the structural
imbalance of social institutions.

The use of a cross-sectional approach limits the potential of this study. A longitudinal

study could better capture the variation in the effect of institutional anomie across time.
Using a cross-national sample may offer a better test of institutional anomie since nationstates differ in their institutional balances and cultural values.

Baumer and Gustafson (2007) tested the empirical validity of Merton's anomie

perspective, as well as Messner and Rosenfeld's institutional anomie theory. The authors
admit that a full test of institutional anomie theory would need to include global measures

of the degree of cultural emphasis on monetary success, and the balance of the major
institutions. They admitted that due to a lack of these measures, a complete test of the

theory would not be possible. They ran a partial test of the theory that examined some of
the relationships that are central to institutional anomie and have also not received a lot of

previous scrutiny by past research (2007:628). The researchers proposed an integrated
model of Merton and Messner and Rosenfelds' theories of anomie. Baumer and

Gustafson (2007:629) theorized that

commitment among citizens to pursue monetary success goals, weak commitment
among citizens to legitimate means of pursuing monetary success goals, limited
legitimate opportunities for pursuing monetary success, limited or unequal
educational and economic attainment, and commitment to and investment in

education, family, political, community, and religious institutions

are responsible for explaining differences in instrumental crime across geographic units.
However, separate models were run for Merton's and Messner and Rosenfeld's theories
of anomie.
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Data for 77 counties were used in this study that were obtained from three

sources—Uniform Crime Reports (dependent variable), General Social Survey, and U.S.
Census Bureau. GSS data, which are household-level data, were aggregated for each

county in the study. Data were taken from 1975-1976, due to the relevant measure only

being available for this time period. Crime rates were for 1977 and were measured as a
composite variable of the number of robberies, burglaries, larcenies, and auto thefts per
100,000 residents. The degree of commitment to monetary success goals, which

conceptualizes an important cultural value, was measured by the GSS question "next to
health, money is the most important thing." The degree of weak commitment to

legitimate means for pursuing monetary success goals also came from the GSS and was
measured by aggregating the question whether respondents agree "there are no right or
wrong ways to make money, only hard and easy ways" (2007:633). The two questions
from the GSS survey were combined for the years 1973 to 1976.

The concept of the economy was measured by limited job availability, which was
measured by the work force to job ratio. The variable loweducational andeconomic
attainment was composed of six items. Educational and income inequality was measured

by the income Gini and education Gini coefficients. Strength of noneconomic social
institutions included measures of education, family, polity, religion, and community.

Education was measured by percentage of government expenditures on education, as well
as a separate measure using pupils per teacher. Familial strength was measured by a

composite of three items related to time spent with close relatives overthe past month, as
well as a separate measure that operationalized marriage. The polity was measured by

separate measures of welfare assistance and voter participation. The institution of religion

50

was measured by church adherence rates. The community was measured by a composite
of four items that tap social capital (2007:639-640).

Baumer and Gustafson ran separate models, one to test Merton's theory, and one

to test institutional anomie theory. The model that tested institutional anomie theory
included the variables commitment to monetary success and weak commitment to
legitimate means, as well as interaction terms between commitment to monetary success

and weak commitment to legitimate means in the model. Three-way interaction terms
were also created between commitment to monetary success and weak commitment to

legitimate means and each separate noneconomic institution variable. This was to test to
see if interaction between cultural dynamics and social structure significantly predict
instrumental crime. Each of the eight models included the cultural value variables, the
two-way interaction terms between these two variables, and one of the three-way

interaction terms. The R2 of each model ranged from .758 to .806. In Models 1 and2,
only the two-way interactions were significant (b= 8.68) and (b= 8.62) respectively, at the
.05 level. In model 3, weak commitment to legitimate means (b= 46.59), the two-way

interaction terms (b= 12.12), and the three-way interaction term for time spent with

family and the cultural values (b= -3.23) were significant at the .05 level. In Models 4
and 5, only the two-way interaction terms of commitment to monetary success and

commitmentto legitimate means (b= 7.82) and (b= 9.59), respectively, were significantat
the .05 level. In Model 6, the two way interaction terms (b= 9.01) and the three-way
interactions between welfare assistance and cultural values (b= -5.08) were significant at

the .05 level. In Models 7 and 8, only the two-way interaction terms (b= 6.84) and

(b= 8.02) were significant at the .05 level (2007:648). Results show that welfare
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assistance and time spent socializing with family members are moderators of dominant
economic values on crime. Next, simple slopes were run for the significant three-way
interactions. The results from this model show

the effects of commitment to monetary success goals when weak commitment to
legitimate means is prevalent (1 and 2 standard deviations above its mean), and
the effects of weak commitment to legitimate means when commitment to
monetary success goals is strong (1 and 2 standard deviations above its mean),
dampen significantly as the two higher order moderators (welfare assistance and
time spent with family) take on larger values (2006:651).

This was very consistent with the results from the OLS regression and also with the

theory itself. However, when indicators welfare assistance and time with family have

high values, the moderation effect vanishes. Overall, support was found for institutional
anomie theory, at least with regards to the significant effects.

Overall, this study had the major strength of integrating cultural dynamics with
social structure, as well as combining survey data with macro-level data. Providing

multiple measures for certain institutional variables, as well as providing a full range of
noneconomic institutional variable also are a key strengths in this study. However, this

study could be improved by using cross-national data, instead of county-level data from
the United States. Also, conducting a longitudinal analysis over a cross-sectional analysis
can better capture change in the effects of institutional anomie variables over time.

Finally, testing assumptions of ordinary least squares regression was never mentioned in
the article, thus it cannot be determined if the analysis results can be trusted.

Muftic (2006) tested to see if variations in the deviant behavior of cheating at the

university level could be explained by institutional anomie theory. The study examines if
American students and international students studying in the United States have different
cheating behaviors, due to cultural differences regarding the importance of monetary
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success. More specifically, the author hypothesized "that American students, relative to
foreign-born students, will have an increased adherence to economic goal orientations
that increase cheating behaviors" (2006:630). This study incorporates both measures of
cultural values and the more traditional measures of institutions within the model. Muftic

discussed how most studies only focus on institutional imbalance and how that increases

the potential for crime, but rarely do they discuss the intersection betweenthe
institutional imbalance and cultural values that weigh monetary success heavily.

This study used individuals as the unit of analysis, and a convenience sample 122
American born students and 48 international students. The students in this sample were

asked to fill out a surveythat includedquestions relating to cheating behaviors and their
own beliefs about the fulfillment of economic goals (2006:634). This study used an

additive model to see if an emphasis on the American Dream had an effect on whether an
individual cheats or not. A second interactive model was used to determine if

noneconomic institutions moderate the effect of the economy on crime rates. Eight

general hypotheses were tested in this study (2006:637):

(1) The adherence to the cultural values of the American Dream will be
higher among U.S.-born students compared to non-U.S.-born students. (2)
U.S.-born students will be more involved in the economy and less
involved or committed to noneconomic social institutions (i.e., education,

family, and the polity) compared to non-U.S.-born students. (3) U.S.-born
students will have a higher likelihood of student cheating compared to
non-U.S.-born students. (4) Involvement in noneconomic social
institutions (i.e., education, family, and the polity) will moderate the
influence of the economy on student cheating. (5) In the additive model,
students who have higher adherence to the cultural values composing the
American Dream (i.e., individualism, achievement, universalism, and the
fetishism of money) will be more likely to cheat. (6) In the additive model,
students who are more involved or committed to the economy will have a
higher likelihood of cheating. (7) In the interactive model, students who
are high in adherence to the American Dream and more involved or
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committed to the economy will have a higher likelihood of cheating. (8) In
the interactive model, the relationship between students' adherence to the
American Dream and likelihood of cheating will be moderated by
involvement or commitment to noneconomic institutions (i.e., family,
education, and polity).
All of the variables in these hypotheses were measured at the micro level and attempted

to stay true to institutional anomie theory by incorporating data from international
students.

Data for the study were collected from a convenience sample of students at a

medium-sized, land grant university, in the upper Midwest during 2004. The total number
of students used in the final sample was 162-114 that were U.S. born and 48 that were
international students attending college in the United States. The study overrepresents

non-U.S. students who make up 28.2 percent of the sample, while at the university level,
non-U.S. students only made up 6.3 percent of the population. Other overrepresentations

of groups such as minorities were also in the sample. Logistic regression was used, as the
dependent variables were from 11 survey questions relating to whether a student has
cheated, which was coded as 1 for yes and 0 for no (2006:640). Overall, 65.9 percent of
respondents had cheated in one form or another.

The four cultural values that make up the American Dream—achievement,
individualism, universalism, and the fetishism of money were used to create variables

that measure cultural values. One to seven questions were used to measure each value.

Using factor analysis, these values were then transformed into one variable for each
cultural value. Cronbach's alpha revealed that all of the four cultural values measures had

high internal consistency. Thus, all of the measures were transformed into one variable
that captures the entire American Dream. This variable was split at the median and
recoded as low and high emphasis on the American Dream. The institutions of the family
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and education were measured in a similar fashion. Using factor analysis, numerous

questions regarding the institutions of the family and education were reduced to four.
Seven-point scale questions were created for these two variables, with higher scores
representing higher participation in the given institution (2006:640-641). The economy

was measured categorically by whether the respondent was employed or not. Polity was
measured categorically by whether the respondent regularly performed community

service. Age and categorical measuresof gender, U.S. born, and citizen of the United
States were used as control variables (2006:642-643).

First, one-way ANOVAs were run between U.S. born students and non-U.S.
born students and revealed significant differences among the cultural values of

individualism (t = 4.516 p < .001), universalism (t = -2.938 p < .001), and the fetishism

of money (t = -2.940 p < .01). Partial support for the first hypothesis was shown for the
universalism, fetishism and money, but not individualism, due to the direction of the
relationship being opposite of the hypothesis (2006:644).
The second model included all of the institutional variables and control variables

for place of birth and gender. Partial support was obtained for hypothesis 4, as
interactions terms (p = -.307, p < .01) for students who were employed and had high
level of family bonding were less likelyto cheat (2006:645). Using bivariate analysis to
test hypothesis 3, U.S. students were significantly more likely than non-U.S. students to

cheat (/= 57.189, p<.001).
The final set of models used logistic regression to test hypotheses 5 through 8.

The first logistic model includedthe variables for cultural values, institutions, and the
control variables. Age (/3= -.199, Exp£=.819), female (fi= -1.270, Exp£=.281), fetishism
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of money (0= .229, Exp^l.257), family (£= -.201, Exp)8=.818), and polity
(y£= -.557, ExpyS^.573) were all significant at the .05 level. Born in the United States

(/3= -2.272, ExpyS=.9.703) was significant at the .001 level, individualism

{P= -.272, Exp^=.762) and education (p= -.2.155, Exp£=.116) were significant at the
.01 level, and universalism (fi= .229, Exp)8=1.257) was significant at the .07 level.

Consistent with the hypotheses, the institutions of the family and polity had an inverse

relationship withcheating (2006:647). In partial support of hypothesis 5, universalism
and fetishism of money predicted cheating, when all other variables were controlled. In
the secondmodel, the moderating effects of culture and social institutions on cheating

behavior were examined. "Specifically, separate models were calculated that examined

the impact involvement in or commitment to social institutions have on student cheating
behaviors while separating out high and low adherence to the American Dream"

(2006:649). No support was provided for hypotheses 7 or 8, as only born inthe United
States was significant in both models.

Overall, the results show that the measure for the economy, employment, has a

moderating effect on cheating behavior. However, thisbehavior ran counter to the theory
and actually reduced the likelihood of cheating by a student. This is due to the economy

notbeing measured as being dominant over other institutions. The author does notclarify
how much a student who is employed works in a givenweek, which could determine if
the economy has precedent over howthe individuals spend their time. The study also
reveals that not all citizens of the United States may accept the concept of the American

Dream. The notion of every American being socialized to the American Dream is a key

partof institutional anomie theory that is open to debate. A second problem is thatthis is
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not a true cross-national study which would be necessary to fully test Messner and
Rosenfeld's (1994) theory. Third, tests of assumptions of logistic regression such as
linearity and multicollinearity are never mentioned in the study, therefore no one can

discern if the data have been properly analyzed. Fourth, religion is left out as a major

noneconomic institution. Fifth, a longitudinal study can show any change over time in the
effect of the institutional balance and cultural values on cheating behavior. However, this
study does include measures of cultural values, which most quantitative studies fail to
capture. More studies in the future should include measures of cultural values.
Schoepfer and Piquero (2006) tested to see if one type of white-collar crime,

embezzlement, is a form of crime that can be explained by institutional anomie theory.
This is justified by the offender being motivated under a strong cultural emphasis on
monetary success. Economic institutional dominance can also create an environment in

which people feel the only means of achieving goals is through crime and deviance.
Although white-collar criminals differ from street criminals, who have traditionally been
studied using institutional anomie theory, both should face the same structural pressures
to commit crime. Schoepfer and Piquero (2006:232) hypothesized that

(1) lower percentages of the population without high school degrees lessens the
effect of unemployment on rates of embezzlement; (2) lower divorce/marriage
ratios (less divorces than marriages) lessen the effect of unemployment on
embezzlement rates; (3) higher percentages of registered voters who voted lessens
the effect of unemployment on embezzlement.
The sample used in this study was the 50 states in the United States. The
dependent variable, embezzlement rates, was taken from UCR data from 1990 and

Census data were used to calculate rates of embezzlement per 100,000 in 1991.

Embezzlement is the only measure that would capture white-collar crime that is recorded
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by the Uniform Crime Reports. Other measures of noneconomic institutional variables
were gathered from 1990 U.S. Bureau of Census data. The institution of education was
measured as the percentage of the adult population who did not graduate from high
school. The polity was measured by the percentage of people from each state who

participated in the 1990 general and local elections. Family was measured as the ratio of

people divorced to those who were married in 1991. Interaction terms were also created
between each noneconomic variable and the variable for the economy, which was

measured as the percentage of the population unemployed.

Poisson regression was used to analyze the rare event data of embezzlement rates
in a smaller macrosocial unit. Each interaction term was mean-centered to deal with

possible multicollinearity. Model 1 included only the dependent variable and the variable
for each institutional independent variable. Education (fi= .050) and polity (fi= -.025)
were both significant at the .01 level, while the economy (fi= -.136) was significant at the

.05 level. A pseudo R2 of .133 was found in the first model. Model 2 incorporated the
interaction terms for economy and education. Education (fi= .050) and polity (ft= -.025)

were significant at the .01 level, while the economy (/?= -.139) was significant at the .05

level. A pseudo R2 of .133 was found in the second model. Model 3 incorporated the
interaction term for economy and family. Education (fi= .050) and polity (fi= -.025) were
significant at the .01 level, while the economy (fi= -.148) was significant at the .05 level.

A pseudo R2 of .134 was found in the third model. Model 4 incorporated the interaction
terms for economy and polity. Education (ft= .048), economy (fi= -.151), and polity (fi= -

.019) were significant at the .01 level. A pseudo R2 of .154 was found inthe fourth model
(2006:233).
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The results of this investigation were supportive of IAT. The additive effects
indicated that higher levels of voter participation were prohibitive of
embezzlement while increasing high school dropout rates exacerbated
embezzlement... Finally, with regard to the three interaction effects only one,
economy (and) polity, was significant. The sign of this interaction implied that
higher rates of polity weakened the effect of unemployment on embezzlement
(2006:223).
This study suffers from several limitations as a test of institutional anomie theory.
First, unemployment rates do not capture the dominance of the economy over other

institutions, but instead capture economic instability. Second, a full range of institutions
was not used, as the noneconomic institution religion was left out in this study. This is
clearly stated as an important institution by Messner and Rosenfeld (2007). Third, this
study is cross-sectional and does not capture change over time, which is necessary to see

if variations in crime are related to changes in the social structure. Fourth, using larger
marcosocial units such as nation-states allows a researcher to test institutional anomie

using units that differ more markedly in their social and cultural structures.
Freichs, Munch, and Monika (2008) focused on growing cultural individualism
and increased structural inequalities to create an integrated anomie model. The first part
of their approach was one of the main tenets of Mertonian anomie theory, the mismatch
between culturally prescribed goals and structural means or lack of means of obtaining
these goals. Based on institutional anomie theory, the second part of their theoretical
explanation was the structural balance or imbalance of institutions. The third part
combined both of the first two parts of their approach. Higher crime rates were

hypothesized to result at the individual level by an individual failure to obtain goals and a
failure at the structural level to integrate members of society successfully. Finally, they
argued that nations that favor more individualism as a result of global economic pressures
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and nations that rely less on institutions to integrate members would have higher crime
rates (2008:197-198).

Four sets of hypotheses were tested in this study. With regards to relative

deprivation, hypotheses la and lb respectively stated that higher income inequality and
higher highschool enrollment would increase anomie crime. With regards to the
devaluation of the family, hypotheses 2a and 2b respectively statedthat higher female

employment and higher divorce rates would lead to anomie crimes. Decommodification
was tested in hypotheses 3a and 3b, in which higher union density and higher public

social expenditures were predicted to result in lower anomie crimes. Hypothesis 4a stated
that higher long-term unemployment increases crimes, and tests for labor market
flexibility on crime. Hypothesis 4b stated higher imprisonment rates reduce anomie
crime, was used to test for punitiveness (2008:201-202). Twenty nations were used in this
cross-national time-series study that allowed the researchers to test for variations within
and across nations from 1974-2000.

Two dependent variables were used in the study—the robbery rate per 100,000

people from the UN survey of crime trends, and homicide rates per 100,000 people from
the World Health Organization. Economic inequality was operationalized by two
measures—the Gini coefficient and P90/P10 earnings ratio, which were compiled

separately from two different sources, the OCED and World Income Inequality
databases. Both datasets for income inequality were used for separate models and the

results were compared. Tertiary school enrollment rates were used as a measure of
education. Female employment and divorce rateswere used as measures of family

disruption. Union density rates and rates of public expenditure were used as measures of
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decommodification. Long-term unemployment was used as a measure of labor market

flexibility. Imprisonment rates were used as a measure of punitiveness that was used as

an exogenous variable. Controls included the proportion of men aged population for 1529 and also the proportion of men unemployed 15-24. GDP per capita was used and a set
of dummy variables was constructed for each year to control for time (2008:202-203).

Multiple imputation was used to handle missing data. The dependent variable was

logged for this model. A generalized method of moments (GMM) was used to address the
problemof the logged dependent variable being correlated with the error term. The first
models were run with only the controls, income inequality, and education. In the second

step, they included the decommodification index. After this they replaced
decommodificationwith the six explanatory variables that represent the social institutions

of the family, state, and labor market. Minor multicollinearity was not addressed. In the

third step, only variables related to labor-market policies were introduced, while in the
fourth step, only indicators of more general socio-politicalconditions were included.
Finally, the full model was tested with all of the measures included, except for the
decommodification index. It should be noted that for the multivariate models, robbery

rates were used as the dependent variable (2008:204).
Bivariate correlations over time that should be noted were female employment

and long-term unemployment (r=-0.40), female employment and public social
expenditure (r=-0.32), and public social expenditure and union density (r=0.25). Overall,
25 out of 105 of the possible correlations over time were significant at the .05 level.

Following this, model misspecification did not seem to be a problem according to tests of
GMM estimations. The Sargan test revealed that the null hypothesis of overidentifying

61

restrictions could not be rejected. The Arellano-Bond test showed autocorrelation of the
first order, which was expected. However, there was no evidence of significant
autocorrelation at the second-level (2006:206).
Overall, four different sets of models were used. One set with the steps

aforementioned using the OCED Gini coefficient, one using the OCED P90/P10 earnings
ratio, one using the World Income Inequality Database Gini coefficient, and one using
World Income Inequality Data P90/10 earnings ratio. A difference GMM was applied in
models 1-5 in each set of models and system GMM was applied in model 5a for each.
Results for both sets of model 1 with the Gini coefficient revealed that the dependent

variable and both controls were significant. Tertiary education was also significant in
both models. Decommodification had the only significant effect in the World Income

Inequality Database (obtained for WIDER), but was a positive relationship which would
run contrary to institutional anomie theory. When the measures of institutions were

included, imprisonment was significant in the set of models with OECD inequality
measures. However, all of the variables became significant at the. 05 level in the WIDER
Gini coefficient set of models. The WIDER model with all indicators included except for

decommodification confirmed the significant results of the previous models. OCED
versions were not as conclusive when all the indicators were included. When the earnings

ratio was included, more equal earnings ratios significantly increased the rates of
robberies, with the relationship going from positive in the Gini coefficient to negative in
the P90/10 earnings ratio. Other than this, most of the results remained the same

throughout the all sets of models with different measures of economic inequality. The
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biggest divergence in the differenced GMM full model and system GMM model is the
reduced number of significant effects in the system GMM model (2008:208-209).
Freichs, Munch, and Monika (2008:209) concluded that

overall, our research design proved successful as we were able to demonstrate that
individual inclusion and stratified exclusion on the one hand and different

strategies of integration (represented by our institutional indicators) on the other
hand interlink in regulating the incidence of crime.
Although this study did not directly focus on institutional anomie, it does have

strengths that future studies of IAT should try to incorporate. The most important

strengths are that it is a cross-national study and that it is longitudinal. A weakness in this
study was the absence of religion as a social institution.

Bjerregaardand Cochran (2008) used more innovative and more theoretically
sound measures in their test of institutional anomie theory. They aimed to better test the

theory using cross-national data. This study also used better operationalizations of key
concepts, while taking into consideration the effects of noneconomic institutions. The
main innovationof this study was the inclusion simultaneously "of open competition,
where monetary achievementand individual economic success are emphasized and

portions of the population are impeded from achieving success" (2008:185) into the
model. Bjerregaard and Cochran(2008) argued that nations with the highest structural
anomie would have the highest rates of homicide.

The samplefor this test included49 nations. Cross-national average homicide
rates for years 1996-1999 were used as the dependent variables. This variable was logged
to reduced skewness. Logging the dependent variable also reduced any problematic
heteroskedasticity. The first measure of the economy was an index of economic freedom
that was developed by the Heritage Foundation. Each country was rated on fifty
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economic variables across ten broad categories. Economic inequality was measured using
the Gini coefficient of household income. This coefficient was scaled 0-100, with perfect

income equality being a 0 and a perfectly unequal distribution being 100. The strength of
the economy was measured by the GDP in U.S. dollars, and was logged to reduce

skewness. Finally, all of these measures were mean-centered so that they could be turned
into two-way interaction terms with each other, as well as a three-way interaction that
includes each economic variable (2008:187).

A variable for economic growth was used to serve as an indicator of how

advanced a given country's economy was. Economic growth was the annual percentage
growth in GDP. A 1995 to 1997 average was employed to reduce year to year

fluctuations in GDP growth. Family disruption was measured by the divorce rate. Lack of
voter turnout was used to measure the polity or ineffectiveness of it. The strength of the
institution of education was measured by the expenditures on education as a percentage
of the GDP (2008:187).

Ordinary least squares regression was used to test the effects of the indicators for
the dominance of economy, economic growth, and noneconomic institutions on crossnational homicide rates. Model 1 only included the variables for economic dominance

and economic growth without any of the interaction terms. The total variation explained
in the first model was 52 percent. The Gini (fi= .057) and GDP (j3= -.644) were

significant at the .01 level. Model 2 introduced the interaction terms for economic
dominance. The total variation explained increased to 64 percent. The Gini (/?= .075),

GDP (/?= .723), and the interaction term for the Gini and GDP (fi= .072) were significant
at the .01 level. Model 3 included every variable in the model. The explained variation
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increased to 71 percent. The Gini (/3= .061), GDP (/3= -.716), and the interaction term for
the Gini and GDP ((3= .064) were significant at the .01 level, while three-way interaction
terms for the economic strength variables (/3= .082) and the polity (/3= .027) were
significant at the .05 level.

These models provided mixed support for institutional anomie theory. Although,
the GDP and Gini coefficient were significant as predictors of homicide rates, only the
polity was significant as a noneconomic moderator of economic dominance on homicide

rates. Finally, a graph with predicted homicide rates under varying economic conditions
was created. Values ranged from either low to high across the three measures of

economic strength. Homicide rates were predicted to be the highest (predicted mean of
143.452) when all three of the measures are high. Homicide rates were predicted to be the
lowest (predicted mean of .087) when the Gini index is low, GDP is high, and economic

freedom is high (2008:190).
Using a cross-national study is a much better way to test institutional anomie

theory. However, capturing changes over time is also important to fully testing
institutional anomie theory. The lack of measures of religion and other control variables
also reduces the value of this study. The presence of high VIFs in the models and any

tests of multicollinearity are not addressed in the study, which violates a major
assumption of OLS regression.
In a second study, Bjerregaard and Cochran (2008b) tested the effect that

noneconomic institutions have on crimes rates, particularly if they mediate or moderate

the effects of the economy. The authors discussed how previous work on institutional
anomie theory had mixed results on whether noneconomic institutions moderate or
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mediate the effects of the economy on crime rates. Messner and Rosenfeld (1999) stated
that social institutions will foster weak social controls when the economy is dominant,

thus that the economy will have an indirect or mediated effect on crime rates via other
noneconomic social institutions, while Chamlin and Cochran (1995) argued that social

institutions have a moderating effect on crime rates when weak social controls are met
with cultural pressures to achieve monetary success (2008b:33).

The sample was composed of 49 nations and data for the study were collected
from numerous agencies including the World Bank, INTERPOL, United Nations, and the

World Health Organization. The independent variables weretaken from 1997 if possible,
or if not, were taken from 1996. Variables that had problems with collinearity were

combined based on the results of a principal components analysis. Two dependent

variables were used in this study—total thefts, which came from INTERPOL, and
homicide rates from both the World Health Organization (multiple year average from

1997 to 1999) andINTERPOL. INTERPOL data were only used for homicide rates when
World Health Organization data were missing. Homicide rates were logged to address the
problem of positive skewness (2008b:34).

The economy was measured by the Gini coefficient of household income as a

measure of economic inequality. Thiscoefficient was scaled 0-100, with perfect income

equality being a 0 anda perfectly unequal distribution being 100. A second
operationalization of the economy was used with social welfare being measured as annual
total expenditures on social security as a proportion of the gross domestic product. A
third operationalization of the economy was an index of economic freedom that was

developed by the Heritage Foundation. Eachcountry was rated using fifty economic
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variables across ten broad categories. The family was measured as a factor variable that
combined divorce rates and percentage of females in the labor force. Higher scores on
this measure represent more family disruption. The institution of education was measured
by combining illiteracy rates and pupil-to-teacher ratios into one variable based on the
results of a principal components analysis. The polity was measured by the percentage
that did not turn out for the latest election. This measure showed the ineffectiveness of

the polity. Interaction terms were also created between the economy measures and
measures of each noneconomic institution (2008b:37-38). The sex ratio, an index of

racial heterogeneity, and percentage of population aged 15-29 were combined into one
control variable to address problems of multicollinearity. A second control variable of

affluence consisted of a composite measure that combined measures of GDP per capita in
U.S. dollars, life expectancy, and annual health expenditures (2008b:38).
Ordinary least squares regression was used to analyze the data. First, five sets of
models were run using the dependent variable, homicide rates. The second set of models
is the exact same as the first set, except that the dependent variable used was theft. The
first set of models tested the effect of each measure of the economy directly on the
dependent variable. The second set of models included the social institutions and one

measure of the economy for each model. Models 3-5 include the same variables as Model
2 but used a different interaction term for each model. Every model also included the
control variables to ensure that they took the possibility of spuriousness into account
(2008b:39).

Overall, the models explained 38.6 to 58.4 percent of the variation in homicide
rates across nations and 43.2 to 74.3 percent of the variation in theft rates across nations.
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Out of the three economic measures, only the Gini coefficient had a significant direct

effect on homicide rates (fi= .045). The measure for social security was the only measure

to have a significant direct effect on theft rates (p= .091). With the Gini coefficient as the
measure for the economy, the economy's effect on homicide rates was mediated by
noneconomic institutions. Family disruption had a positive relationship with crossnational homicide rates when the economic freedom index was used as the economy

variable. Voter turnout also had a significant relationship with homicide rates when

annual expenditures on social security were used as the economy variable. High levels of
family disruption was associated with homicide rates when levels of social security
expenditures were also high (/3= .056). The relationship between lower levels of
education and economic inequality led to an increase in homicide rates (/3= .050). In the
second set of models, a positive relationship was found between social security

expenditures andtheft (ft= .091). This actually runs counter to the effect of social safety
nets hypothesized in institutional anomie theory. However, this may be the result of the
lack of mediation by other noneconomic institutions. The effectsof these institutions

remained significant at the .05 level (^=.061). Thepositive relationship of economic

inequality with theft rates was significantly enhanced when family disruption was high (/?
= 0.095). Low levels of voterturnout had a significant relationship with economic

inequality (/?=-.002). The lasttwo results are more in line with the results one would
expect with institutional anomie theory.

The study yielded very limited results in support of institutional anomietheory.
However, it is almost impossible to do a complete test with an OLS regression, even

when every assumption is met. One needs to conduct a longitudinal study that captures
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variations in crime rates with changes in the social structure and cultural dynamics. The

authors captured the economy and other noneconomic institutions very well. However,
Messner and Rosenfeld (2007a) state that religion needs to be included as a noneconomic
institution. The use of nations as the unit of analysis is the best way to capture variations
across units.

Stults and Baumer (2008) tested an integrated model of Merton's anomie theory
and Messner and Rosenfeld's institutional anomie theory. They argued that the two
theories have failed to adequately address the core concepts of the anomie perspective on

lethal violence. Stults and Baumer (2008:216) hypothesized
an expanded anomie model in which an unbalanced pecuniary value system - the
core causal variable in Merton's theory and IAT - translates into higher levels of
homicide primarily in indirect ways by increasing levels of firearm prevalence,
drug market activity, and property crime, and by enhancing the degree to which
these factors stimulate lethal outcomes.

Much of the previous research on institutional anomie had focused heavily or completely

on the social structure in explaining spatial variations in crime rates.
Stults and Baumer (2008) expanded on the previous integrated anomie model by
Baumer and Gustafson (2007). In their new model, citizens' commitment to pursing
monetary goals and weak commitment to using legitimate means still act as exogenous
variables. Social stratification and commitment to and investment in social institutions

also acted as exogenous variables. Their modified integrated model of lethal criminal
violence introduced the concept of criminal violence as property crimes, illicit drug
market activity, and property crime rates as having a direct effect on spatial differences in

homicide rates. Criminal violence variables act as mediating variables in this study. All
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four exogenous variables have a direct effect on homicide rates, as well as an indirect
effect through criminal violence (2008:222).

The modified integrated model of lethal criminal violence was tested using 74 of
the 87 counties within the United States that make up the sampling frame for the General

Social Survey for the time period of the mid-to-late 1970s. Missing data for key variables
prevented the use of the complete data set. Individual responses to GSS questions were

aggregated to createmeasures at the county-level. Explanatory variables were calculated
from the years 1975 and 1976. However, the levelsof criminal violence and homicide
rates were calculated from 1977.

A three year average from 1976-1978 was created for the dependent variable,

homicide rates per 100,000 people. Homicide rates were collected from the National
Center for Health Statistics. The mediating variable firearm prevalence was taken from
two sources and combined into one measure, survey-based percentages of household

ownership of at least 1 gun, andhealth dataon the percentage of firearm-related suicides.
NCHS drug-related mortalities per 100,000 and UCR data on arrests for sale or
manufacturing drugs for the averaged year of 1976-1978 was used as the dependent
variable. The variable was logged to address problems with skewness. Property crime
was measured using the UCR 1977data on robberies, thefts, and larcenies per 100,000.

The degree of commitment to monetary success goals, whichconceptualizes an
important cultural value, was measured by the GSS question "next to health, money is the
most important thing." The degree of weak commitment to legitimate means for pursuing
monetary success goals also came from the GSS and was measured by aggregating to the
county level the question whether respondents agree "there are no right or wrong ways to
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make money, only hard and easy ways" (2006:230). The two questions from the GSS

survey were combined from the years 1973 to 1976. Interaction terms were created for
these two variables and were included in the multivariate models.

Drawing from Baumer and Gustafson (2007), Stults and Baumer (2008) used

many of the same measures for key variables in their study. Social structural positions
were computed from three separate variables. Limited job opportunities were measured
as the ratio of total persons aged 16 and older active in or seeking a job in the labor
marketto the number of jobs available. The variable low educational and economic

attainment was composed of six items. Educational and income inequality were measured

by the income Gini andeducation Gini coefficients. Strength of noneconomic social
institutions were included for five institutions—education family, polity, religion, and

community. Education was measured by percentage of government expenditures on

education, and pupils perteacher. Familial strength was measured by a composite of
three items related to time spentwith close relatives overthe past month, as well as a

separate measure thatoperationalizes marriage. The polity was measured by separate
measures of welfare assistance and voter participation. The institution of religion was

measured by church adherence rates. The community was measured by a composite
index of four items that measure social capital (2008:247)

A number of control variables were used in this study. The mean number of hours

watching television was usedas a measure for daily television viewing. Logged

population size and logged population density were combined to create a population
structure variable. Age structure was a control variable that was measured by the

percentage of the population aged 16 to 34. Police strength was a control variable that
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was measured by the police officers per 100,000residents. The South was coded as a

region dummy variable. Resource deprivation was a control variable that was measured
by combining the percentage who were poor, the percentage of families with children
headed by a female, the percentage of residents who were black, and median family
income into one variable (2008:247).

Ordinary least squares regression was used to analyze the data. First, a

multivariate regression was run by regressing the dependent variable on all of the

explanatory and control variables. In Model 1, the interaction terms between commitment
to monetary success and weakcommitment to legitimate means (fi= .018), time spent

with family (/?= -.549), percent of government expenditures spent of education (ft= .186), and social capital (b = -.409) were all significant predictors of homicide rates at the
.05 level. The explained variance in Model 1 was .649. Models 2-5 looked at the effects
of the explanatory variables and controls on the four mediating variables: firearm

prevalence, drug arrest, drug mortality, and property crime rate. Time spent with family
was a significant predictor in Models 2, 3, and 5. The interaction terms were significant at
the .05 level in models 3 and 5. Limitedjob availability was significant at the .05 level in

Model 2. Percent of government expenditures was significant in Model 5. Finally, the
civically-engaged church adherence rate was significant in model 5.
Model 1 in the second series of models was identical to Model 1 in the first series.

Models 2-4 introducedthe potentially mediating variables of firearm prevalence, drug

arrests and mortality, and property separately as independent variables. In Model 5, every
variable was included. In Model 2, the interaction terms (/?= .018) and percent of

government expenditures on education are significant (fl= -.185) at the .05 level. In
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Model 3, the mediating term for drug arrest rate (ft = .012), low educational and
economic attainment (ft = .548), percent government expenditure on education (ft = -.142)

were all significant at the .05 level. In Model 4, property crime (ft= .001), commitment to

monetary success (fi= -.128), commitment to marriage (ft =.976), and social capital (ft = .489) are significant at the .05 level. In Model 5, property crime (ft = .001), low
educational and economic attainment (ft = .503), commitment to marriage (ft = .844), and

social capital (ft = -.416) were all significant at the .05 level. Explained variation in these
models ranged from .645 in Model 2 to .716 in Model 5.
Overall, Stults and Baumer (2008:241) concluded that

homicide rates tend to be higher in areas where a strong commitment to monetary

success is paired witha weak commitment to legitimate means, even after
controlling for a broad array of characteristics identified by various theoretical
perspectives as predictive of homicide. However, after introducing several
theoretically meaningful intervening mechanisms, we no longer found a direct
effectof this unbalanced value system on rates of lethal violence. Specifically, we
found that drug arrest and property crime rates reduced this effect by more than
80 percent and rendered it non-significant.

Property crime was the strongest moderator of the effect of social structure onhomicide
rates. In the second series of models, social institutions had a mixed effect on different

dependent variables. These findings yield only weak support with regard to institutional
anomie theory.

This study did an excellent job of incorporating well-conceptualized control

variables, as well as potential mediating variables in models of violent crime. The study
also useda wide range of institutional variables and included important measures of

cultural dynamics. However, this is nota full testof institutional anomie theory because it
relied on data from a single nation, instead of examining a sample of nations which are

more likely to have a different cultural dynamics and institutions. Cross-sectional data do
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not allowone to capture change in the effects of institutional anomie variables over time
that occur that could provide evidence for or against institutional anomie theory.
Conclusion

Table 1 summarizesthe key elements of the empirical studies reviewed in this

chapter. Overall, all of the studies at best only provide moderate support for institutional
anomie theory. This is for varying reasons, whether it is because the tests are cross-

sectional or utilize poor measures of key theoretical constructs such as the dominance of
the economy. The current study attempts to fill in the gaps by looking at variation over
time. This test of institutional anomie theory also attempts to use the best measures

possible for each key concept. This test also includes the full range of institutions that
were mentioned by Messner and Rosenfeld. Based on my review of the literature, I
conclude that an ideal test of institutional anomie theory should have several essential
components.

First, every test of institutional anomie theory should include a measure that taps
the level of economic dominance. As we will see, one such measure used in past studies
is the decommodification index. Messner and Rosenfeld (1997b) used a

docommodification index, as they arguethat it best measures the relationship between the

relative strength of the economy in relation to noneconomic social institutions. Second,
the noneconomic institutions of the family, polity, education, and religion should be

included as predicators of crime rates. Each measure of these institutions should reflect
the relative strengththey have vis-a-vis the economy. Messnerand Rosenfeld (2007)
mention these institutions as the most important noneconomic institutions. Other
variables should also be used to control for other competing explanations of variations in
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crime rates across nations. Third, the interrelationship of the social structure and cultural

dynamics needs to be addressed. Most tests of institutional anomie theory only take into
consideration social structure and fail to address the interrelationship it has with cultural

dynamics. Both of these factors, together, contribute to variations in crime rates. Fourth,

to best explain variations in crime rates across geopolitical areas, the study should be
cross-national. Changes within geopolitical areas such as within the United States do not

best capture variation in socialstructure and cultural dynamics, as much of the sample
tends to not differ. Fifth, studies should test for variations in the effect of institutional
anomie variables on crime rates over time. Using a longitidunial approach can capture

additional structural changes that can provide additional evidence in support of
institutional anomie theory.

In Chapter4,1 discuss the research design of the present study, where I attemptto

incorporate the essential features of an ideal test of institutional anomie theory delineated
above. This discussion includes hypotheses to be tested, data and measures, analytical
methods, and limitations of the study.

Table 1- Studies that Test Institutional Anomie Theory

Study

Hypothesis(es)

Units of Analysis

Longitudinal?

Dependent Variable

Institutional Variables

Chamlin and

We would expect an
improvement in

States (N=50)

No

Property crime rate is

Absolute economic deprivation
(families below poverty
level)(1979). Family- (ratio of
yearly divorces/ yearly marriages
per 1,000 for 1980). Religion(Stark 1980 data for adjusted rate
of church membership per 1,000).
Polity- percentage of voting age

Cochran (1995)

measured as the total

number of robbery,
burglary, larceny, and
auto theft offenses per
1,000(1980) (5)

economic conditions to
result in a reduction of

instrumental crime only
when there is a
simultaneous

strengthening of
noneconomic institutions

individuals who voted in 1980

(4). More on page 7

congressional contests.
Alternative model variables on Pg.

Control
Variables

Statistical
Method(s)

Racial

OLS resgression;
weighted least
squares regression

Higher levels of

due to model residual

lower levels of the

problem. Each case is
weighted by the
square root of the
1980 population size

divorce-marriage
ratio, and higher
levels of voting
participation

of the state.

reduce the

heterogeneity
measured as

percentage of
population that is
black in 1980 and

the age structure is
percentage of
population aged 18

Findings

church

membership,

criminogenic
effects of poverty

to 24 in 1980.

on economic

9-10

crime(9). Must
examine tables.

Messner and

Homicide rates and

Rosenfeld (1997)

decommodification

Countries (N=45)

No

vary inversely

WHO homicide rates

Decommodification index

Sex ratio (In);

OLS regression;

Weak to

per 100,000 averaged
over available years

(Welfare expenditures as % of
GDP; % for employment
injuries; spending per
capita—z-scores summed;
a=. 701); measures relative
dominance of economy over
polity (high values=low
economic dominance)

Gini income

homicide rates

moderate

inequality;

logged; missing

economic

data mean

discrimination

substitution

negative
relationship in
support of
theory

1980-1990

index (Gurr and
Scarritt 1989);
development
index (GNPC
(In), infant
mortality, %
>64, pop growth,
% urban, life
expectancy at

birth)
Savolianen (2000)

Economic inequality has
positive effect on lethal
violence(6)

Countries (Same as
Messner and

Rosenfeld 1997).
Second separate
sample(p. 9)- N=32

No

Same WHO stats
as Messner and

Economic inequality based on

Rosenfeld (1997),
logged for

WHO 1990

power based on government
spending on social security and
other welfare programs as a
percent of total welfare
expenditure(Pg. 9). Each dataset

disaggregated by

has interaction terms between

sknewness.

Second, uses

sex

GINI and institutional balance of

indicator of economic inequality
and decommodification

GDP per capita
(World Bank).
Population age
structure (UN for
years around
1990). Sex Ratio

OLS regression; no
multicollinearity;
missing data means
substitution

Both models

provide some
support.

Table 1- Continued

Study
Barton and Jensen

(2002)

Hypothesis(es)

Units of Analysis

LongitudinaL

Decommodification and

US (N=l)

Yes

homicide vary inversely

Control

Statistical

Institutional Variables

Variables

Method(s)

Findings

Homicide

Homicide rate data came from

Eckberg for 1900 to 1932 and
fromNCHS annual mortality

Cirrhosis death
rates per

Time-series

rate data came

Dependent Variable

from Eckberg for
1900 to 1932 and

fromNCHS

tables for 1933 to 1997.Inflation is
controlled for over time.

100,000 as a proxy

regression. Tests for
stationarity and

for alcohol

autocorrelation. Chow

Moderate support.
Although no
support for
changes in

consumption

breakpoint tests.

decommodifiation

annual mortality

Prohibition

tables for 1933 to

legislation, Mob

significantly
affecting

murders,

homicide

1997.7

immigration,
unemplorment
rates, divorce rates,
armed forces,
postwar period, age
structure of the

population
(2002)

The U.S. should rank

higher than other nations
in the importance of the
economy. Citizens of the
U.S. should rank higher
with regards to self-

International (N3454)

No

Logged homicide
rates per 100,000

Economy- Decommoficiation

from World Health

Organization. Survey measures of
family, work, leisure, and religion,
marriage/divorce ratio. Survey
measures of legitimate means and
commitment to goals.

Organization from
1990.

interest and utilitarian

from International Labour

Latin Country,
Birth rates,
Diversity, and per
capita wealth

OLS regression.
Normality tested.
Missing data filled in

No support.
Results counter to
IAT.

from other sources
such as Microcase

(58)

standards concerning law
breaking (58).
Maume and Lee

(2003)

Noneconomic
institutions will have a

U.S. Counties with

mediating effect on the
economy with regards to
creating criminogenic
pressures, as opposed to
moderating effects

100,000 or more
(N= 454)

population of

No

Total homicides
were obtained
from the

Supplementary
Homicide Reports
offender file for

the years 19901992.

1990 Gini coefficient for family
income inequality. Polity- average
of the voting rates for the 1988
and 1992 presidential elections.
Family- divorce for people 15
years of age and over. Educationaverage of educational
expenditures per person of school
age in the county for the years of
1987 and 1992. Religionadherence rate to civicallyengaged religious denominations
for 1990. Average monthly
welfare payments per poor person
adjusted for cost of living and also
the proportion of families
receiving welfare in an index.

Population
structure- z-scores

for the logged
population size and
population density.
Percentage of
people aged 15-29.

Negative binomial
regression.
Multicollinearity
addressed.

Moderate support,
strong mediating
effect of the
noneconomic
institutions on the

relationship
between income

Percent black.

inequality and

Dummy coded
South region

crime.

instrumental

Table 1- Continued

Study

Hypothesis(es)

Units of

Longi-tudinal?

Dependent Variable

Institutional

Analysis
Cullen, Parboteeah,
and Hoegl (2004)

Control

Statistical

Variables

Method(s)

Variables

The more dominant the

Individual-level data

Seven items that

Several items measuring each of

economy, the greater the
willingness of its
managers to justify
ethically suspect

from 3,450

represent unethical

the four cultural values:

managers across 28

behavior on a 1-10

nations in 2000.

scale and

individualism, achievement,
universalism, and fetishism of

No

combining them
using factor
analysis

behaviors

Age, gender
(dummy-coded),
marital status

money. Economy- Three-item

(dummy coded),
religious

measure for welfare socialism.

attendance.

HLM modeling.
Multicollinearity
addressed. Normality
and homoscedasticity

Moderate results

in support of
IAT.

not addressed.

Family- Marriage/divorce ratio.
Education- educational attainment
score.

Kim and Pridemore

(2005b)

Alcohol- Deaths

OLS regression.
Normality,
multicollinearity, and
homoskedasticity are

rates from alcohol

all taken care of.

poisoning. Cities
over 100,000

Missing data handled
using other indicators

people. Males aged

to regress on

25-44. North
Caucasus and East
of Ural Mountains

variables with

Economic

economic social

Socioeconomic change- residual
change (from 1992-2000) scores
for a composite index made up of
measures of the population,
poverty, unemployment,
privatization, and foreign capital

institutions (81).

investment in 2000 or closest

year. Family-1994 proportion of
single-parent families with at least

The association between
(socio-economic) change
and (property) crime is
conditioned by the
strength of non-

Regions in Russia
(N=78) for 2000.

No

Two separate DVsArmed robbery
rates and robbery
rates per 100,000

one child under 18. Education-

logged rate of people enrolled in
college per 1,000. Polity- logged
proportion of registered voters
who participated in the 2000
presidential elections (85-86).

Inequality- P80/20
income ratio.

were dummy
coded. Interaction
terms between
socioeconomic

change and the
three measures for
noneconomic
institutions of the

family, education,
and polity were
also included.

missing cases.

Little support
found for

hypothesis.

Table 1- Continued

Study

Hypothesis(es)

Units of Analysis
U.S. counties (N=77)

Longitudinal?

Dependent Variable

Gustafson

Commitment among citizen to
pursue monetary success, weak

(2007)

commitment among citizens to

the number of

legitimate means of pursing
monetary success goals, limited
legitimate opportunities for
pursuing monetary success,
limited or unequal educational

robberies, burglaries,

Baumer and

No

Crime rates-

composite variable of

for 1975-1976

larcenies, and auto
thefts per 100,000
residents in 1977

Institutional Variables

Control

Statistical

Variables

Method(s)

Degree of commitment to monetary
success goals and degree of weak
commitment to legitimate means for
pursuing monetary success goals

OLS regression.
Assumptions

Support was shown
through welfare

never mentioned.

assistance and time

spent socializing with
family members are

were each measured with GSS

questions. Economy- work force to
job ratio, low educational and

moderators of
dominant economic
values on crime.

economic attainment - six items.

and economic attainment, and

Education and income inequality-

commitment to and investment

income Gini and education Gini

in education, family, political,
community, and religious
institutions (629) are
responsible for explaining

coefficients. Education- percentage
of government expenditures on

Findings

education, as well as a separate
measure using pupils per teacher.
Family- a composite of three items
related to time spent with close

differences in instrumental

crime across geographic units.

relatives over the past month, and a
separate measure that
operationalizes marriage. Polityseparate measures of welfare
assistance and voter participation.
Religion- church adherence rates.
Community- four items measuring
social capital.
Muftic (2006)

Overall, that American students,

Individual, U.S. born

Series of 11

Cultural values of achievement,

relative to foreign-born

andnonU.S. born

questions on whether

individualism, universalism, and

students, will have an increased

students (N= 162)

adherence to economic goal

from Midwest

the student has
cheated or not.

orientations that increase

university from 2004.

fetishism of money were measured
using a composite of one to seven
questions from a survey. These four

cheating behaviors (630)

No

measures with factored into one

Moderate support- the

Age and categorical
measures of gender,

Binary logisitc
regression. No

institutions of the

U.S. born, and citizen

mentioned of

family and polity had

of the United States
were used as control
variables

assumptions of
logistic
regression.

an inverse

relationship with
cheating.

variable; The American Dream,

Universalism and

which was spilt into high and low
measures. Family and Education-

fetishism of money
predicted cheating,

several measures for each variable
factored into one variable for each

variables were

measure. Economy- whether student
was employed or not. Politywhether student was civically active.

when all other
controlled

Table 1- Continued

Study
Schoepfer and
Piquero (2006)

Hypothesis(es)
(1) Lower percentages of the
population without high school
degrees lessens the effect of
unemployment on rates of
embezzlement; (2) Lower
divorce/marriage ratios (less
divorces than marriages) lessen
the effect of unemployment on
embezzlement rates; (3)Hhigher
percentages of registered voters

Units of Analysis
U.S states (N=50)

Longitudinal?
No

Dependent Variable
Dependent variableembezzlement rates

per 100,000 from
UCR data from 1990
and Census data to

predicted rates of
embezzlement
inl991

Institutional Variables

Education- Percentage that did not
graduate from high school. PolityPercentage of people who
participated in 1990 general and
local elections. FamilyDivorce/marriage ratio. Economypercentage of population
unemployed. Interaction terms

Control

Statistical

Variables

Method(s)

None

Findings

Poisson

Moderate support-

regression.
Multicollinearity

The results of this

addressed

investigation were
supportive of IAT.
The additive effects

indicated that higher
levels of voter

between each noneconomic measure

participation were
prohibitive of

and the economy.

embezzlement while

increasing high
school dropout rates

who voted lessens the effect of

unemployment on
embezzlement (232)

exacerbated
embezzlement...

economy (and) polity,
was significant. The
sign of this interaction
implied that higher
rates of polity
weakened the effect

of unemployment on
embezzlement

(2006:223).
Freichs,
Munch, and
Monika (2008)

Two - robbery rate

Economic inequality- two

Labor market

Normality was

Little direct support

per 100,000 and

measures—the Gini coefficient and

assessed. GMM

an individual failure to obtain

homicide rate per

P90/P10 earnings ratio. Education-

flexibility- long-term
unemployment.

used to correlate

for IAT. Tested a
different version of

goals and a failure at the
structural level to integrate
members of society successfully

100,000.

Tertiary school enrollment rates.
Family- Two measures, Female
employment and divorce rates.
Decommodification (Economy)-

Punitivenes-

for possible

anomie. However,

imprisonment rates.
proportion of men
aged population for

autocorrelation.
Minor

multicollinearity

their research design
proved successful as
they were able to

15-29 and also the

was not

demonstrate that

proportion of men
unemployed 15-24.
GDP per capitadummy variables for
each year to control

addressed.

individual inclusion

Multiple
imputation used
to handle missing

exclusion on the one

Overall, higher crime rates will
result at the individual level by

Cross-national

(N=20)

Yes

Union density rates and rates of
public expenditure

for time

data.

and stratified
hand and different

strategies of
integration
(represented by the
institutional

indicators) on the
other hand interlink in

regulating the
incidence of crime

(209)
-^1

Table 1- Continued

Longi-

Study

Hypothesis(es)

Units of Analysis

Bjerregaard

Nations with the highest

Cross-national.

and Cochran

structural anomie will have the

(N=49)

(2008a)

highest rates of homicide.

tudinal?
No

Dependent Variable

Institutional Variables

Control

Statistical

Variables

Method(s)

Findings

Economy- measure of economic
freedom. Economic inequality- Gini

Economic growth-

rates from 1996-

How advanced each

OLS RegressionAll assumptions

1999.

coefficient of household income.

nation's economy

met. However,

provided mixed
support for

Logged homicide

These models

Strength of economy- logged GDP

was. Measured

VIFs were higher

institutional anomie

in U.S. Dollars. All were mean

through annual
percentage growth in
GDP, averaged from

and should be

theory. Although, the

considered

GDP and Gini
coefficient were

centered Two-way interaction terms
between each of the three economic

variables, as well as a three-way
interaction term. Family- divorce
rate. Polity- Percentage of registered
voters who did not participate.
Education- expenditures on
education as a percentage of the

problematic.

significant as
predictors of
homicide rates, only
the polity was
significant as a

1995 to 1997.

noneconomic
moderator of

GDP

economic dominance
on homicide rates.

Bjerregaard

The effect that noneconomic

Cross-National

and Cochran

institutions will have either a

(N=49)

(2008b)

mediating or moderating effect
on crimes rates.

No

Two - Total thefts

and logged homicide
rates per 100,000 for
1997 or 1996 if not
available

Economy- measure of economic
freedom. Economic inequality- Gini

Due to problem of
multicollinearity, the

OLS regressionAll assumptions

coefficient of household income.

sex ratio, an index of
racial heterogeneity,
and percentage of
population aged 15-

were met.

Strength of economy- logged GDP
in U.S. Dollars. Familycombination of measures for divorce
rates and females in the labor force.
Education- combined variable of the

measures illiteracy rates and pupilto-teacher ratios. Polity- percentage
of registered voters who did not
participate in last election.

The study yielded
very limited results in
support of
institutional anomie

theory.

29 were combined
into one control

variable. Affluence-

composite measure
that combined

measures of GDP per
capita in U.S. dollars,

life expectancy, and
annual health

expenditures.

o

Table 1- Continued

Study
Stults and
Baumer
(2008)

Hypothesis(es)
An expanded anomie model in
which an unbalanced pecuniary
value system - the core causal
variable in Merton's theory and
IAT - translates into higher
levels of homicide primarily in
indirect ways by increasing
levels of firearm prevalence,
drug market activity, and
property crime, and by
enhancing the degree to which
these factors stimulate lethal

outcomes (216).

Units of Analysis
U.S. Counties

(N=74). GSS data
from mid-to-late
1970s.

Longitudinal?
No

Dependent Variable

Institutional Variables

Control

Statistical

Variables

Method(s)
OLS regressionAssumption of
linearity met.

Findings
Weak supportproperty crime was
the strongest

DV-1976-1978

Mediation

Daily TV.- mean

averaged homicide
rates per 100,000
people

variables- firearm prevalence
measured by combining measures
regarding ownership and suicide
rates. Logged drug mortality rates
per 100,000 from NCHS averaged
from 1976-1978. Property crime per

number of hours

watching television.
Logged population
size and logged
population density
were combined to

effect of social
structure on homicide
rates. In the second

100,000 from 1977 UCR data.

create a population

series of models,

Separate GSS questions responses
capture the variables degree of

structure variable.

social institutions had

Age structure-

a mixed effect on
different sets of

commitment to monetary success

goals and degree of weak
commitment to legitimate means.
Interaction terms for the two cultural
values were used. Education-

percentage of government

expenditures on education, as well
as a separate measure using pupils
per teacher. Family- a composite of
three items related to time spent
with close relatives over the past
month, and a separate measure that
operationalizes marriage. Polityseparate measures of welfare
assistance and voter participation.
Religion- church adherence rates.
Community- four items measuring
social capital. Social structural
positions are computed from three
separate variables. Limited job
opportunities are measured as the
ratio of total persons aged 16 and
older activity in or seeking in the job
market to the number of jobs

percentage of the
population aged 16 to
34. Police strength police officers per

moderator of the

models.

100,000 residents.
The South- region
dummy variable.
Resource

deprivationmeasured by
combining the
percentage who are
poor, the percentage
of families with

children headed by a
female, the

percentage of
residents who are

black, and median

family income into
one variable

available. The variable low
educational and economic

attainment was composed of six
items. Educational and income

inequality were measured by the
income Gini and education Gini
coefficients.

oc
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CHAPTER IV
METHODS

The Setting: Institutional Anomie Theory in Europe

The aim of this thesis is to explain the changes that occurred within Europe that
have led to increases in crime victimization. Beginning in the 1970s and 1980s, and

continuing after the formation of the European Union, a shift began for once strong social
welfare states. This shift moved these nations toward economies that emphasized the

free-market and individual responsibility, and a diminished social safety net. This also
caused a shift in the institutional balance of power, as the economy became more
dominant over other noneconomic institutions. For example, the four Nordic countries of

Norway, Sweden, Finland, and Denmark had traditionally provided their citizens with the
most access to social welfare programs of all of the European nations. This was possible

as unemployment had been relatively low since the end of World War II. However, in the
1990s unemployment rose due to a hard recession that caused production and revenues to
fall sharply. Within a few years, out of a reaction to the high unemployment rates, neo-

liberal policies began to be passed in these nations, making it harder to obtain
unemployment benefits. This led to changes towards stricter welfare policies throughout
each of the four Nordic nations up to the present time (Johannson 2001:63-64).
A second case that follows a similar trajectory is the Netherlands. Oorschot
(2006:58) describes how the Netherlands, which three decades ago could have been
labeled a social democratic state, has shifted ".. .from a system based on collective

solidarity towards one predominantly based on individual responsibility. In the process,

the degree of social spending has decreased significantly." Many of the original social
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welfare programs had begun following the conclusion of World War II with the notion
that the citizens of the Netherlands deserve security and protection. Beginning in the late

1970s and early 1980s, in the context of an economic crisis and other domestic

challenges such as a large aging population and high inactivity rates, many of the social
welfare benefits Dutch citizens had enjoyed were changed or removed. However, in the

mid-1980s, the economy recovered and unemployment rates slowly dropped fromjust

overten percent in 1985 to six percent in 1990 (Orrschot 2002:401), and economic and
monetary reasons were no longer the argument for the reduction of social welfarism, but
instead such reductions were justified based on a growing moral objection that

individuals neededto be more responsible for their actions. Since 1980, total welfare

expenditures as a percentage of its GDP has dropped from 26.9 to 21.8 percent, while old
age, disability, unemployment, andfamily benefit expenditures, as well as active labor
market policies, have all beenreduced during this timeframe (Oorschot 2006:60-62).
Although not nearly as severe, the shiftfrom social welfarism to a more free-

market economy in Europe was similar to what happened to the United States beginning
in the 1970s. The nations used in the example were nations that had tried to protecttheir
citizens from the harsh effects of a free-market economy. These two sets of nations have

not beenthe only nations in Europe experiencing welfare retrenchment. Korpi (2003)
examines the overall state of social welfare policy and the shift from the social contract

of full employment and a social welfare state to the reduction of social rights. In many
instances these policies can be seen as reactive measures to short term problems (e.g.,

recession, highunemployment) that have had very longterm consequences. With the

growth of the European Union, many nations have had to deal with market policies that
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have opened their borders to migrant workers, with many of these migrant workers
willing to work for less money and without benefits. Employees who still want to remain
members of the work force have to often do so with lower wages, slashed benefits, and

littlejob security. Once again this follows a trend that began in the United States.

Using institutional anomie theory, this study will test to see if thistransition from
autonomous nations to one unified economy has led to an institutional dominance of the

economy over other social institutions throughout Europe. In direct relation to this, we
will see if this change has caused a cultural shifttowards monetary success over other
values andnorms. Finally, this study willtest to see if this structural and cultural shift
towards economic dominance is responsible for increases in crime victimization overthe
last decade.

The study is unique in that it tests institutional anomie theory in the context of the
changing landscape of Europe over time. Although the examples given focus onmore
advanced nations, less developed nations suchas some of the Eastern European nations

that belong to the European Union are also used inthis study. This is due to the policies
that have affected the institutional balance of powertowards one that greatly favors the

economy have been felt throughout the EU and nations that have close ties with it.
Data Sources

Two different datasets are be used in this study. The use of two datasets can

provide greater reliability if they yield similar findings. The main dataset is the European
Social Survey. Beginning in 2002, the ESS provides data for thefull sample of the study
(N=19) with 17 being members of the European Union (Austria, Belgium, Czech
Republic, Germany, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, United Kingdom, Greece,
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Hungary, Ireland, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Sweden, Slovenia), while two
(Switzerland and Norway) are not members. The second supplementary dataset will come
from the Eurostat database. The Eurostat database was selected because it is identified by

the European Social Survey as being a compatible dataset for providing contextual

variables. The major difference is that the European Social Survey relies on individual
survey responses from citizens of each of the respective countries, while Eurostat
provides macro-level data from each respective nation.
The ESS datasets are available from European Social Survey website

(http:/www.EuropeanSocialSurvey.org). Background information for the project and
datasest can be found by clicking on the data documentation on the main page. On the

next page the user will click on data archive, as this will direct the user to files that can be
downloaded for each round of surveys (round 1 was collected in 2002, round 2 in 2004,
round 3 in 2006, and round 4 in 2008) and provides information on the data collection

methods employed in each round (http://ess.nsd.uib.no/). Each round differs slightly from
the others, as each has a different focus. However, each round contains the same

variables that will be used for this test of institutional anomie theory. Level-1 and level-2

data will come from the survey responses. Level-1 variables are based on questions that
serve as control variables. Level-2 captures measures of institutions by aggregating up

survey questions to the country level that capture the relative strength of a particular
noneconomic institutions.

Data for the first round of the European Social Survey were collected in 2002.

Originally 22 nations were used in the sample, with 15 being European Union nations,
and 7 not being from the European Union. However, I removed one case (Israel), as it
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really is not a part of Europe. A random probability sample of adults was used in each
nation. The surveys were conducted through hour long face-to-face interviews. Survey
question responses included discrete response choices (nominal and Likert scale

questions), as well as continuous response choices (full-range of responses). Topics
covered included, but were not limited to

Immigration and asylum; citizenship and engagement; public trust; political
interest and participation; socio-political orientations; governance and efficacy;
moral, political and social values; social exclusion; national, ethnic and religious
allegiances; well-being, health and security; demographics and socio economics
(Norwegian Social Science Data Services 2002:5).

The second round of the European Social Survey was done in 2004. In all there
were 23 nations in the sample, with 20 being European Union nations (Austria, Belgium,
Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland,

Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, and
Sweden), and 3 not being from the European Union (Iceland, Norway, and Switzerland).
Random probability samples of adults were used in each nation. The surveys were

conducted through hour long face-to-face interviews. Survey question responses included
discrete response choices (nominal and Likert scale questions), as well as continuous

response choices (full-range of responses). Topics covered included, but were not limited
to, media; social trust; political interest and participation; socio-political orientations;
social exclusion; national, ethnic and religious allegiances; health and care seeking;
economic morality; demographics and socioeconomics; family, work and well-being
(Norwegian Social Science Data Services 2004:6).

The third round of European Social Survey was conducted in 2006. There were 20
nations in the sample, with 18 being European Union nations (Austria, Belgium,
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Bulgaria, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Netherlands,
Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and United Kingdom), and 2 not

being from the European Union (Norway and Switzerland). A random probability sample
of adults was used in each nation. The surveys were conducted through hour long face-to-

face interviews. Survey question responses included discrete response choices (nominal
and Likert scale questions), as well as continuous response choices (full-range of
responses). Topics covered included, but were not limited to

media; social trust; political interest and participation; socio-political orientations;
social exclusion; national, ethnic and religious allegiances; timing of key life
events and the life course; personal and social well-being and satisfaction with
work and life; demographics and socio economics (ESS DocumentationReport
2006:6).

The fourth round of European Social Survey was conducted in 2008. In this round
there were 22 nations in the sample, with 20 beingEuropean Union nations (Belgium,

Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,

Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain,
Sweden, and United Kingdom), and 2 not being from the European Union (Norway and

Switzerland). A random probability sample of adults was used in each country. The

surveys were conducted through hour long face-to-face interviews. Survey question
responses included discrete response choices (nominal and Likert scale questions), as
well as continuous response choices (full-range of responses). Topics covered includes,
but were not limited to

media; social trust; political interest and participation; socio-political orientations;
social exclusion; national, ethnic and religious allegiances; attitudes towards and

experiences of ageism; attitudes to welfare provision and service delivery;
demographics and socio economics (ESS Documentation Report 2008:7).

88

Two sets of analyses were run to test institutional anomie theory. One set of tests
used all of the European countries available in each survey. Thus, the level-2 sample size
is different for each survey year (2002, N=19; 2004, N=23; 2006, N=20; and 2008,
N=22). The second set of tests used the set of countries that is common across survey

rounds (N=16)\ Use of the full set of countries available for each year increased the
number of cases and hence the power of the statistical tests, while use of the common set

of countries increased comparability. If both sets of tests yield the same results,
confidence in the findings will be increased.
In our second dataset, Eurostat statistics

(http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/statistics/themes), was used to provide
macro-level institutional measures for the same points in time. The use of a second

dataset can lend support for the findings from the first dataset and vice versa. Using this
second dataset can also allow this study to use some of the measures that were used in

previous studies to see if similar results are obtained. The Eurostat datawere only be used
for measures of the institutions, thus it was only used at level-2. For example, this dataset
allowed creation of a decommodification index, which is used as a measure of economic

strength in relation to the institution of the polity. Three variables were created using
statistics from these data. These three measures are the ones reflecting the relative

strength of the economy to the polity, education, and family, respectively.
Variables

The dependent variable or outcome variable is the variable that taps into the

prevalence of crime within a givencountry. Our level-1 unit of analysis is the individual,
so this measure is from the individual level. The European Social Survey has a question
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regarding crime victimization (Norwegian Social Science Data Services 2002:38), "Have
you or a member of your household been the victim of a burglary or assault in the last 5
years?" This was used to measure crime at the individual level. Response choices are

(l=yes), (2=no), (7=refusal to answer), (8=Don't Know), and (9= No answer). This
variable was dummy coded as yes being 1 and all else being 0. It is necessary to dummy
code this variable as it needs to be transformed into a binary variable for use in logistic
regression.

Control variables in this study are used to account for differences in population

composition across nations. Because European Social Survey data has not been used in
previous studies, the control variables that were used are unique to this study for the most
part. Missing data for each variable was handled by imputing missing data. This was

done through in SPSS by using the multiple imputation function. Multiply imputing all of
the measures for social institutions at level-1 before aggregation also removed any

missing data at level-2 for the European Social Survey dataset.

The question "Are you a citizenof [country]?" (Norwegian Social Science Data
Services 2002b:42) was used as a control variable in this study. The responses to this

question are coded (l=yes), (2=no), (7=refusal to answer), (8=Don't Know), and (9=No
answer). Respondents who are a citizenof the country where they live should be less
likely to be the victimof a crime, due to the higherprobability they are in more stable
socioeconomic group and also less likely to be a minority in the country. Citizen of
country was coded with no being 0, yes being 1.

The question, "Do you belong to a minority ethnic group in [country]"

(Norwegian Social Science Data Services2002b:43), was used as a control variable that
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measures membership in a disadvantageous group. This control variable is distinct from
that of citizenship as members of minority groups can be citizens of from the country.

The responses to this question are coded as (l=yes), (2=no), (7=refusal to answer),
(8=Don't Know), and (9= No answer). This control variable was dummy coded with 0
being yes and 1 being no.

Gender is a variable that has been used in previous research as a control variable.

Research shows women are less likely to commit crimes, as well as less likely to be

crime victims. The question"CODE SEX, respondent" or gender (Norwegian Social
Science Data Services 2002b:62) is coded as 1 for male, 2 for female, and 9 for no
answer. Gender was recoded with female 1 and male equal to 0.

"Age of respondent, calculated" (Norwegian Social Science Data Services
2002b:63) was used as a control variable. Those in younger age groups (under 25) are

most likely to commit crimes as well as to be crime victims. In prior studies such as Kim
and Pridemore (2006), age specific groups are examined. However, this variable is
continuous and includes the full range of values. Recoding of the imputed data was done
to ensure that the minimum value was set at 15 and maximum value was set at 102. Any

value belowthe minimum age was recoded as 15 and any value above the maximum was
recoded as 102.

To control for the size of the area a respondent lives in, the variable domicile was

used. The respondent was specifically asked, "Whichphrase on this card best describes
the area where you live?" (Norwegian Social Science Data Services 2002b:65), with
response choices (1= A big city), (2= The suburbs of outskirts of bit city), (3= A town or

small city), (4= A country village), (5= A farm or home in the countryside), (7=refusal to
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answer), (8= don't know), and (9= No answer). Onaverage people are much more likely
to be crime victims in large urban areas than in smallertowns and rural areas.

Up until the fall of the Soviet Union, several of the nations used in this study were
communist, rather than democratic, free-market nations, while not every nation that

adopted communism belonged to the Soviet Union, such asthe former nation of

Yugoslavia. By the time the Soviet Union collapsed, all these previously communist
nations had adopted free-market economies. A dummy variable was created for nations
that were former communist nations, as these nations may have differentpatternsof

crime victimization, as they have more recently adopted free-market economies. This
variable was dummy coded with (1= former communist nations) and (0= all other
nations).

The second level (level-2) of analysis is at the nation-state level. Every analysis

conducted was intended to explain variations that are occurring across nations. All of
level-2 variables from the European Social Survey are aggregated to the national level
from the individual responses. These variables are aggregated by creating a mean or

median, depending on the level ofmeasurement, for all ofthe respondents ofa given

country. These variables were recoded, if necessary atthe first level. All ofthe variables
used at the second level measure the relative strength of the social institutions vis-a-vis

the economy. With the ESS dataset, separate measures are used for a cultural item,

religion, education, and family. The second set ofmeasures comes from Eurostat, which
includes a decommodification index that measures the strength of the polity relative to

the economy. Other Eurostat measures include measures for the strength ofthe family
and education in relation to the economy.

92

Religion is the first noneconomic institution included in this study. People who
spend more time involved in religion should be less involved in the institution of the

economy and vice versa. Religionis a noneconomic institution that is typically left out of
cross-national studies due to the lack of government statistics on religious adherence and

membership. However, ESS data provide a measure of religious involvement through the
question (C 14),"Apart from special occasions such as weddings and funerals, abouthow
often do you attend religious services nowadays?" (Norwegian Social Science Data

Services 2002b:40). This variable was originally coded as (1= Every day), (2= More than

once a week), (3= Once a week), (4= At leastonce a month), (5= Only on special holy
days), (6= Less often), (7= Never), (77=Refusal), (88=Don'tknow), and (99 No
answer). Coding for the religion variable was reversed so that higherreligious

involvement would be represented by a higher value (7= Every day) and lower religious
adherence would be represented by a lower score (1= Never).
Education is the second noneconomic institution used in this study. It is one of the

key variables Messner and Rosenfeld (2007) discuss. Education has been measured
differently in numerous studies. For instance, Bjerregaard and Cochran (2008b) measured
education by combining illiteracy rates and pupil-to-teacher ratios into one variable based
on the results of a principal components analysis. Maume andLee (2003) measured
education as the average of educational expenditures per person of school age in the

county for the years of 1987 and 1992. Education in this study was measured from the

response to the question (Norwegian Social Science Data Services 2002b:33), "What is
the highest level of education you have achieved?" Response categories included (0=Not

possible to harmonise into 5-level ISCED), (1= Less thanlower secondary education),
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(2= Lower secondary education completed), (3= Upper secondary education completed),
(4= Post-secondary non-tertiary education completed), (5= Tertiary education

completed), (55= Other) (77= Refusal), (88= Don't know), and (99= No answer). The
value "Other" was recoded as system missing. Respondents who have obtained higher

education are more likely to earn more money and thus live outside of areas that have
higher rates of crime victimization.
The final noneconomic institution based on the ESS dataset is the family. The

family is an important buffer from the harsh effects ofa free-market economy. The

stronger a family is, and the more time they spend together as a whole, the less they
should be affected by the economy. Acommon way that the strength ofthe family has

been measured is through divorce rates, as this isviewed as a form offamily disruption

(Maume and Lee 2003; Schoepfer and Piquero 2006). Family strength was measured
using the question (F 58), "Could I ask about your current legal marital status?

(Norwegian Social Science Data Services 2002b:87) Which ofthe descriptions on this
card applies to you?" (Appendix A3 2002:87). Response choices to the question were (1=
Married), (2= Separated (still legally married)), (3= Divorced), (4= Widowed), (5= Never
married), (6= Pacte de solididarite (PACS)), (7= Refusal), (8= Don't know) (9= No

answer). Marital status was measured with avariable for France and a separate variable
for the rest ofthe ESS. First, both ordinal variables had to be recoded with the categories

divorced and separated as equal to 1, with all else equal to 0. Then the variables had to be
merged by combining the responses for 1and 0into one marital status variable.
The second set of institutional measures comes from the Eurostat database. The

first measure used is the decommodification index. A decommodification index has been
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used by researchers such as Messner and Rosenfeld (1997b) and Savolainen (2000) to
test the strength of the economy relative to the polity. Messner and Rosenfeld

(1997b:1399) originally used a decommodification index based on the justification that

".. .general expenditure patterns reflects the underlying logic of social welfare programs."
Results in Messner and Rosenfeld (1997b) and Savolainen found that a

decommodification index was highly correlated with crime rates. They measured

decommodificationby combining three measures—social expenditures as a percentage of

gross domestic product, social expendituresper capita, and percentage of social
expenditures on disability. A principal components analysis was run to determine
whether these three statistics can be justifiably combined into one measure All three
measures were obtained from the Eurostat database for each country. These measures

were converted to z-scores prior to analysis.
Education is another institution that can be measured with data available in the

Eurostat database. The relative strength of the institution of education in comparison to

the economy is measured using the annual expenditure on public and private educational

institutions. The higher the amount of spending, the less dominant the economy should be
with regardsto the institution of education. Baumerand Gustafson (2007) and

Bjerregaard and Cochran (2008a) used a similar measure in their study, as they used
public school expenditures as a percentage of the GDP.

The strength of the family was also measured using Eurostat data on family

composition. Similar to the measure based on the ESS, the Eurostat measure for family
strength was based on the prevalence of marriages and divorces. Family strength was
measured as the ratio of marriages to divorces per 1,000 for a given year. This has been
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usedin several studies (e.g., Chamlin and Cochran 1995) as a measure of the strength of
the institution of the family. More specific data on the composition of the family is not
available for all the nations in the sample. Higher divorces should result from a culture
and social structure that emphasize the importance of the economy and monetary success,

because more time will be spent at work and less with family. Therefore, a higher ratio of

marriages to divorces should result in lower rates of crime victimization.

Social structure represents only halfof the theoretical framework of institutional
anomie theory. Totestinstitutional anomie theory properly, one must include measures
that tap into cultural values that favor the "American Dream" or monetary success over

other values. Using the European Social Survey, two items were used to tap into the

cultural importance ofmonetary success. The first variable, ipsuces, measures the

importance ofbeing successful to an individual. The second variable, imprich, measures

the importance ofbeing rich, having money and expensive things to an individual. They
were reverse coded so thatthe higher the values on these Likert scales, the higher

importance an individual attaches to being successful or rich. Principal components and
reliability analyses were conducted to verify that the variables could be combined in a
summated scale. This measure was aggregated to be used as a level-2 variable.
Hypothesized Models

The level-1 model in HLM is composed of the dichotomous outcome variable,
crime victimization, andthe individual-level control variables. Logistic regression

models the log odds of crime victimization asa function ofthe individual-level

predictors. The logit coefficients (ft's) show the increase inthe log odds ofcrime
victimization for a unitchange in the independent variable of interest, and when
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exponentiated, they show howmany times the odds of crime victimization increase for a
unitchange in the independent variable. The symbol ny is used for the mixed logit model
for the dichotomous variable. Presented below is the actual equation from HLM of the

level-1 model. In this regression equation ft0jrepresents the intercept, whileftij-ft6j

represent the logit coefficients for each of the level-1 variables—dummy variable for
citizen of nation (CTZCNTR), Minority status (MINORITY), respondents gender

(GENDER), Age of respondent (AGE), size of domicile (DOMICILE), and being to the
former communist bloc (CommunistBloc).

Each of these level-1 predictors is expected to have an effect on the dependent

variable. Respondents who are citizens of the country are hypothesized to have lower log

odds of being the victimized. Respondents who are members of a minority within a given

country are hypothesized to have higher log odds of being the victimized. Being female

is hypothesized to decrease the log odds ofbeing victimized. It is hypothesized that the
younger the respondent is, the higher the log odds of being victimized. Living in larger
cities is hypothesized to increase the log odds of being victimized. Finally, living a
former communist bloc country is hypothesized to increase the log odds of being
victimized.
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Level-1 Model

?rob(CRMVCTDVirl\ftj) = fa
\og[</>ij/(l-<t>ij)] = r\y

r\t, =ftoj +ftij^CTZCNTRjj) +ft2j* (MINORITY^ +ft3j*(GENDER^ +ft^AGEDQj) +
ft5j*(DOMICILEij) + ^/(CommunistBloCy)

The Level-2 model(s) is a random-intercept model where differences in adjusted

mean log odds ofcrime victimization across countries are modeled as a function ofthe
social institutional variables. Only the intercept is specified as random in the model(s),

which means that only the intercept can vary randomly across nations, while all of the
effects of the level-1 variables are specified as fixed (i.e., the same) across nations.
Presented below is the level-2 model that includes the institutional measures from the

European Social Survey and Eurostat. In this model, ftoj represents the intercept atlevel1. The symbol y0o represents the intercept atlevel-2, while inmodel 1, yoi- yo2 are the
institutional and cultural variables, cultural values variable (cultural item) and

decommodification index (DECOMM). Due to the small number ofnations inthe sample
for the common set of countries, as well as the full set of nations for the year 2002, both
sets of models will be broken down into more analyses, as the maximum number of
variables allowed at level-2 will be three. Each subsequent model includes each one of

the following institutions asy0i\ variable religiosity (ESSRELIG), educational attainment

level (ESSEDUCA), family composition (ESSFAMIL), annual educational expenditures

(ESEDUCAT), marriage-to-divorce ration (ESFAMILY). The symbol u0j represents the
random intercept part for the models.
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With the first dataset, the level-2 (across nations) variables are each expected to
affect the dependent variable. First, countries that have placed higher average importance

on being rich and successful are expected to have higher log odds of crime victimization.
Countries with higher average religiosity are hypothesized to have lower log odds of
crime victimization. Countries that have higher average education attainment levels are

hypothesized to have lower log odds of crime victimization. Countries that have higher
rates of divorce on average are hypothesized to have higher log odds of crime
victimization. For the second level-2 dataset, countries with higher average religiosity are

hypothesized to have lower log odds of crime victimization. Countries with higher
decommodification scores are hypothesized to have lower log odds of crime

victimization. Countries with higher annual expenditures on education are hypothesized
to have lower log odds of crime victimization. Countries with a higher ratio of marriedto-divorce ratios are hypothesized to have lower log odds of crime victimization.

Level-2 Model with

ftoj-Joo + yoi*(Decommod) + yo2*(Culturalitemj) + yo3*("institutionalmeasurej) uoj
ftlj = Jio

ft2j = y20
fty = 730

$4] ~ 740
ft5j = 750
ft6j = 760
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Statistical Methods

Missing Data

Missing data from individual survey responses were handled by multiple
imputation. This was done in SPSS by first separating each nation using split file.
Separating the responses by each nation, gives a more accurate estimate of an actual

response from a citizen of that particular country. Thus, the imputed data are more
reliable than not splitting the file. Then, missing responses were estimated by running
multiple imputation in SPSS. One major strength of using multiple imputation over more

traditional methods of handling missing data such as listwise or pairwise deletion is it
allows the researcher to maintain the highest possible sample size, as cases are not

deleted if the surveys are not answered completely. Allison (2000:301-302) argues that
when using multiple imputation "[introducing appropriate random error into the

imputation process makes it possible to get approximately unbiased estimates of all
parameters. No deterministic imputation method can do this in general settings."
Repeated imputations also allow for better standard error estimates, with the average
number of repeated imputations ranging from three to five. Allison also discusses three

assumptions that must be met when considering the use of multiple imputation:
[fjirst, the data must be missing at random, meaning that the probability of
missing data on a particular variable Y can depend on the other variables,
but not on Y itself (controlling for the other observed variables). Second,
the model used to generate the imputed values must be "correct" in some
sense. Third, the model used for the analysis must match up, in some
sense, with the model used in the imputation (2000:302).

However, determining whether or not the data is truly missing at random is something
that can easily be mistaken.
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Regression Diagnostics

Since the dependent variable is dichotomous, Bernoulli binary logistic regression

will be used. Normality andhomogeneity of variance are not required withbinary logistic

regression, thus only multicollinearity and linearity must be assessed using SPSS. Both
the level-1 and level-2 data must be addressed separately. There are four main tests for

multicollinearity: VIFs (variance inflation factor), condition indexes, tolerances, and

eigenvalues. VIFs measure how the much the variances increase because of higher
correlated independent variables in a regression analysis. The cutoff value for each VIF is
2.5. Tolerance measures amount of unique variance in each independent variable. The
closer the value is to 0, the more the variable has variance that overlaps withthe other

independent variables inthe equation. Eigenvalues that are close to zero are considered

problematic. The condition index is a ratio ofan eigenvalue ofone ofthe independent
variables onthe other independent variables. Dimensions with a condition index above

30 could be problematic. Excessive multicollinearity at level-1 would be addressed by
either removing the variable from the model or leaving it in with a specific justification.

The assumption oflinearity must be addressed separately. ABox-Tidwell test was used
to assess the linearity ofthe contiuous variables, age. This was done by computing Box-

Tidwell variables for my continuous level-1 variables. I then ran a binary regression with
all ofmy original predicators and my new Box-Tidwell term inthe model. The BoxTidwell term is likely to be significant at the .05 level, due to the large sample size. Thus
we must look at the odds coefficients to see if they greatly differ from 1 to see if linearity
is a problem.
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Analysis Procedures

This study used hierarchal generalized linear modeling procedures in HLM 7.0 to
test institutional anomie theory within nations, as well as testing for variations across

nations. Hierarchal generalized linear modeling is a statistical tool that allows testing of
multilevel models. I created two separate analysis files for each of the datasets, one with
the common set of 16 countries, and the other with all available countries for the given

survey year. As I was looking at four different points in time (2002, 2004, 2006, 2008),
two different sets of countries per year, there will be 8 models total. After each dataset
was loaded into HLM 7.0, Bernoulli logistic regression was selected. Restricted
maximum likelihood estimation was selected. The design weight for the level-1 ESS data
was used to make the data representative of the population in each nation.

Following Hox (2010), I ran several models with hierarchical generalized linear

modeling to helpjustify my final two-level model. My modeling beganwithjust my
outcome variable at level-1 and overdispersion on. I then ran an intraclass correlation test

to see if I had enough variation between nations to justify a two-level model. When there

was significant variation in crimevictimization across nations the need for a multilevel

model was established. When the residual variation at level 1, o2, is close to 1,1 then
turned off over dispersion for the rest of my models. After this I ran the model including
all of the level-1 predictors. Following this I ran a random-intercept model with the
institutional and cultural variables included as predictors of cross-national differences in
crime victimization. The model first contained only the decommodification index and the

cultural item. Next, separate models were run with the decommodification index, cultural
item, as well as one institutional variable.
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In the next chapter, I present the results of my analyses. Besides simply

explaining and tabling the results for the models I also compare the results of the models
using ESS institutional measures with those based on Eurostat institutional measures.
This is important to see if the different sets of measures yield comparable results.

Similarity in significant findings with both sets of measures can lend empirical

justification to using either survey data or aggregate data for testing institutional anomie
theory. Finally, Chapter 6 discusses the findings, addresses limitations, and draws
conclusions for this study.
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CHAPTER V
FINDINGS

Preliminary Diagnostics

There are two assumptions to be met in logistic regression—non-problematic
levels of multicollinearity (i.e., no perfect or near perfect correlation or redundancy

between the independent variables)—and a linear relationship between the continuous
independent variables and the log odds of the dependent variable (Menard 2002:67-78).
Therefore, the first step in the analysis was to check to be sure these two
assumptions were met.

Collinearity diagnostics were examined for both level-1 (within nations) and
level-2 models (across nations). These diagnostics revealed that the variances and
standard errors of the coefficients are minimally inflated by collinearity and that each

independent variable has sufficient unique variation. The condition indexes at level 2 did
show some instability in the results, but this is in part due to the small number of nations

included in the analysis. uThus, there was no evidence that multicollinearity was having
an adverse effect on the logistic regression results. This is consistent throughout all years,
therefore no changes to the current data sets due to multicollinearity were necessary.
The Box-Tidwell test was used to test for nonlinearity. This test involved

computing the Box-Tidwell term for my only continuous level-1 variable, age of
respondent, by multiplying it by its natural log. A binary regression with all of the
original predictors at level-1 and the new Box-Tidwell term was then performed. The
Box-Tidwell term for age had a p-value of <.001 indicating that it is statistically
significant. The original age variable's direction of relationship flipped, causing it to now
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have a positive relationship with the dependent variable. The tests were consistent for all
data sets. To fix this problem of nonlinearity, three separate dummy variables were

created: ages 41 to 60, 61-80, and 81 to the highest age (102). Ages 15 to 40 is the
reference group. Each dummy variable has one of three age groups coded as 1 andevery

other age group coded as 0. Atlevel2, there were no problems with nonlinearity with any
of the continuous variables, thus nothing was done with regards to recoding variables at
level 2.

Analyses and Results

Findingsfor 2002 Full Sample ofNations

Table 2 presents the results ofthe logistic regression for the full sample of nations
available in2002 (N=19). Model 1 isthe intercept-only model, estimated to determine
whether there is sufficient variation in crime victimization across nations to warrant a

multilevel analysis. This model shows that 15.05% ofthe variation in crime
victimization is between nations, thus showing the need for a multilevel analysis.
Model 2 shows the results of the level-1 model. Five of the level-1 variables are

statistically significant, three being age dummy variables. Females were 11.6% less

likely to be crime victims than males (b = -.122 , p =.001). In addition, the dummy coded
variable for ages 41 to 60 was significant (b = -.151, p = <.001), as belonging to this age

group reduced the odds ofcrime victimization by 14.0% compared with the reference
group ofthose aged 15 to 40. Belonging to the second dummy coded age group (ages 61
to 80) reduced the odds ofcrime victimization by 50.0% compared with the reference

group ofthose aged 15 to 40 (b= -.693, p = <.001). Finally, belonging to the third dummy
coded age group (ages 81 tohighest) reduced the odds ofcrime victimization by 61.6%
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compared with the reference group of those aged 15 to 40 (b= -.957, p = <.001). Thus,
the relationship between age and crime victimization is nonlinear as indicated by the
Box-Tidwell test. Finally, living in smaller places significantly reduced the odds of

crime victimization by 22.4% for every decrease in domicile size (b = -.254, p = <.001).
The remaining independent variables at level 1—minority, citizen, and living in a former
Soviet Bloc nation—were not statistically significant.
Models 3 through 8 present the results of the level-2 analyses that test institutional
anomie theory. Each of these models contains the decommodification index that

measures the strength of the polity relative to the economy, with high values indicating

the polity is strong relative to the economy, and the cultural measure of the importance of
being rich, having money and expensive things, and being successful, with high values

indicating high importance. Model 3 includes these two measures alone. Models 4
through 8 each include one additional institutional measure. This procedure was
followed due to the small sample size at level 2 and the resulting limited number of
degrees of freedom.
Model 3 shows that, consistent with institutional anomie theory,
decommodification significantly reduces crime victimization (b = -.071, p = .022). For

each unit increase in the decommodification index, the odds of crime victimization drop

by 7.1%. The cultural measure of importance of being rich and material success has a
negative, significant impact on crime victimization (b = -.707, p = <.001). For each unit
increase in the importance of being rich and material success, there is a 49.3% reduction

in the odds of crime victimization. In other words, more emphasis on the importance of

Table 2- Logistic Regression Results for Full Sample of Nations (N=19), 2002
Variable

Intercept

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Model 5

Model 6

Model 7

Model 8

-1.279

-.347

4.291

4.735

4.023

4.272

4.310

4.035

(.086)

(.151)

(1.010)

(1.059)

(1.113)

(1.024)

(1.031)

(1.067)

.278*

.707*

73.043*

113.868*

55.882*

71.640*

74.414*

56.563*

Across Nations

Decommodification index

(Eurostat)

ean) Cultural importance of
being rich, having money and
expensive things and being
successful (high values=High
importance, ESS)

-.073

-.054

-.084

-.074

-.091

-.072

(.034)

(.034)

(.040)

(.032)

(.044)

(.032)

.929*

.948*

.919*

.928*

.913*

.930*

-.707

-.721

-.682

-.702

-.693

-.675

(.157)

(.151)

(.164)

(.165)

(.159)

(.164)

.493*

.487*

.506*

.496*

.500*

.509*

Level of educational attainment

-.138

(ESS)

(.124)
.871

Family (ESS)
Divorced/Separated rate over all

(2.796)

else

3.729

(Median) Religion (ESS)
Religious attendance levels.

1.316

-.007

(.057)
.993

Family (Eurostat)
Marriage to Divorce ratio for

(.049)

2002

.964

Spending on public education
per capita (Eurostat)

-.036

<.001

(< .001)
1.000

o
On

Table 2- Continued
Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Model 5

Model 6

Model 7

Model 8

Within Country (ESS)

Domicile (size of place of residence,
higher values are smaller places)

Minority

Female

Citizen

Communist Bloc nation

Age 41-60 (Dummy coded) against all
other ages

Age 61-80 (Dummy coded)
Against all other ages

Age 81-highest (Dummy coded) against
all other ages

-.254

-.258

-.258

-.259

-.259

-.259

-.258

(.022)

(.023)

(.023)

(.023)

(.023)

(.023)

(.023)

.776*

.772*

.772*

.772*

.772*

.772*

.772*

-.018

-.018

-.019

-.019

-.019

-.019

-.019

(.079)

(.083)

(.083)

(.083)

(.083)

(.083)

(.083)

.982

.981

.981

.981

.981

.981

.981

-.123

-.125

-.125

-.125

-.125

-.125

-.125

(.039)

(.040)

(.040)

(.040)

(.040)

(.040)

(.040)

.884*

.882*

.882*

.882*

.882*

.882*

.881*

.083

.081

.082

.082

.081

.081

.081

(.116)

(.123)

(.122)

(.122)

(.122)

(.123)

(.123)

1.086

1.085

1.085

1.085

1.085

1.085

1.085

.028

.023

.110

-.036

.019

-.154

.041

(.119)

(.167)

(.160)

(.231)

(.170)

(.037)

(.156)

1.030

1.024

1.116

.965

1.019

.940

1.042

-.151

-.154

-.154

-.154

-.154

-.154

-.154

(.036)

(.037)

(.037)

(.037)

(.037)

(.037)

(.037)

.860*

.858*

.858*

.858*

.858*

.858*

.858*

-.693

-.704

-.704

-.704

-.704

-.704

-.704

(.694)

(.071)

(.070)

(.071)

(.071)

(.071)

(.070)

.500*

.495*

.495*

.495*

.495*

.494*

.495*

-.957

-.969

-.970

-.969

-.969

-.970

-.969

(.134)

(.138)

(.137)

(.138)

(.138)

(.138)

(.137)

.384*

.379*

.379*

.379*

.379*

.379*

.380*

15.05%
ICC

Logit coefficient (standard error) odds ratio.
♦Significant

at p < .10 level, one-tailed test
o
-^1
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being rich and material success decreases the odds of crime victimization, which goes
against institutional anomie theory.

The remaining models in Table 2 show that the results found for the

decommodification index and the cultural measure of being rich and material success

remains statistically significant and of approximately the same magnitude when each of
the other institutional variables is added to the level-2 model. However, none of the

institutional measures for family, education, or religion are statistically significant,
contrary to institutional anomie theory.
In sum, the results for the full set of available nations in 2002 provide partial

support for institutional anomie theory. The odds of crime victimization are reduced
when the polity is strong relative to the economy. However, an over-emphasis on being
rich and material success decreases the odds of crime victimization. This relationship
runs contrary to institutional anomie theory, as an over-emphasis on material success
should increase the likelihood of crime victimization.

Findingsfor 2002 Common Sample ofNations

Table 3 presents the results of the logistic regression for the common sample of
nations in 2002 (N=16). The second data set for 2002 follows the same steps as the full
sample of nations. Model 1 shows that 13.14% of the variation in crime victimization is
between nations, thus showing the need for a multilevel analysis. Just like the first data
set, Model 2 shows the results of the level-1 model. Five of the level-1 variables are

statistically significant. Females were 12.2% less likely to be crime victims than males (b
= -.130, p =.002). Living in smaller places significantly reduced the odds of crime
victimization by 21.0% for every decrease in domicile size (b = -.236, p = <.001).

109

Finally, the dummy coded variable for ages 41 to 60 was significant (b = -.185, p =
<.001), as belonging to this age group reduced the odds of crime victimization by 16.9%.

The second dummy coded age group (ages 61 to 80) reduced the odds of crime
victimization by 53.4% for belonging to this age group (b= -.763, p = <.001). The third

dummy coded age group (ages 81 to highest) reduced the odds of crime victimization by
65.4% for belonging to this age group (b= -1.062, p = <.001). Similarto the full sample
of nations, the remaining independent variables at level 1—minority--, citizen, and living
in a former Soviet Bloc nation—were not statistically significant.

Models 3 through 8 present the results of the level-2 analyses that test institutional

anomie theory, withthe same procedures that were followed in the first data set. Model 3
shows that the decommodification index is a significant predictor of crime victimization
at level-2, with a one unit increase in decommodification decreasing the odds of crime

victimization by 2.7% (b = -.068, p = .199). Contrary to institutional anomie theory, the
cultural measure of being rich and material success has a negative, significant impact on

crime victimization (b = -.677, p = .014). For eachunit increase in the importance of
material success, there is a 49.2% reduction in
the odds of crime victimization. Consistent with the first data set for 2002, the more

emphasis on the importance of being rich and material success has an effect that
decreases the odds of crime victimization.

The remaining models in Table 3 show that the decommodification index has the

expected negative effect on crime victimization only in Models 4 and 5, while the
cultural measure of being rich and material successremains negative, statistically

Table 3- Logistic Regression Results for Common Sample of Nations (N=16), 2002
Variable

Intercept

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Model 5

Model 6

Model 7

Model 8

-1.230

-.294

4.032

4.458

3.668

4.075

4.223

3.727

(.087)

(.174)

(1.708)

(1.603)

(1.806)

(1.719)

(1.822)

(1.756)

.292*

.745*

56.364*

86.345*

39.181*

58.860*

68.267*

41.571*

Across Nations

Decommodification index

(Eurostat)

(Mean) Cultural importance of
being rich, having money and
expensive things and being
successful (high values=High
importance, ESS)
Educational attainment (ESS)

-.067

-.154

-.046

-.032

-.048

-.026

(.041)

(.102)

(.033)

(.032)

(.040)

(.030)

.935

.990

.955*

.969

.953

.974

-.677

-.680

-.652

-.676

-.690

-.637

(.273)

(.248)

(.279)

(.275)

(.287)

(.280)

.508*

.507*

.521*

.509*

.501*

.529*

-.154

(.102)
.857*

Family (ESS)
Divorced/Separated rate over all

2.423

else

11.280

Religion (ESS)
Religious attendance levels.

(2.690)

-.022

(.046)
.978

Family (Eurostat)
Marriage to Divorce ratio for

(.039)

2002

.964

-.037

Spending on public education

<.001

(Eurostat)

(<.001)
1.000

Table 3- Continued

Within Country (ESS)

Model 1

Domicile (size of place of residence,
higher values are smaller places)

Minority

Female

Citizen

Communist Bloc nation

Age 41-60 (Dummy coded) against all
other ages

Age 61-80 (Dummy coded)
Against all other ages

Age 81-highest (Dummy coded) against
all other ages

13.14%
ICC

Logit coefficient (standard error) odds ratio.
♦Significant

at p < .10 level, one-tailed test

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Model 5

Model 6

Model 7

Mod

-.236

-.238

-.238

-.238

-.238

-.238

-.238

(.022)

(.022)

(.022)

(.022)

(.022)

(.022)

(.022)

.790*

.788*

.788*

.788*

.788*

.788*

.788*

-.020

-.020

-.020

-.020

-.020

-.020

-.020

(.090)

(.091)

(.091)

(.091)

(.091)

(091)

(.091)

.980

.981

.980

.981

.981

.981

.980

-.130

-.131

-.132

-.132

-.131

-.131

-.131

(.045)

(.046)

(.046)

(.046)

(.045)

(.046)

(.046)

.878*

.877*

.877*

.877*

.877*

.877*

.877*

.086

.086

.086

.087

.086

.086

.086

(.140)

(.142)

(.142)

(.14)

(.141)

(.142)

(.142)

1.090

1.090

1.090

1.091

1.090

1.090

1.090

-.105

.354

.378

.333

.368

.319

.350

(.109)

(.194)

(.195)

(.219)

(.192)

(.2221)

(.187)

.901

1.425

1.459*

1.394*

1.445*

1.377

1.420

-.185

-.186

-.187

-.187

-.186

-.186

-.186

(.032)

(.033)

(.033)

(.033)

(.033)

(.033)

(.033)

.831*

.830*

.830*

.830*

.830*

.830*

.830*

-.763

-.769

-.770

-.770

-.769

-.770

-.769

(.058)

(.058)

(.058)

(.058)

(.058)

(.058)

(.058)

.466*

.463*

.463*

.463*

.463*

.462*

.463*

-1.062

-1.069

-1.071

-1.070

-1.069

-1.069

-1.069

(.139)

(.139)

(.139)

(.138)

(.138)

(.138)

(.138)

.346*

.343*

.343*

.343*

.343*

.343*

.343*
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significant, and of approximately the same magnitude when each of the other institutional
variables is added to the level-2 model. Only one other institutional variable was

statistically significant when added in with the decommodification index and the cultural
measure of being rich and material success. Consistent with institutional anomie theory,
the ESS measure for educational attainment is a significant predictor at level-2 (b= -.154,

p= .079). For each level increase in educational attainment, there is a 14.3% decrease in
crime victimization.

In sum, the results for the common set of available nations in 2002 provide partial

support for institutional anomie theory. This set of nations does provide more support in
favor institutional anomie than the full sample of nations. The odds of crime

victimization are significantly reduced when the polity is strong relative to the economy

only in Models 3-5. Contrary to institutional anomie theory, over-emphasis on being rich
and material success actually decreases the odds of crime victimization. The ESS

educationpredictor in Model 4 is the only other predictor that is statistically significant.
Findingfor 2004 Full Sample ofNations

The results of the logistic regression for the full sample of nations in 2004

(N=23) are presented in Table 4. The results for 2004 follow the same procedures that
were discussed for the data sets for 2002. Model 1 shows that 11.67% of the variation in

crime victimization is between nations, thus showing the need for a multilevel analysis.

In model 2 of the analysis, seven level-1 variables are statistically significant. First,

females were 4.5% less likely to be crime victims than males (b = -.046, p =.081). Being
a citizen of a country increases the odds of crime victimization by 19.8% (b = .180, p =
.003). The direction of this relationship runs counter to the hypothesis. Not being a
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minority reduces the odds of crime victimization by 17.0% (b = -.187, p = .003). Living
in smaller places (domicile) significantly reduced the odds of crime victimization by
19.0% for every decrease in domicile size (b = -.210, p = <.001). The dummy coded
variable for ages 41 to 60 was significant (b = -.101, p = <.004), as belonging to this age
group reduced the odds of crime victimization by 9.6%. The second dummy coded age
group (ages 61 to 80) reduced the odds of crime victimization by 45.6% for belonging to

this age group (b= -.609, p = <.001). The third dummy coded age group (ages 81 to
highest) reduced the odds of crime victimization by 62.9% for belonging to this age
group (b= -.991, p = <.001). The variable former Soviet Bloc nation was the only
independent variable at level-1 not statistically significant.
The results of the level-2 analyses that test institutional anomie theory are
displayed in Models 3-8 in Table 4. Model 3 shows that the decommodification index is
not statistically significant at level-2. Also, contrary to institutional anomie theory, the

cultural measure of being rich and material success has a negative, significant impact on
crime victimization (b =

-.524, p = .002). For each unit increase in the importance of being rich and material
success, there is a 40.8% reduction in the odds of crime victimization. The more

emphasis on the importance of being rich and material success has an effect that
decreases the odds of crime victimization in this model.

The remaining models in Table 4 show that the cultural measure of being rich

and material success remains statistically significant and of approximately the same
magnitude when each of the other institutional variables is added to the level-2 model.

Unlike like the results in 2002, the decommodification index is not statistically

Table 4- Logistic Regression Results for Full Sample of Nations (N=23), 2004
Variable

Model 1

Intercept

Model 2

Model 3

-1.299

-.486

(-071)

(.111)

.273*

.615*

Model 4

Model 5

Model 6

Model 7

Model 8

2.908

3.612

2.849

2.958

2.899

2.807

(.977)

(.977)

(1.042)

(.973)

(.979)

(1.006)

18.323*

37.057*

17.268*

19.263*

18.162*

16.567*

Across Nations

Decommodification index

(Eurostat)

(Mean) Cultural importance of
being rich, having money and
expensive things and being
successful (high values=High
importance, ESS)
Educational attainment (ESS)

-.011

-.008

-.011

-.009

-.010

-.013

(.027)

(.029)

(.026)

(.027)

(.028)

(.027)

.989

.992

.989

.991

.990

.988

-.524

-.568

-.517

-.538

-.527

-.511

(.149)

(.142)

(.153)

(.150)

(.146)

(.152)

.592*

.566*

.596*

.585*

.590*

.600*

-.150

(.078)
.861*

Family (ESS)
Divorced/Separated rate over all

(1.385)

else

1.214

Religion (ESS)
Religious adherence levels.

.194

.021

(-034)
1.021

Family (Eurostat)
Marriage to Divorce ratio for

(.036)

2002

1.013

.012

Spending on public education

<.001

(Eurostat)

(< .001)
1.000

♦Significant

at p < .10 level, one-tailed test

Logit coefficient (standard error) odds ratio.

ICC

Age 81-highest (Dummy coded) against
all other ages

Age 61-80 (Dummy coded)
Against all other ages

Age 41-60 (Dummy coded) against al
other ages

Communist Bloc nation

Citizen

Female

Minority

Domicile (size of place of residence,
higher values are smaller places)

Within Country (ESS)

Table 4- Continued

11.67%

Model 1

.808*

.808*

.810*

1.198*

1.198*

-.999

(.116)
.368*

-.991

(.116)
.371*

.541*

.544*

-.614

-.614

(.055)

-.609

.903*

.904*

(.054)

.903*

(.038)

.368*

(.114)

-.999

.541*

(.055)

(.038)

-.102

-.101

(.037)

-.102

1.158

1.132

.918

.147

(.122)

.124

(.128)

-.086

(.153)

1.198*

.181

(.066)

.181

(.066)

.180

.368*

(.115)

-.999

.541*

(.055)

-.614

.903*

(.038)

-.102

1.136

(.128)

.127

1.198*

(.065)

.181

.955*

.954*

.955*

.955*

(.065)

(.034)

-.047

(.034)

-.047

-.047

.829*

(.034)

.829*

.830*

-.188

(.068)

-.046

.829*

(.068)

(.067)

.808*

(.019)

-.213

Model 5

(.033)

(.068)

-.188

-.187
-.188

(.019)

-.213

(.019)

-.213

Model 4

-.211

Model 3

(.017)

Model 2

.368*

(.116)

-.999

.541*

(.055)

-.614

.903*

(.038)

-.102

1.134

(.127)

.126

1.199*

(.066)

.181

.954*

(.034)

-.047

.829*

(.068)

-.188

.808*

(.019)

-.213

Mode

.368*

(.114)

-.999

.541*

(.055)

-.614

.903*

(.038)

-.102

1.129

(.127)

.121

1.199*

(.065)

.181

.955*

(.034)

-.047

.829*

(.068)

-.188

.808*

(.019)

-.213

Model 7

.368*

(.115)

-.999

.541*

(.055)

-.614

.903*

(.038)

-.102

1.126

(.125)

.118

1.198*

(.066)

.181

.955*

(.034)

-.047

.829*

(.068)

-.188

.808*

(.019)

-.213

Model 8

<V1
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significant. One other institutional variable was statistically significant when added in
with the decommodification index and the cultural measure of material success. In Model

4, the measure for education strength from the ESS, educational attainment level, was
found to be statistically significant. For each level increase in educational attainment,

there is a 13.9% decrease in crime victimization (b = -.150, p = .035). In sum, the results

for the full set of available nations in 2004 provide little support for institutional anomie
theory. The decommodification index fails to be statistically significant in any of the
models. In addition, contrary to institutional anomie theory, over-emphasis on being rich
and material success actually decreases the odds of crime victimization. The statistically

significant institutional measure for ESS educational attainment provides the only
statistically significant support for institutional anomie theory.
Findingsfor 2004 Common Sample ofNations
The results of the logistic regression for the common sample of nations in 2004
(N=16) are presented below in Table 5. Model 1 shows that 11.53% of the variation in

crime victimization is between nations, satisfying the assumption for a two level model.
In Model 2 of the analysis, seven level-1 variables are statistically significant. First,

females were 7.5% less likely to be crime victims than males (b = -.775, p =.017). Being
a citizen of a country actually increases the odds of crime victimization by 16.1% (b =
.149, p = .042), running counter to the hypothesis. Not being a minority reduces the odds

of crime victimization by 19.8% (b = -.208, p = .006). Living in smaller places
significantly reduced the odds of crime victimization by 17.7% for every decrease in
domicile size (b = -.195, p = <.001). The dummy coded variable for ages 41 to 60 was

significant (b = -.162, p = <.001), as belonging to this age group reduced the odds of
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crime victimization by 15.0%. The second dummy coded age group (ages 61 to 80)
reduced the odds of crime victimization by 49.3% for belonging to this age group (b= .680, p = <.001). Finally, the third dummy coded age group (ages 81 to highest) reduced

the odds of crime victimization by 62.5% for belonging to this age group (b= -.981, p =
<.001). The former Soviet Bloc nation dummy-coded variable was the only level-1
predictor not statistically significant.

The decommodification index is not statistically significant at level-2 in Model 3.

The cultural measure of being rich and material success has a negative, significant impact
on crime victimization (b = -.494, p = .007). For each unit increase in the importance of
being rich and material success, there is a 39.0% reduction in the odds of crime

victimization. The more emphasis on the importance of being rich and material success

has an effect that decreases the odds of crime victimization in this model. Despite being
significant this provides no support in favor of institutional anomie theory.
The remaining models in Table 5 show the cultural measure of being rich and
material success remains statistically significant and of approximately the same
magnitude when each of the other institutional variables is added to the level-2 model.

The decommodification index was not significant in any of the models with level-2
predictors. Two other institutional variables were statistically significant when added in
with the decommodification index and the cultural measure of material success. Model 4

shows that for every level increase in ESS educational attainment (b= -.102, p= .049), the
odds of crime victimization dropped by 9.7%. In Model 5, the ESS family variable is a

significant predictor of crime of variation in crime victimization rates across nations (b=

Table 5- Logistic Regression Results for Common Sample of Nations (N=16), 2004
Variable

Intercept

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Model 5

Model 6

Model 7

Model S

-1.263

-.410

2.727

3.154

2.054

2.693

2.748

2.524

(.839)

(.144)

(1.079)

(1.172)

(1.143)

(1.121)

(1.184)

(1.599)

1.263*

.664*

15.283*

23.422*

7.801*

14.774*

15.617*

12.482*

Across Nations

Decommodification index

(Eurostat)

(Mean) Cultural importance of
being rich, having money and
expensive things and being
successful (high values=High
importance, ESS)
Educational attainment (ESS)

.022

.025

.012

.021

.021

.021

(.028)

(.028)

(.029)

(.028)

(.036)

(.026)

1.022

1.026

1.012

1.021

1.021

1.022

-.494

-.516

-.426

-.486

-.496

-.466

(.172)

(.175)

(.174)

(.184)

(.181)

(.187)

.610*

.597*

.653*

.615*

.609*

.627*

-.102

(.057)
.903*

Family (ESS)
Divorced/Separated rate over all

2.574

else

13.119*

Religion (ESS)
Religious adherence levels.

(1.484)

-.008

(.039)
.992

Family (Eurostat)
Marriage to Divorce ratio for

(.039)

2002

.997

-.003

Spending on public education

<.001

(Eurostat)

(< .001)
1.000
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Within Country (ESS)

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Model 5

Model 6

Model 7

Model 8

Domicile (size of place of residence,

-.195

-.198

-.198
-.198

-.198

-.198

-.198

-.198

higher values aresmaller places)

(.023)

(.023)

(.023)

(.023)

(.023)

(.023)

(.023)

.823*

.821*

.821*

.821*

.821*

.821*

.821*

-.208

-.214
-.214

-.215

(.082)

(.085)

(.084)

-.214
(.084)

-.215
(.085)

-.215
(.085)

-.215
(.085)

.812*

.807*

.807*

.807*

.807*

.807*

.807*

-.077

-.078

-.078

(.036)

(.037)

(.037)

-.078
(.037)

-.078
(.037)

-.078
(.037)

-.078
(.037)

.925*

.925*

.925*

.925*

.925*

.925*

.925*

Minority

Female

Citizen

Communist Bloc nation

.149

.154

.154

(.087)

(.085)

(.085)

.153
(.085)

.154
(.085)

.154
(.085)

.153
(.085)

1.161*

1.167*

1.167*

1.166*

1.166*

1.166*

1.166*

.088

.400

.394
.394

(.152)

(.096)

(.093)

.472
(.111)

.405
(.086)

.402
(.084)

.391
(.090)

1.093

1.491*

1.484*

1.635*

1.499*

1.495*

1.478*

Age41-60 (Dummycoded) against all

-.162

-.164

-.164

-.164

-.164

-.164

-.164

other ages

(.039)

(.040)
(.040)

(.040)
(.040)

(.040)

(.040)

(.040)

(.040)

.850*

.848*

.848*

.848*

.848*

.848*

.848*

Age 61-80 (Dummy coded)

-.680
-680

-.687
-.687

-.687
-.687

-.687

-.687

-.687

-.687

Against all other ages

(.052)
(°52)

(.052)
(052)

(.052)
(.052)

(.052)

(.052)

(.052)

(.052)

.507*

.503*

.503*

.503*

.503*

.503*

.503*

Age 81-highest (Dummy coded) against
all other ages

ICC

-.981

-.982

-.983

-.983

-.982

-.982

-.982

(.132)

(.130)

(.129)

(.130)

(.130)

(.130)

(.130)

.375*

.374*

.374*

.374*

.374*

.374*

.375*

11.53%

Logit coefficient (standard error) odds ratio.
♦Significant

at p < .10 level, one-tailed test

vO
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2.574, p= .054). For every one percent increase in divorces, the odds of crime
victimization increase 1211.9 percent. This agrees with the research hypothesis.
The results for the common set of available nations in 2004 provide little support
for institutional anomie theory, the decommodification index is not statistically
significant in any of the models. Contrary to institutional anomie theory, over-emphasis

on being rich and material success actually decreases the odds of crime victimization.
The statistically significant institutional measure for ESS education strength and ESS
education strength do provide some evidence that is consistent with institutional anomie
theory.

Findings for 2006 Full Sample ofNations

Presented below in Table 6 are the results of the logistic regression for the full
sample of nations available in 2006 (N=20). Model 1 shows that 12.88% of the variation

in crime victimization is between nations. This provides satisfactory evidence that a
second level model is needed. Five level-1 variables are statistically significant for the

full sample of nations in 2006. Being a citizen of a country increases the odds of crime
victimization by 27.2% (b = .240, p = .05). The direction of this relationship actually runs
counter to the hypothesis. The level-1 predictor living in smaller places significantly

reduced the odds of crime victimization by 17.3% for every decrease in domicile size (b
= -.190, p = <.001). The dummy coded variable for ages 41 to 60 was significant (b = .085, p = <.003), as belonging to this age group reduced the odds of crime victimization

by 8.2%. The second dummy coded age group (ages 61 to 80) reduced the odds of crime

victimization by 43.2% for belonging to this age group (b= -.565, p = <.001). Finally, the
third dummy coded age group (ages 81 to highest) reduced the odds of crime

Table 6- Logistic Regression Results for Full Sample of Nations (N=20), 2006
Variable

Intercept

1.978

1.943

2.980

(1.176)

(1.038)

(.830)

6.977*

19.685*

2.020

1.371

2.131

(1.063)

(1.119)

(1.116)

7.536*

3.939

8.426*

7.230*

<.001

-.045

.005

-.002

.032

-.009

(.032)

(.030)

(.032)

(.034)

(.032)

(.031)

1.000

.956*

1.006

.998

1.007

.991

-1.406

-.958

(.079)

(.133)
.384*

Model 8

Model 5

Model 3

.245*

Model 7

Model 6

Model 4

Model 2

Model 1

Across Nations

Decommodification index

(Eurostat)

(Mean) Cultural importance of
being rich, having money and
expensive things and being
successful (high values=High
importance, ESS)
Educational attainment (ESS)

-.469

-.493

-.476

-.456

-.472

-.590

(.167)

(.183)

(.174)

(.206)

(.167)

(.128)

.626*

.611*

.621*

.632*

.624*

.555*

.301

(.078)
1.352*

Family (ESS)
Divorced/Separated rate over all

(2.607)

else

.120

Religion (ESS)
Religious adherence levels.

-2.120

-.011

(.086)
.989

Family (Eurostat)
Marriage to Divorce ratio for

(.046)

2002

1.037

.037

Spending on public education

<-.001

(Eurostat)

(<- .001)
1.000*

to

Table 6- continued

Within Country (ESS)

Model 1

Domicile (size of place of residence,
higher values are smaller places)

Minority

Female

Citizen

Communist Bloc nation

Age 41-60 (Dummy coded) against all
other ages

Age 61-80 (Dummy coded)
Against all other ages

Age 81-highest (Dummy coded) against
all other ages
ICC

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Model 5

Model 6

Model 7

Model 8

-.190

-.192

-.192

-.192

-.192

-.192

-.193

(.019)

(.019)

(.019)

(.019)

(.019)

(.019)

(.019)

.823*

.826*

.825*

.826*

.826*

.825*

.825*

.103

.104

.104

.105

.104

.104

.103

(.115)

(.116)

(.116)

(.115)

(.116)

(.116)

(.118)

1.109

1.109

1.110

1.110

1.110

1.109

1.109

-.003

-.004

-.004

-.004

-.004

-.004

-.004

(.037)

(.038)

(.038)

(.038)

(.038)

(.038)

(.038)

.997

.996

.997

.996

.996

.996

.996

.240

.243

.244

.244

.243

.243

.245

(.093)

(.092)

(.092)

(.092)

(.092)

(.092)

(.092)

1.272*

1.275*

1.276*

1.276*

1.276*

1.276*

1.278*

-.188

.192

-.484

.253

.180

.232

.084

(.170)

(.212)

(.172)

(.227)

(.247)

(.223)

(.202)

.828

1.212

.953

1.288

1.197

1.262

1.088

-.085

-.086

-.086

-.086

-.086

-.086

-.086

(.030)

(.031)

(.031)

(.031)

(.031)

(.031)

(.031)

.918*

.918*

.918*

.918*

.918*

.918*

.917*

-.565

-.569

-.570

-.570

-.569

-.569

-.571

(.069)

(.070)

(.070)

(.070)

(.070)

(.070)

(.070)

.568*

.566*

.566*

.566*

.566*

.566*

.565*

-1.028

-1.035

-1.036

-1.036

-1.035

-1.035

-1.038

(.152)

(.152)

(.154)

(.152)

(.152)

(•152)

(.153)

.378*

.355*

.355*

.355*

.355*

.355*

.354*

12.88%

Logit coefficient (standard error) odds ratio.
♦Significant

at p < .10 level, one-tailed test
to
to
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victimization by 62.2% for belonging to this age group (b=-1.028, p = <.001). The
variables former Soviet Bloc nation, female, and minority, all independent variables at
level-1, were not statistically significant.
Model 3 shows that the decommodification index is not statistically significant at

level-2. Also, contrary to institutional anomie theory, the cultural measure of material

success has a negative, significant impact on crime victimization (b = -.469, p = .07). For
each unit increase in the importance of being rich and material success, there is a 37.4%
reduction in the odds of crime victimization. The more emphasis on the importance of

being rich and material success has an effect that decreases the odds of crime
victimization in this model.

The remaining models in Table 6 show that the cultural measure of material
success remains statistically significant and of approximately the same magnitude when
each of the other institutional variables is added to the level-2 model. The

decommodification index was only significant and negative at level-2 in Model 4. Two
other institutional variables were statistically significant when added in with the
decommodification index and the cultural measure of being rich and material success.

The ESS education measure was a statistically significant institutional measure (b= .301,

p= .001). For every level increase in education attainment the odds ofcrime victimization
increase by 35.2%, thus running contrary to institutional anomie theory. Model 8 includes
the measure for Eurostat education spending per capita in 2006 (b= <.001, p= .025). For

every dollar increase ineducation spending, there is a less than a .01% odds decrease in
crime victimization.
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The results for the full set of available nations in 2006 provide almost no support
for institutional anomie theory. The odds of crime victimization are reduced when the

polity is strong relative to the economy in only one of the models (Model 4).
Contradictory to institutional anomie theory, over-emphasis on being rich and material
success actually decreases the odds of crime victimization. The education measure from

the European Social Survey provides contradictory support against institutional anomie

theory. The statistically significant institutional measure for education spending from
Eurostat does provide only other institutional support for the theory at level-2.
Findingsfor 2006 Common Sample ofNations

Shown in Table 7 are the results of the logistic regression for the common sample
of nations in 2006 (N=16). Model 1 shows that 11.19% of the variation in crime

victimization is betweennations, giving evidencethat a second level analysis is
warranted. In Model 2, six level-1 variables are statistically significant for the common
sample of nations in 2006. Being a citizen of a country significantly increases the odds of

crime victimizationby 28.9% (b = .254, p = .007). The direction of this relationship
actually runs counter to the hypothesis. For every unit decrease in domicile size the odds

of crime victimization by 17.5% for every decrease in domicile size (b = -.193, p =
<.001). Being a member of a former soviet bloc nation significantly decreases the odds of

crime victimization by 39.0% (b = -.494, p = <.001). The age group 41 to 60 was
significant (b = -.083, p = <.007), as belonging to this age group reduced the odds of

crime victimizationby 7.9%. The second dummy coded age group (ages 61 to 80)
reduced the odds of crime victimization by 45.2% for belonging to this age group (b= .602, p = <.001). Finally, the third dummy coded age group (ages 81 to highest) reduced
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the odds of crime victimization by 66.3% for belonging to this age group (b= -1.086, p =
<.001). The variables female and minority were not statistically significant.

Models 3 through 8 present the results of the level-2 analyses that test institutional
anomie theory, with the same procedures that were followed in the first data set. Contrary

to institutional anomie theory, the cultural measure of being rich and material success in

Model 3 has a negative, significant impact on crime victimization (b = -.318, p = .032).
For each unit increase in the importance of being rich and material success, there is a
27.3% reduction in the odds of crime victimization. The more emphasis on the

importance of being rich and material success has an effect that actually decreases the
odds of crime victimization in this model. The decommodification index was not

significant in Model 3.

The remaining models in Table 7 show that the cultural measure of material

success remain statistically significant and of approximately the same magnitude when
each of the other institutional variables is added to the level-2 model. The

decommodification index was significant only in Model 7 at level-2, however its effect

was positive rather than the negative effect expected by institutional anomie theory. Two
other institutional variables were statistically significant when added in with the
decommodification index and the cultural measure of being rich and material success.

The ESS education measure was statistically significant in Model 4. For every level
increase in education attainment the likelihood of crime victimization actually increased
by 25.5% (b = .227, p = .001). Model 8 includes the statistically significant measure for

education spending from Eurostat in 2006. For every increase in education spending the

odds likelihood of crime victimizationwere reduced <.01% (b = <-.001, p = .04).

Table 7- Logistic Regression Results for Common Sample of Nations (N=16), 2006
Variable

Intercept

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Model 5

Model 6

Model 7

Model 8

-1.376

-.834

1.161

.574

1.115

1.198

1.077

2.399

(.083)

(.133)

(.972)

(1.128)

(.981)

(1.108)

(.920)

(.844)

.253*

.434*

3.193

1.775

3.051

3.315

2.937

11.014*

Across Nations
Decommodification index

(Eurostat)

(Mean) Cultural importance of
being rich, having money and
expensive things and being
successful (high values=High
importance, ESS)
Educational attainment (ESS)

.022

<.001

.022

.025

.028

<.001

(-024)

(.021)

(.025)

(.022)

(.019)

(.020)

1.022

1.001

1.022

1.025

1.029*

1.000

-.318

-.325

-.319

-.328

-.317

-.484

(.157)

(.171)

(.156)

(.200)

(.154)

(.123)

.727*

.723*

.727*

.720*

.728*

.617*

.227

(.057)
1.255*

Family (ESS)
Divorced/Separated rate over all

(3.196)

else

4.079

Religion (ESS)
Religious adherence levels.

1.406

.011

(.077)
1.011

Family (Eurostat)
Marriage to Divorce ratio for

(-047)

2002

1.032

.031

Spending on public education

<-.001

(Eurostat)

(< .001)
1.000*
to

Table 7- continued

Within Country (ESS)

Model 1

Domicile (size of place of residence,
higher values are smaller places)

Minority

Female

Citizen

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Model 5

Model 6

Model 7

Mode

-.193

-.194

-.194

-.194

-.194

-.194

-.195

(.021)

(.021)

(021)

(.021)

(.021)

(-021)

(.021)

.825*

.824*

.823*

.824*

.824*

.824*

.823*

.041

.042

.042

.042

.042

.042

.042

(.096)

(.097)

(.098)

(.097)

(.097)

(.097)

(.100)

1.041

1.043

1.043

1.043

1.043

1.043

1.043

-.026

-.026

-.026

-.026

-.026

-.026

-.027

(.042)

(-042)

(.042)

(.042)

(.042)

(-042)

(.043)

.974

.974

.974

.974

.974

.974

.974

.254

.255

.256

.256

.255

.256

.258

(.103)

(.102)

(.103)

(.102)

(.102)

(.102)

(.103)

1.289*

1.291*

1.291*

1.291*

1.291*

1.291*

1.294*

-.494

-.209

-.306

-.295

-.199

-.179

-.311

(.086)

(.137)

(.134)

(.228)

(.173)

(.154)

(-091)

.610*

.811*

.737*

.745

.920

.836

.733*

Age 41-60 (Dummy coded) against all

-.083

-.083

-.084

-.083

-.083

-.083

-.084

other ages

(.033)

(.034)

(.034)

(.033)

(.034)

(.033)

(.034)

.921*

.920*

.920*

.920*

.920*

.920*

.920*

Communist Bloc nation

Age 61-80 (Dummy coded)
Against all other ages

Age 81-highest (Dummy coded) against
all other ages
ICC

-.602

-.606

-.606

-.606

-.605

-.606

-.608

(.071)

(.071)

(.072)

(.071)

(.071)

(071)

(.072)

.548*

.546*

.545*

.546*

.546*

.546*

.545*

-1.086

-1.093

-1.094

-1.093

-1.093

-1.093

-1.096

(.168)

(.168)

(.169)

(.167)

(.168)

(.167)

(.171)

.337*

.335*

.335*

.335*

.335*

.335*

.334*

11.19%

Logit coefficient (standard error) odds ratio.
♦Significant

at p < .10 level, one-tailed test
to
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The results for the common set of nations for 2006 provide almost no support for
institutional anomie theory; most significant results ran contrary to the theory. The

decommodification index was only significant in Model 7 but the direction of the effect is
contrary to institutional anomie theory. Also going against institutional anomie theory,
over-emphasis on being rich and material success actually decreases the odds of crime
victimization. The education measure from the European Social Survey increases the
odds of crime victimization which is not consistent with institutional anomie theory.

Findingsfor 2008 Full Sample ofNations

Represented below in Table 8 are the results of the logistic regression for the full
sample of nations available in 2008 (N=22). Model 1 shows that 17.57% of the variation
in crime victimization is between nations, thus showing the need for a multilevel

analysis. In Model 2, five level-1 variables are statistically significant for the full sample
of nations in 2008. The dummy variable communist nations was significant (b=-.481, p=
.001). Respondents belonging to former communist countries are 38.2% less likely to be
the victims of crimes. For every unit decrease domicile size the odds of crime

victimization by 16.9% for every decrease in domicile size (b = -.185, p = <.001). Being
a female reduced the odds of crime victimization by 6.2% (b=

-.020, p = .013). The dummy coded age group ages 61 to 80 reduced the odds of crime
victimization by 41.0% for belonging to this age group (b= -.528, p = <.001). Finally, the
dummy coded age group ages 81 to highest reduced the odds of crime victimization by
61.9% for belonging to this age group (b= -.963, p = <.001). Citizen of a country,
minority, and the dummy coded variable for ages 41 to 60 were not statistically
significant.

Table 8- Logistic Regression Results for Full Sample of Nations (N=22), 2008
Variable

Intercept

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Model 5

Model 6

Model 7

Model 8

-1.557

-.855

1.435

1.004

1.239

.918

1.421

1.362

(.091)

(.150)

(.765)

(.851)

(.812)

(.836)

(.775)

(.719)

.211*

.425*

4.199*

2.730

3.453*

2.503

4.140*

3.902*

Across Nations

Decommodification index

(Eurostat)

(Mean) Cultural importance of
being rich, having money and
expensive things and being
successful (high values=High
importance, ESS)
Educational attainment (ESS)

-.013

-.009

-.019

.003

-.013

-.016

(.027)

(.028)

(.028)

(.032)

(.027)

(.029)

.987

.991

.981

1.003

.987

.984

-.353

-.357

-.337

-.229

-.368

-.345

(.124)

(.124)

(.125)

(.152)

(.113)

(.119)

.703*

.699*

.714*

.795*

.692*

.708*

.163

(.069)
1.177*

Family (ESS)
Divorced/Separated rate over all

2.679

else

14.577

Religion (ESS)
Religious adherence levels.

(2.649)
-.130

(.074)
.878*

Family (Eurostat)
Marriage to Divorce ratio for

(.071)

2002

1.046

.045

Spending on public education

<.001

(Eurostat)

(< .001)
1.000

Table 8- continued

Within Country (ESS)

Model 1

Domicile (size of place of residence,
higher values are smaller places)

Minority

Female

Citizen

Communist Bloc nation

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Model 5

Model 6

Model 7

Model 8

-.185

-.186

-.187

-.187

-.187

-.186

-.186

(.024)

(.024)

(.024)

(-024)

(-024)

(.024)

(.024)

.831*

.830*

.830*

.830*

.830*

.830*

.830*

.020

.020

.020

.019

.020

.020

.020

(.081)

(.081)

(.081)

(.081)

(.080)

(.081)

(.081)

1.020

1.020

1.020

1.020

1.020

1.020

1.020

-.064

-.064

-.064

-.064

-.064

-.064

-.064

(.029)

(.029)

(.029)

(.029)

(.029)

(.029)

(.029)

.938*

.938*

.938*

.938*

.938*

.938*

.938*

.096

.095

.095

.096

.096

.095

.095

(.084)

(.085)

(.085)

(.084)

(.084)

(.084)

(.085)

1.100

1.100

1.100

1.100

1.100

1.100

1.100

-.481

-.108

-.107

-.107

-.221

-.089

-.121

(.145)

(.209)

(.201)

(.200)

(.213)

(.213)

(.195)

.618*

.898

.899

.899

.801

.915

.886

Age 41-60 (Dummy coded) against all

-.023

-.023

-.023

-.023

-.023

-.023

-.023

other ages

(.035)

(.035)

(.035)

(.035)

(.035)

(.035)

(.035)

.977

.977

.977

.977

.977

.977

.977

Age 61-80 (Dummy coded)
Against all other ages

Age 81-highest (Dummy coded) against
all other ages

-.528

-.532

-.533

-.532

-.533

-.532

-.532

(.078)

(.078)

(.079)

(.078)

(.078)

(.078)

(.078)

.590*

.587*

.587*

.587*

.587*

.587*

.587*

-.963

-.968

-.970

-.968

-.970

-.969

-.969

(.147)

(.143)

(.144)

(.143)

(.143)

(.143)

(.143)

.381*

.380*

.380*

.380*

.379*

.380*

.380*

17.57%
ICC

Logit coefficient (standard error) odds ratio.
♦Significant

at p < .10 level, one-tailed test

O
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Models 3 through 8 present the results of the level-2 analyses that test institutional
anomie theory, with the same procedures that were followed in the first data set. Model 3
shows that the decommodification index is not statistically significant at level-2. Also,

contrary institutional anomie theory, the cultural measure of being rich and material
success has a negative, significant impact on crime victimization (b = -.353, p = .06). For

each unit increase in the importance of being rich and material success, there is a 29.7%
reduction in the odds of crime victimization. The more emphasis on the importance of

being rich and material success has an effect that decreases the odds of crime
victimization in this model.

The remaining models in Table 8 show that the results found the cultural measure

of being rich and material success remained statistically significant and of approximately
the same magnitude when each of the other institutional variables is added to the level-2
model. The decommodification index was not significant in any of the models with level-

2 predictors. Two other institutional variables were statistically significant when added in
with the decommodification index and the cultural measure of being rich and material

success. The ESS education measure shows that for every level increase in education
attainment the odds of crime victimization increase by 17.7%, thus running contrary to

institutional anomie theory (b = .163, p = .015). Model 6 includes the statistically

significant measure for religiosity in 2008. For every increase in religious attendance the
odds of crime victimization were reduced 12.2% (b = .130, p = .043). This finding is
consistent with the research hypothesis.
The results for the full set of available nations in 2008 provide almost no support

for institutional anomie theory. As with most of the other findings, the
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decommodification index is statistically significant in none of the models. Contrary to

institutional anomie theory, over-emphasis on being rich and material success actually
decreases the odds of crime victimization. The statistically significant institutional

measure for religious attendance from Eurostat does provide support for institutional
anomie theory. However, the education measure from the European Social Survey

provides contradictory evidence for institutional anomie theory.
Findings for 2008 CommonSample ofNations

Table 9 results of the logistic regression for the common sample of nations in
2008 (N=16). Model 1 shows that 13.60% of the variation in crime victimization is

between nations, thus showing the need for a multilevel analysis. Six level-1 predictors
are significant at in Model 2. Belonging to a former communist bloc nation decreases the
odds of crime victimization by 46.5% (b= -.626, p= <.001). For every unit decrease in
domicile size the odds of crime victimization by decrease 18.7% (b = -.207, p = <.001).
Being a female reduced the odds of crime victimization by 4.7% (b= -.048, p = .025).

Being a citizen of country increases the odds of crime victimization by 19.7% (b= .179,
b= .018). The dummy coded age group ages 61 to 80 reduced the odds of crime

victimization by 46.9% for belonging to this age group (b= -.634, p = <.001). Finally, the
dummy coded age group ages 81 to highest reduced the odds of crime victimization by
68.3% for belonging to this age group (b= -1.148, p = <.001).The variables minority and
the dummy coded age variable for ages 61 to 80 were not statistically significant.
Models 3 through 8 present the results of the level-2 analyses that test institutional

anomie theory, with the same procedures that were followed in the first data set. Model 3
shows that the decommodification index is significant, but not in the hypothesized

Table 9. Logistic Regression Results for Common Sample of Nations (N=16), 2008
Variable

Intercept

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Model 5

Model 6

Model 7

Model 8

-1.443

-.725

2.048

1.706

1.966

1.795

1.882

1.780

(.100)

(.084)

(1.020)

(1.131)

(1.040)

(1.192)

(.946)

(.968)

.236*

.484*

7.754*

5.504*

9.701*

6.020*

6.564*

5.931*

Across Nations

Decommodification index

(Eurostat)

.030

.016

.032

.017

.038

.037

(.018)

(.018)

(.018)

(.023)

(.018)

(.020)

1.031*

1.016

1.033*

1.018

1.057*

1.037

Cultural importance of being

-.439

-.450

-.439

-.379

-.434

-.402

rich, having money and

(.160)

(.172)

(.160)

(.208)

(.148)

(.151)

expensive things (high
values=High importance, ESS)

.645*

.638*

.645*

.685*

.648*

.669*

.150

Educational attainment (ESS)

(.066)
1.162*

Family (ESS)

2.272

Divorced/Separated rate over all

(2.031)

else

9.701

Religion (ESS)

-.058

Religious adherence levels.

(.082)
.944

Family (Eurostat)

.056

Marriageto Divorce ratio for

(.032)

2002

1.057*

Spending on public education

<.001

(Eurostat)

(< .001)
1.000

Table 9- continued

Within Country (ESS)

Model 1

Domicile (size of place of residence,
higher values are smaller places)

Minority

Female

Citizen

Communist Bloc nation

Age 41-60 (Dummy coded) against all
other ages

Age 61-80 (Dummy coded)
Against all other ages

Age 81-highest (Dummy coded) against
all other ages

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Model 5

Model 6

Model 7

Mode

-.207

-.208

-.209

-.209

-.208

-.208

-.208

(.022)

(.022)

(.022)

(.022)

(.022)

(.022)

(.022)

.813*

.812*

.812*

.812*

.812*

.812*

.812*

-.021

-.020

-.021

-.020

-.020

-.019

-.020

(.086)

(.084)

(.084)

(.083)

(.084)

(.083)

(.084)

.980

.980

.981

.980

.981

.981

.980

-.048

-.048

-.048

-.049

-.048

-.048

-.049

(.025)

(.025)

(.026)

(.025)

(.025)

(.025)

(.025)

.953*

.953*

.953*

.953*

.953*

.953*

.953*

.179

.180

.180

.181

.180

.180

.180

(.086)

(.086)

(.086)

(.084)

(.085)

(.086)

(.086)

1.197*

1.197*

1.198*

1.198*

1.197*

1.197*

1.197*

-.626

-.140

-.126

-.193

-.210

-.111

-.147

(.091)

(.158)

(.164)

(.193)

(.224)

(.159)

(.157)

.535*

.869

.882

.825

.811

.895

.864

-.038

-.038

-.038

-.038

-.038

-.038

-.038

(.040)

(.040)

(.040)

(.040)

(.040)

(.040)

(.040)

.963

.963

.963

.963

.963

.963

.963

-.634

-.639

-.639

-.639

-.639

-.640

-.640

(.077)

(.077)

(.077)

(.077)

(.077)

(.077)

(.077)

.531*

.528*

.528*

.528*

.528*

.527*

.528*

-.1.148

-.1.156

-.1.156

-.1.156

-.1.156

-.1.157

-.1.157

(.138)

(.136)

(.136)

(.135)

(.135)

(.135)

(.135)

.317*

.315*

.315*

.315*

.315*

.315*

.315*

13.60%
ICC

Logit coefficient (standard error) odds ratio.
♦Significant

at p < .10 level, one-tailed test

4^
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direction (b = .030, p = .060) A one unit increase in the index results in a 3.1 percent

increase in the odds of crime victimization, statistically significant in models Also,
contrary to institutional anomie theory, the cultural measure of being rich and material
success has a negative, significant impact on crime victimization (b = -.439, p = .009).
For each unit increase in the importance of being rich and material success, there is a

35.5% reduction in the odds of crime victimization. The more emphasis on the
importance of being rich and material success has an effect that decreases the odds of
crime victimization in this model.

The remaining models in Table 9 show that the results found for the cultural

measure of material success remain statistically significant and of approximately the
same magnitude when each of the other institutional variables is added to the level-2

model. The decommodification index was significant in models 5 and 7 with other level2 predictors. This does not yield support for institutional anomie theory, as the
relationship in a direction (positive) that is not supportive of the theory. One other

institutional variable was statistically significant when added in with the
decommodification index and the cultural measure of being rich and material success.
Displayed in Model 4, the ESS education measure was a statistically significant. For
every level increase in education attainment the odds of crime victimization increase by
16.2%, thus running contrary to institutional anomie theory (b = .150, p =.021).
In sum, the results from this study mostly fail to support the hypotheses derived

from institutional anomie theory. In the final chapter I will summarize the results, offer

some plausible explanations for why the results of this study fail to support institutional
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anomie theory, discuss some of the limitations of the study, and suggest avenues for
future investigation.
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CHAPTER VI

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

Summary and Implications ofResults

Presented below in Table 10 is a summary of the results of this study. This

includes both the data sets from the common sample of nations and the full sample of

nations for all years. Each variable from each data set has either an "S" for significant or
a "NS" for not significant. For every model that is significant there is either a "+" for a
positive relationship or a "-" for a negative relationship.
The most consistent result found over time in this study is the high importance of

materialistic values having a negative effect on crime victimization across nations. This
goes directly against the research hypothesis that an emphasis on the importance of
materialistic values should increase crime victimization. Previous tests of institutional

anomie theory have by no means been consistent in their findings when testing the

importance of materialistic values and rates of crime and other deviant behaviors.
Presented in the literature review chapter are four examples of different findings when

testing institutional anomie theory with the incorporation of the importance of
materialistic values.

Jensen (2002) found that the United States, which has always had much higher
crime rates than most every other advanced nations, had a very low ranking with regards
to emphasis on material possessions as a good thing. This also reflects a negative

relationship between crime rates and importance of materialistic values. However, the
study by Cullen et al. (2004) found theoretical support for two of their cultural

Table 10. Summary of Findings for Common Set of Nations (N=16)f and Full Set of Nations Available for Each Year (N=19-23)

tt

Across Nations

2002

2004

2006

2008

2002

2004

2006

2008

(Level 2)

N=16

N=16

N=16

N=16

N=19

N=23

N=23

N=22

Decommodification

-S(3-5)

NS

+S(7 only)

+8(3,5,7)

-S

NS

-S (4 only)

NS

Cultural Structure

-S

-S

-S

-S

-s

-S

-S

-S

Education (ESS)
Family (ESS)
Religion (ESS)
Family (Eurostat)

-s

-S

+S

+s

NS

-S

+S

+S

NS

+s

NS

NS

NS

NS

NS

NS

NS

NS

NS

NS

NS

NS

NS

-s

NS

NS

NS

+S

NS

NS

NS

NS

NS

NS

-S

NS

NS

NS

-S

NS

Domicile

-S

-S

-S

-S

-S

-S

-s

-S

Minority

NS

-S

NS

NS

NS

-S

NS

NS

Female

-S

-s

NS

-S

-S

-S

NS

-S

Citizen

NS

+s

+S

+s

NS

+s

+S

NS

+S(4-6)

+S(3-8)

-S (2-4,8)

-S(2 only)

NS

NS

NS

-S (2 only)

-S

-S

-S

NS

-S

-s

-s

NS

-S

-S

-S

-S

-S

-s

-s

-S

-S

-S

-S

-S

-S

-s

-s

-S

Index

Education

(Eurostat)

Within Nations

(Level 1)

Communist Bloc

Age 41-60
Age 61-80
Age 81+

fThese nations are Belgium, Switzerland, Germany, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, United Kingdom, Hungary, Ireland, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Sweden, and
Slovenia.

+tThese nations are 2002: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Germany, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, United Kingdom, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Netherlands, Poland,
Portugal, Sweden, Slovenia, Switzerland, and Norway.

2004: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia,
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Iceland, Norway, and Switzerland.

2006: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, United
Kingdom, Norway, and Switzerland.

2008: Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia,
Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, Norway, and Switzerland.
oo
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hypotheses. They found that "the stronger the universalism values in a nation, the greater
the willingness of its managers to justify ethically suspect behaviors" (2004:413-15).

Cullen et al. also found that "the stronger the pecuniary materialism values in a nation,
the greater the willingness of its managers to justify ethically suspect behaviors"
(2004:413-15). Their study does attempt to explain cross-national differences by using
multilevel modeling. The study does use unethical behavior as the outcome variable,

which may explain the differences in results from the current study and what Jensen also
found. In another test of institutional anomie theory, Stults and Baumer (2008) found an
indirect positive relationship between homicide rates and strong commitment to monetary

success paired with weak commitment to legitimate means. Muftic (2006) found
inconclusive findings of the effects of the "American Dream" on the dependent variable,
cheating behavior. Although their study only looks at one setting or subpopulation within
the United States, the university, they bring up a concept that may be very relevant to this
study. This is the idea that not every American buys into the concept of the "American
Dream" and a culture that places materialistic values very high.
When taking into consideration the results of the current study, it would be hard
to come to the conclusion that the importance of materialistic values in European
countries has reached a point that was theorized by Messner and Rosenfeld. However,

this does not eliminate the possibility that they could reach these levels in the future. The
results for the full sample of nations show that the effect of materialistic values on crime
victimization diminished over time from 49.2% in 2002 35.5% in 2008. The same

downward trend is seen in the results for the common sample of nations with a 50.7%

decrease in crime victimization seen in 2002, but only a 29.7% decrease in 2008. This
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could very well be a sign that European countries are experiencing a change that is seeing
more neoliberal values become precedent. This change could ultimately lead towards a
relationship between materialistic values and crime victimization that is in the predicted
theoretical direction.

One major limitation in the items used to measure the importance of materialism
is that they do not cover every aspect of the "American Dream." The two items used were
the only items available in the European Social Survey that could capture the importance
of materialistic values. Other survey questions that could have helped strengthen the
measure would be questions asking about the importance of achieving success or

becoming rich on one's own. Another question that would help strengthen the item used

in the study would be a something asking about how important achievement in the work
place is in determining a person's worth. Adding these two measures to the items used in
the present study could greatly increase the overall validity of the measure and thus
would increase the confidence in the results. Another possible limitation is that

materialist cultural values may explain changes in crime victimization within and
between countries over time rather than between countries at specific points in time as
was examined in the present study.

The decommodification index is one of the key variables originally used by

Messner and Rosenfeld (1997) in testing institutional anomie theory. The research
hypothesis is that higher decommodification scores would result in lower levels of crime
victimization across nations. Tthis study failed to yield any conclusive results that would

support the research hypothesis. In the common set of nations, the decommodification
index was significant and negative as expected in the year 2002. Following 2002, the next
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three years examined yielded results that do not provide a clear trend with significant
results often in the opposite direction of what was originally hypothesized.
Messner and Rosenfeld (1997) found a significant relationship in the

hypothesized direction between decommodification and homicide. Although, this study

conceptualized decommodification the same way as Messnerand Rosenfeld, the sample,
dependentvariable, method of analyzing the data, and years examined were much
different. This is likely the reason why there is a difference in the results. Savolaninen

(2000) used a very similar sample and method as Messner and Rosenfeld (1997) and also
had results that were very supportive of the researchhypothesis. Jensen (2002) found no

significant results between decommodification and crime rates. Freichs, Munch, and
Monika (2008) also had results that did not support the research hypothesis and had
results that ran contrary to the hypothesis as was found in the present study.

Forthe European Social Survey measure for familial strength, it was hypothesized
that a higher ratio of divorce and separated would result in higher rates of crime
victimization. Overall, this variable provided little support for the research hypothesis.

The only supportive finding was for the common set of nations in 2004 where there was a

positive significant relationship.

The Eurostat measure for familial strength also does

notprovide support for the research hypothesis. It was hypothesized that a higher ratio of
marriage to divorce would result in lowerlevelsof crime victimization. The only
significant effect of this variable was for the common set of nations in 2008, however, the
effect was positive rather than negative.

Other studies such as Chamlin and Cochran (1995), Maume and Lee (2003), and

Kim and Pridemore (2005a) are good examples of studies that had significant results
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between strength of the family and the dependent variable. In each of these studies the
divorce rate was used much like in the Eurostat measure used in the current study.

Throughout all of the studies, most had familial measures that had significant results in
some of their models. However, this current study varies in methods from most models,

as well as the dependent variable. Almost all of the studies use the individual as the unit
of analysis for measure family, while the nation is the unit of analysis in this study.
The ESS educational attainment measure in this study was hypothesized to have a

negative effect on levels of crime victimization. For the common sample of nations,
educational attainment rates are in the hypothesized direction in 2002 and 2004. After
2004 the relationship flips to the opposite direction in 2006 and 2008. Thus, a clear

direction or pattern was not found that would not be supportive of institutional anomie
theory.

The Eurostat measure of education spending was hypothesized to have a negative

relationship with crime victimization rates. For both the common set of nations and the
full set of nations, the expected statistically significant negative relationship only occurs

in 2006, while the relationship is nonsignificant in all other years. Overall, the results do
not follow a consistent pattern that would be supportive of institutional anomie theory. A
better potential measure that could have been used is education spending as a percentage
of the GDP.

In the literature, the impact of education on crime/deviance was not tested until

Cullen et. al (2004), where they derived an educational attainment measure similar to the
one in this study. Schoepfer and Piquero (2006) found that their measure of education

was significant. Kim and Pridemore (2006b) found no significant results when testing an
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interaction term of education and socioeconomic change on the dependent variables

armed robbery and robbery rates. Baumer and Gustafson (2007) found no statistical
support for their measure of education on the dependent variable. Like many of the other
measures used, this shows that results vary greatly depending on the way education was
measured and what was used as a dependent variable.
The final institutional measure that was tested in this study was the European

Social Survey item on religious attendance/involvement. A negative relationship was

expected between this measure of religion and crime victimization. However, the only

negative statistically significant effect for this variable was found in 2008 for the full set
of countries, while the relationship was nonsignifiant in all other cases. The main reason
for the null results could be the use of the median instead of the mean as the measure of

central tendency. The median was used as the measure of religious attendance was based

on a 7-point Likertscale. This created a situation where most scores fell into a middle
score such as a 3 or 4, hence there was little variability in the measure.

Previous studies such as Chamlin and Cochran (1995) found that higher levels of

church membership had a negative effect on the criminogenic effects of poverty on
economic crime. Jensen (2002) also found that his measure of religion was also a

significant negative predictor of crimerates. Baumer and Gustafson (2007) did not find
any support between religious adherence rates and the dependent variable. Religion is a
measure that has seldom been used in past studies.
Limitations

Overall, level-2 predictors provide little evidence that institutional anomie

explains variation in rates of crime victimizationacross nations. The first major limitation
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of this study is the sample size at level-2. The largest sample size for any of the data sets
is small for a two level hierarchical linear modeling project (N= 23), while the common

set of nations is much smaller (N= 16). Generally, the higher the sample size, the higher
the statistical power a significance test has. With such small sample sizes, one cannot

completely be certain of the veracity of the results in this study. The small sample sizes
alone may account for the lack of statistically significant findings in this study. Although
data for more countries was initially available from the ESS, missing data for entire
questions for certain countries meant that they had to be removed in the multilevel
analysis due to the list-wise deletion function.

A limitation in past research was the lack of use of survey research in previous
tests of institutional anomie theory. This study attempted to fill this gap in previous
research by using survey data to construct institutional measures. However, the
researcher was limited to the survey questions available in the ESS to capture the strength
of social institutions. Due to a lack of previous use of survey data, it is difficult to tell if
the items used in the current study are valid measures of the strength of institutions and
their effect on the economy.
Future Research and Conclusion

This study set out to test institutional anomie theory using crime victimization
rates of assault or burglary over the past 5 years as a dependent variable. Because
quantitative research on institutional anomie theory has traditionally used measures such
as murder, theft, or burglary rates calculated over specific geographic aggregates, this

study provides new evidence on whether or not less established measures can be used as
the dependent variable. Although most of the findings were not statistically significant at
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level-2, it would be interesting to see if future research would have different results if a
larger sample of countries was used.

Beyond just a larger sample size, future research could take advantage of more

rounds of data from the European Social Survey. The European Social Survey will be
releasing their 2010 round in the near future. Other techniques such as time-series

analysis should also be considered. This type of technique allows a researcher to actually
test whether institutional strength measures can account for changes over time in crime
victimization within countries.

Besides just the dependent variable, all but three of the variables from both levels
of analysis came from survey data. The use of survey data for constructing measures of

social structure is an option that has not be used in most studies. Taking advantage of
other survey sources could allow for different options for measures of institutions. Tied in
with this, I believe it is critical that future studies on institutional anomie theory should

take the cultural aspect of the theory into consideration. This is a critical part of

institutional anomie theory that is has not been given much consideration in past studies,

possibly due to the difficultly in creating measures that have high validity. I believe
surveys are an important vehicle for creating measures that tap into the cultural
importance of money, success, possessions, and individualism. Surveys allow a

researcher to directly ask how important these are to individuals within a given nation or
other aggregated unit of analysis.

In the end, the lack of support found in this study for key hypotheses of
institutional anomie theory might just be because it is a theory, like Merton's anomie
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theory before it, that was developed based on U.S. historical experience. As Jock Young
(2011:80) reminds us, the United States

... is extremely atypical in terms of the majority of advanced industrial countries
...[in] its lack of social democratic politics, its meager welfare state, its extremely
high commitment to the American Dream version of meritocracy, its high
emphasis on formal legal equality as an ideal, its remarkable ethnic pluralism, the
extent and range of organized crime, the extent of ghettoization, etc.... All of
these factors are likely to have a profound effect on the theory generated in such a
society... There is no doubt that the United States has, in the twentieth century,
produced many important developments in theoretical criminology. It is to argue,
however, that these theories cannot be merely transplanted to, say, a European
context; they have to be transposed carefully.

Thus, simply testing institutional anomie theory without modification in the European
context may be responsible for the weak-to-nil findings in the present study. This issue
should be addressed in future studies that attempt testing the theory using countries that
differ substantially from the United States.
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